Do Corporate Governance Mechanisms Matter for Cash Holdings and Firm Value?

Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

11-2011

Abstract

This paper examines the relationships between firm-level corporate governance mechanisms and cash holdings; along with their combined effects on firm value for a sample of firms listed in Singapore and Malaysia. Firms with less effective governance attributes are found to be more inclined to accumulate cash than those with more effective governance. The results support the flexibility hypothesis in that an increase in agency conflicts between managers and minority shareholders leads to entrenched managers having more discretion to hoard cash reserves. In addition, the incremental value of holding excess cash is shown to be negative for firms with a single leadership structure, firms with a pyramidal ownership structure, as well as family-controlled firms. The discounts associated with these firms may reflect investors’ recognition of the possibility of managerial entrenchment.

Keywords

Corporate governance mechanisms, Cash holdings, Firm value

Discipline

Accounting | Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics | Corporate Finance

Research Areas

Corporate Governance, Auditing and Risk Management

Publication

Pacific-Basin Finance Journal

Volume

19

Issue

5

First Page

554

Last Page

570

ISSN

0927-538X

Identifier

10.1016/j.pacfin.2011.04.002

Publisher

Elsevier

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