Publication Type
Master Thesis
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
2011
Abstract
In this thesis, we consider the standard voting model with a finite set of alternatives A and 2 voters, and address the following question: besides Domains D satisfying the
Property T (Chatterji & Sen (2011) ), what are other characteristics of domains that induce every strategy-proof and unanimous social choice function f : Dn → A to satisfy the tops-only property? We impose a minimal richness condition which ensures that for every alternative a ∈ A, there exists a preference ordering where a is maximal. We identify a more general condition on domains that is sufficient for strategy-proofness and unanimity to imply tops-onlyness in the case of 2 voters. This condition is shown to apply to Linked Domains (Aswal, Chatterji & Sen (2003) ).
Keywords
social choice functions, tops-only property, voting, mathematical models
Degree Awarded
MSc in Economics
Discipline
Economic Theory | Public Economics
Supervisor(s)
Chatterji, Shurojit
First Page
1
Last Page
18
Publisher
Singapore Management University
City or Country
Singapore
Citation
ZENG, Huaxia.
A Sufficient Condition for the Tops-Only Property of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions in the Case of Two Voters. (2011). 1-18.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/etd_coll/229
Copyright Owner and License
Author
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.