Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

Publisher’s Version

Publication Date

9-2013

Abstract

We analyze 228 executive compensation contracts voluntarily disclosed by Chinese listed firms and find that central-government-controlled companies disclose more information in executive compensation contracts than local-government-controlled and non-government-controlled companies. Cash-based payments are the main form of executive compensation, whereas equity-based payments are seldom used by Chinese listed companies. On average, there are no significant differences in the value of basic salaries and performance-based compensation in executive compensation contracts. But, compared with their counterparts in non-government-controlled companies, executives in government-controlled companies are given more incentive compensation. Accounting earnings are typically used in executive compensation contracts, with few firms using stock returns to evaluate their executives. However, the use of non-financial measures has increased significantly since 2007.

Keywords

Executive compensation, Voluntary disclosure, Incentives, Performance measures

Discipline

Accounting | Asian Studies | Corporate Finance

Research Areas

Corporate Reporting and Disclosure

Publication

China Journal of Accounting Research

Volume

6

Issue

3

First Page

211

Last Page

231

ISSN

1755-3091

Identifier

10.1016/j.cjar.2013.06.001

Publisher

Elsevier

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2013.06.001

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