Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

acceptedVersion

Publication Date

3-2019

Abstract

We examine the association between corporate tax aggressiveness and theprofitability of insider trading under the assumption that insider tradingprofits reflect managerial opportunism. We document that insider purchaseprofitability, but not sales profitability, is significantly higher on average inmore tax aggressive firms. We also find that the positive association between taxaggressiveness and insider purchase profitability is attenuated for firms withmore effective monitoring and is accentuated for firms with a more opaqueinformation environment.In addition, we provide empirical evidence that tax aggressiveness issignificantly associated with greater insider sales volume in the fiscal yearprior to a stock price crash. Finally, we find that the association between taxaggressiveness and insider purchase profitability weakens after theintroduction of FIN 48, consistent with the increased transparency of taxpositions under the new disclosure requirement reducing insiders’ informationadvantage and hence their ability to profit from insider trading. To the extent that insider trading profitsreflect managerial opportunism, our results are consistent with managersexploiting the opacity arising from tax aggressive activities to extract rentfrom shareholders, particularly those who sold their shares to the managers. Ourfindings are particularly important in light of the number of studies relyingon the agency view of tax avoidance to develop arguments or to drawinferences.

Keywords

Tax aggressiveness, Insider trading, Managerial opportunism, Corporate opacity

Discipline

Accounting | Corporate Finance | Taxation

Research Areas

Corporate Governance, Auditing and Risk Management

Publication

Contemporary Accounting Research

Volume

36

Issue

1

First Page

230

Last Page

258

ISSN

0823-9150

Identifier

10.1111/1911-3846.12422

Publisher

Canadian Academic Accounting Association

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12422

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