Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Lee Kong Chian School of Business

3-2024

Pay suppression in social impact contexts: How framing work around the greater good inhibits job candidate compensation demands

Insiya HUSSAIN
University of Texas at Austin

Marko PITESA
Singapore Management University, mpitesa@smu.edu.sg

Stefan THAU
INSEAD

Michael SCHAERER
Singapore Management University, schaerer@smu.edu.sg

Pay suppression in social impact contexts: How framing work around the greater good inhibits job candidate compensation demands

Insiya Hussain,[a,*] Marko Pitesa,[b] Stefan Thau,[c] Michael Schaerer[b]

[a] University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas 78712; [b] Singapore Management University, Singapore 188065; [c] INSEAD, 77300 Fontainebleau, France *Corresponding author

Contact: insiya.hussain@mccombs.utexas.edu, https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9829-7484 (IH); mpitesa@smu.edu.sg, https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1056-151X (MP); stefan.thau@insead.edu, https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6117-9401 (ST); schaerer@smu.edu.sg, https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2397-9552 (MS)

Abstract: Past research suggests that when organizations communicate the benefits of their work for human welfare-that is, use a social impact framing for work-job candidates are willing to accept lower wages because they expect the work to be personally meaningful. We argue that this explanation overlooks a less socially desirable mechanism by which social impact framing leads to lower compensation demands: the perception among job candidates that requesting higher pay will breach organizational expectations to value work for its intrinsic (rather than extrinsic) rewards, or constitute a motivational norm violation. We find evidence for our theory across five studies: a qualitative study (Study 1), a hiring experiment with undergraduate students (Study 2), an online labor market field experiment (Study 3), a vignette-based simulation (Study 4), and a stimulus sampling study using multiple occupations (Study 5). Exploratory analyses find that the negative effects are unique to monetary (versus nonmonetary) job rewards. Together, results uncover a novel mechanism by which emphasizing work for the greater good leads job candidates to accept lower wages-one that reflects candidates self-censoring on pay from concerns about violating organizational norms rather than solely from a willingness to trade higher pay for potentially meaningful work. Our research contributes to understandings of how social responsibility messaging impacts workers' perceptions of organizations and negotiation behavior. It also holds implications for emerging scholarship on managers' implicit theories of employee work motivation.

Keywords: social impact, norms, motivation, negotiation, compensation

So you've gotten a lot in recent years of what I've come to think of as corporate virtue signaling, where companies that rely on sort of young, idealistic college-educated workers increasingly frame themselves as having a distinct social mission. You're not working in sales, right? You're a client impact manager ... you're not a banker, you're involved in impact investing. You're not selling targeted ads, you're helping to connect humanity ... more and more companies are framing themselves in this way.—Roge Karma on The Ezra Klein Show (Klein 2021)

It's a huge problem, you're absolutely right. "We're not in it for the money" is an incredibly inviting way to dominate and exploit and deprive the workforce. You can guilt people into working under conditions *that they shouldn't be working under by saying this is not about money, it's not about profit, it's about serving society.*—Evan Nesterak's interview with Barry Schwartz (Nesterak 2022)

Organizations often publicize that their work has prosocial or human welfare benefits (Kolk 2003, Dempsey and Sanders 2010) or use a social impact framing for the work their employees conduct (Lee and Huang 2018). For example, companies frequently use messaging that communicates their goal to "make the world a better place" (NPR 2014), do "the greatest good for the most people" (Brickson 2005), and "make a difference" in society (Inspire 2018). Research highlights that opportunities to improve the welfare of others makes work feel

more meaningful (Hackman and Oldham 1976, Grant 2008) and increases employees' willingness to accept lower pay. For instance, Burbano (2016) finds that corporate social responsibility messages lead workers to submit lower wage bids, suggesting—although not testing—that this is because workers are willing to give up pecuniary rewards for nonpecuniary benefits such as purpose and meaningfulness. Relatedly, Hu and Hirsh (2017) show that jobs perceived as meaningful are associated with lower wage requirements. Meanwhile, Wilmers and Zhang (2022) find that college graduates are especially likely to sacrifice pay for prosocial jobs. Together, these studies suggest that a sense of mission or higher purpose is the reason job candidates request and accept lower wages from organizations emphasizing social impact.

Our research refines the current view that the reason job candidates forgo money when organizations emphasize social impact is due to the prospect of meaningful work. We argue that although candidates anticipate important nonpecuniary benefits from work described as socially impactful, such emphasis on social impact can, even inadvertently, have a simultaneous self-censoring effect by generating perceptions among job candidates that it would be counter-normative to show interest in extrinsic work rewards such as higher pay. We build our theory by integrating research on the use of language in normative control (Salancik and Pfeffer 1978, Bourdieu 1991, Huising 2014, Sarangi and Slembrouck 2014) with scholarship on the perceived conflict between intrinsic and extrinsic work motivations (McGregor and Cutcher-Gershenfeld 1960, Derfler-Rozin and Pitesa 2020). Together, these literatures highlight that (a) organizations use language and framing to send normative signals to employees about the "correct" motivations for working, and (b) managers see employee desires for extrinsic rewards as incongruent with valuing work for its intrinsic rewards, such as meaningfulness. We argue that as socially impactful work is widely seen to make work more intrinsically motivating, organizational emphasis on social impact engenders concerns among job candidates that requesting extrinsic rewards such as higher

pay would breach organizational norms around being motivated for the "right" reasons or constitute a *motivational norm violation*. Consequently, candidates suppress their compensation demands and capture less financial value when engaged in job entry discussions. Figure 1 shows our theoretical model.

This work makes two key theoretical contributions. First, we contribute to research that examines how stakeholders perceive social impact (e.g., Lee and Huang 2018, Ng et al. 2019). Thus far, this research has proposed work meaningfulness as the main explanation for why people forfeit money to work for organizations publicizing a commitment to the greater good (e.g., Frank 1996, Burbano 2016, Hu and Hirsh 2017). We hone scholarly understanding of the phenomenon by proposing an overlooked mechanism underlying the effect—the perception that asking for higher compensation violates organizational norms and expectations regarding employee motivation. This mechanism is notably less socially desirable. Organizations generally seek to appear ethical, altruistic, and all-around favorable by others (Chung and Monroe 2003). By demonstrating that job candidates might be relinquishing money for socially impactful work at least in part out of concerns about transgressing organizational norms, we highlight that organizations' strong use of such framing—even if entirely well-intentioned—might not always yield positive outcomes for candidates, at least in the domain of finances. Indeed, more Machiavellian organizations may even use such framing in an entirely instrumental manner to induce guilt among workers and suppress pay.

Second, we contribute to nascent research on implicit theories of work motivation. This research documents a "motivation purity bias" among managers, who often incorrectly presume that a job candidate's expression of extrinsic work motivation suggests lower intrinsic motivation (Derfler-Rozin and Pitesa 2020). Although prior research uncovers this managerial bias, it has not examined how organizations communicate it to candidates, either intentionally or inadvertently, and its consequences

Figure 1. Theoretical Model

for candidate behavior. We deepen scholarly understanding of managers' motivation purity bias by identifying social impact framing—an organizational practice that is increasingly prevalent and otherwise seemingly benign—as a signal to job candidates that this bias is especially likely to be in play. Even though extrinsic rewards in work-for-pay settings are beneficial to performance and do not undermine intrinsic motivation (Gerhart and Fang 2015, Shaw and Gupta 2015, Menges et al. 2017), job candidates might anticipate managers' bias against extrinsic motivation to be especially salient in social impact contexts and, consequently, modify their negotiation behavior.

Theory and Hypotheses
Social Impact Framing and Perceived Motivational Norm Violation

Organizations and their prospective members are sensitive to the value of work that advances the well-being of society at large rather than just economic shareholders (Carroll 1974, Kaplan 2020). Many organizations—including for-profit companies—go so far as to present their missions and brands around their commitment to the public good or utilize what is known as social impact framing (Lee and Huang 2018). For example, TOMS, a footwear and accessories company, tells people that it is "in business to improve lives" (TOMS 2021), and Patagonia, an apparel company, proclaims to be "in business to save our home planet" (Patagonia 2021). Notably, such emphasis on social impact can occur even when organizations engage in practices similar to those of competitors that choose not to frame work in prosocial terms. For instance, K12, a private education company offering standard tutoring services, says that it seeks employees who wish to "make a valuable impact in the lives of students and their families" (K12 2021). Even organizations traditionally associated with profit-seeking missions have adopted this trend with global consulting firm McKinsey, for instance, professing to make "a positive social impact through work" (McKinsey 2021).

We argue that although such social impact framing may be employed with benevolent intentions, when made salient in hiring contexts, it can inhibit job candidates from feeling comfortable engaging in the otherwise relatively common practice of asking for somewhat higher pay than initially offered—that is, from engaging in negotiations for salary or other monetary job rewards. We focus on job candidates in this research as negotiations have high stakes before job offers are finalized and candidates have securely joined the organization. Job entry negotiations are also financially path-determining events that affect long-term earnings, as they set the base salary upon which organizations decide future raises. The salience of job entry negotiations for both employment decisions and future earnings makes it especially

likely that workers attend to signals about the appropriateness of mentioning pay during the hiring process.

We develop our theory by integrating research on the use of language in organizational norm-setting and social control with scholarship on implicit theories of work motivation. First, to create consistency, reliability, and accountability for the purpose of producing products and services, organizations typically come to constitute "strong situations" in which there are clear expectations for appropriate thought, action, and behavior (Salancik and Pfeffer 1978, Davis-Blake and Pfeffer 1989, Meyer et al. 2010). Language and framing play a pivotal role in transmitting the desired norms to workers (Sarangi and Slembrouck 2014), through communication media such as leader proclamations and company mission statements. Together, these provide current and potential employees with guidelines not only for how to perform work, but also for why the work is worthy or valuable in the first place. This has potential to influence the extent to which candidates risk speaking up with ideas that deviate from prevailing norms and values about appropriate motivations for engaging in the work being offered (Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991, Sharma and Good 2013). This may be particularly true in sensitive and high-stakes situations such as salary negotiations, in which candidates are typically the less powerful party (Wolfe and McGinn 2005) and use impression management tactics to present themselves more favorably (Stevens and Kristof 1995).

In the case of social impact framing, organizations convey to future workers that a key reason they are engaging in the organization's activities is to create goods and services that generate broader social benefits. That is, social impact framing signals that the organization's work is valuable for its task significance, in that it directly or indirectly improves the welfare of others (Hackman and Oldham 1976, 1980; Morgeson and Humphrey 2006). An important finding about task significance is that it tends to make work intrinsically motivating such that employees come to appreciate or enjoy the work itself (Amabile 1993, Grant 2008). Indeed, contributing to others' welfare fulfills basic human needs for interpersonal connectedness, purpose, and meaning, which makes it inherently satisfying (e.g., Fried and Ferris 1987, Baumeister 1991, Audi 2005, Wrzesniewski et al. 2009). It is for this reason that organizations using social impact framing also often directly indicate that they seek employees who possess intrinsic motivation—for example, individuals who are "passionate" about the work and "love [the company's] mission of helping people" (Moore 2018). Notably, this stands in contrast to valuing work because it is extrinsically motivating or appealing for its material rewards, such as pay, advancement, and favorable working conditions (Porter and Lawler 1968, Sheldon et al. 2003). Although organizations utilizing social impact framing certainly mete out extrinsic job rewards as

part of standard work-for-pay contracts, they convey the normative expectation that candidates should consider the offered work desirable because it is intrinsically worthwhile.

We further contend that the perception generated by social impact framing that an organization values intrinsic work motivation breeds concerns among job candidates that overt desires for extrinsic work rewards would be viewed as discrepant from firm values. Although it might seem reasonable that an organizational norm to value work for its intrinsic rewards should not, in and of itself, deter workers from also expressing a desire for extrinsic rewards, considerable evidence on individuals' lay theories about work motivation suggests the contrary. To start, a long-standing and widespread assumption among both scholars and practitioners is that intrinsic and extrinsic work motivations are not merely distinct, but competing. This perspective dates to early research from McGregor and Cutcher-Gershenfeld (1960) on "Theory X" versus "Theory Y," which suggests that managers tend to conceive of employees as either interested in the work itself *or* concerned with the material comforts a job provides. Laboratory experiments have since then directly pit the two work motivations against each other, examining how extrinsic motivators "crowd out" intrinsic motivation (e.g., Deci 1971, 1972; Roberson 1990; Deci et al. 1999). Notably, this research focuses on examining whether people are intrinsically motivated to engage in voluntary tasks in the absence of material rewards, and the presumed substitutive nature of intrinsic and extrinsic work motivations has been debunked in work-for-pay settings (Cerasoli et al. 2014, Gerhart and Fang 2015, Shaw and Gupta 2015). Nonetheless, research continues to demonstrate that mixed work motivations spur negative social evaluations based on the notion that intrinsic and extrinsic motivations are fundamentally incompatible.

Most notably, a recent study by Derfler-Rozin and Pitesa (2020) documents the persistence of a "motivation purity bias" among organizational decision makers, whereby job candidates' expressions of extrinsic motivation resulted in inferences of reduced intrinsic motivation even though those inferences were empirically unfounded. Such a bias is shown to have material career consequences for candidates, adversely impacting the likelihood that a candidate exhibiting high extrinsic motivation is selected for a job even when simultaneously exhibiting equally strong intrinsic motivation. Contemporary research on motivation thus demonstrates that managers continue to see intrinsic and extrinsic work motivations as incompatible, such that higher levels of one motivation suggest diminished levels of the other. Other scholarship supports the general view that intrinsically motivated workers are perceived more favorably, as they are not only seen as being more moral (Kwon et al. 2023), but also enjoy more positive subjective evaluations from their managers (Cho and Jiang 2022). In fact, passion

for one's work has been found to legitimize exploitative management practices, under the managerial belief that for passionate workers, the work itself is the main reward (Kim et al. 2020). To the extent that job candidates intuit or are aware of a managerial bias favoring intrinsically motivated workers who are presumed willing to engage in self-sacrifice, they may feel compelled to avoid disappointing managers—or even to avoid the risk of not being hired—by showing interest in job rewards beyond their inherent desire for the work itself.

Against this backdrop, we expect that when organizations make salient through language and framing that their work has a social impact—and is thus intrinsically rewarding—job candidates fear that speaking up about pay would be perceived as being in conflict with the organizational expectation to value work for its intrinsic rewards, or constitute a motivational norm violation.

Hypothesis 1. *An organization's use of social impact framing for work is positively related to job candidates' perceived motivational norm violation in making compensation demands.*

Perceived Motivational Norm Violation and Compensation Demands

We theorize that expecting to violate an organizational norm by speaking up about pay constrains job candidates from expressing their desires for higher compensation. Norms exist to guide people toward behaviors deemed appropriate and desirable, and dissuade them from behaviors deemed unfitting (Hartley 1983). As organizations constitute strong situations in which implicit and explicit cues generate psychological pressure that controls individual behavior, exhibiting deviant behavior or violating norms can be especially consequential and result in social and economic backlash (Rudman 1998, Rudman and Phelan 2008). Employees, for instance, are known to suffer reprisals for behaviors such as challenging the status quo by speaking up candidly (Morrison 2011) and violating gender role expectations (Rudman and Glick 2001, Burke 2005). Similarly, employees fear career penalties, such as lower pay raises and fewer promotions, when using their organization's work–family benefits when they perceive that doing so would oppose the true values and interests of higher-ups (e.g., Rothausen et al. 1998, Haar and Spell 2003, Leslie et al. 2012). In each of these examples, although the described behavior is formally permitted, workers are nonetheless deterred from engaging in it owing to perceived social and economic risks associated with violating informal organizational norms. Similarly, we expect that although negotiating salary is a common and even expected part of the hiring process, exposure to social impact framing engenders perceived motivational norm violation in raising issues of pay, which, in turn, deters job candidates' self-advocacy for higher wages.

Hypothesis 2. *An organization's social impact framing is negatively related to job candidate compensation demands.*

Hypothesis 3. *Perceived motivational norm mediates the negative relationship between an organization's social impact framing and job candidate compensation demands.*

We further explore whether the predicted effects of social impact framing operate more strongly for job candidates' requests for monetary (versus nonmonetary) job rewards. Job negotiations typically involve multiple considerations beyond matters of pay (Galinsky et al. 2008, Gunia et al. 2013). For instance, in addition to the direct monetary rewards of work (e.g., salary, bonuses, and monetary expense reimbursements), negotiations could involve discussions of nonmonetary job rewards (e.g., health coverage, vacation time, and flexible work policies). Such multi-issue negotiations stand in contrast to single-issue negotiations in which parties focus on only one salient concern.

As discussed earlier, we expect that social impact framing negatively influences job candidates' requests for monetary job rewards because of perceptions of norm violation. It remains an open question, however, as to whether job candidates experience the same degree of reticence to demand nonmonetary job rewards. On the one hand, job candidates might similarly perceive that asking for certain nonmonetary job rewards, such as more vacation time, would constitute a norm violation. This is because overt concern with time away from work, the fringe benefits of the job, or opportunities to change the nature or scope of one's work, could all signal candidates' lower intrinsic motivation for the job being offered and willingness to make personal sacrifices for it. On the other hand, nonmonetary job rewards are less frequently associated with perceptions of greed, hedonic self-interest, and antisocial behavior in the way are monetary job rewards (e.g., Vohs et al. 2006). Indeed, it is love of money—and not healthcare benefits or vacation time—that has long been described as "the root of all evil" (Carroll and Prickett 2008, Timothy 6:10). Additionally, material resources, specifically, are often the underlying sources of much competition and conflict, and elicit cultural associations with selfishness and indulgence (e.g., Campbell 1965, Rowthorn 1977, Klare 2002, Promislo et al. 2010). Thus, when organizations utilize a social impact framing, touting noble intentions to benefit the community at large, job candidates may especially feel compelled to show little interest in pay and other monetary rewards, while hesitating less to ask for nonmonetary rewards. In fact, it is even plausible that job candidates request more nonmonetary job rewards in social impact contexts as a way to compensate for feeling compelled to request fewer monetary job rewards. We explore these possibilities in the following research question: Are the negative main and mediated effects of social impact framing on job candidates' compensation demands stronger for monetary (versus nonmonetary) job rewards?

Overview of Studies

We test our theory across five studies. Our primary interest was to examine the phenomenon in hiring contexts—situations in which people are particularly motivated to behave in ways that demonstrate "fit" with the organization (Judge and Ferris 1992), organizational expectations are salient (Bolino et al. 2008), and path-setting salary negotiations occur. Study 1 is a qualitative study in which we experimentally manipulate an organization's social impact framing and ask participants for their open-ended responses as to whether they would negotiate their starting salary in the given context and why. This study has the benefit of capturing participants' understanding of the situation in a naturalistic manner, devoid of any prompts or measures pertaining to the proposed mechanism: perceived motivational norm violation. The study also allows us to assess other potential reasons why social impact framing might deter people from negotiating, and then explore and control for these mechanisms in subsequent studies. Study 2 is a hiring experiment with undergraduate students responding to a purportedly real on-campus job opportunity. Study 3 is a field experiment in an online labor market in which workers bid on a purportedly real task. Both Studies 2 and 3 allow us to draw externally valid conclusions in two different samples (students and an adult working population) with Study 3 including some improvements in design. Study 4 is a hiring simulation in which we replicate the predicted effects. Finally, Study 5 is a stimulus sampling study (Wells and Windschitl 1999) demonstrating that the effects hold across a range of jobs and occupations. In this study, we also test whether effects are stronger for monetary (versus nonmonetary) job rewards. Throughout this research, we frequently use the acronym "DV" for dependent variables. Data, syntaxes, the online supplement, and preregistrations for Studies 1, 3, 4, and 5 (Study 2 was conducted at an earlier time point and not preregistered), can be found at Open Science Framework (OSF; https://bit.ly/2WsECYw).

Study 1
Method
Sample and Procedure. We recruited an initial sample of 400 participants from Prolific, an online survey and crowdsourcing platform (Peer et al. 2017). After screening out eight participants for providing poor-quality responses (e.g., entering filler text unrelated to the question being asked), we had a final sample of 392 participants. The sample has a mean age of 31.77 years ($SD = 12.27$); gender breakdown of 46% men, 53% women, 1% nonbinary; mean work experience of 14.10 years ($SD = 15.48$), and 55% with a bachelor's degree or higher.

Manipulation of Social Impact Framing. We randomly assigned participants to one of two conditions: social

impact framing versus control. Our goal was to assess the extent to which differences in how work is framed might trigger concerns about speaking up about pay as well as the reasons why. We gave participants a description of what an organization might communicate about the nature of its work. In the social impact framing condition, participants read that "organizations often emphasize their mission or commitment to serving the public good in some form—such as by advancing the well-being of socioeconomically disadvantaged groups or caring for the environment." They read that such organizations frequently use company mission statements, job advertisements, and recruitment materials by leaders and managers to convey that their goal is to "make the world a better place," and that they "seek employees who care about serving others and making a positive impact on society." To avoid the organization's business model from operating as a potential confound, we told participants that "such organizations are not necessarily nonprofits, although some might be." In the control condition, participants read a more generic description excluding any mention of social impact specifically—that is, of how organizations use communication and framing to emphasize their values and priorities to job candidates. For instance, we told participants that organizations "often emphasize their goals and commitments," and convey "how employees should think about their work, what is expected of them, and factors that make the job worthwhile" (see Online Supplement I for the full manipulations).

To make the manipulation more concrete, we asked participants to enter the name of any one organization that they could think of that fit the given description. We then asked participants to imagine themselves as a job candidate at the organization they listed. To avoid participants making presumptions about the fairness of the current pay rate, we told them that the salary being offered was in line with the average pay for similar jobs in the industry and region.

Measures
Compensation Demands. We asked participants, "Would you feel comfortable asking the hiring manager to give you a higher salary for the job? Why or why not?" Through this open-ended question, we sought to capture both the extent to which participants reported a willingness to ask for higher pay as well as the rationale for their response. We required participants to write a minimum of 150 characters to ensure adequate descriptiveness.

Results
We used an inductive approach to examine participant responses (Strauss and Corbin 1998, Charmaz 2014). Our key interest lay in analyzing the open-ended compensation demands measure, on which we focused for two key outcomes: (a) the extent to which participants

said they would be willing to negotiate a higher wage and (b) the rationales they provided for their responses. We stripped the data of all information about experimental conditions to avoid biasing the coding process.

The first author began by reading all responses to the compensation demands question and using open-coding techniques to briefly summarize each response. First, we coded text for participants' ultimate decision about whether to try and negotiate a higher salary. Our coding scheme distinguished those who categorically said they would not speak up to negotiate (0 = "no") from those who indicated any degree of willingness to speak up (1 = "yes"). We found a 32% decrease in the odds of making compensation demands in the social impact condition, an effect that was marginally significant ($\chi^2 = 3.56$, $p = 0.06$).[1]

Second, we coded the compensation demands measure for the rationales participants provided for why they would or would not negotiate. In the initial stage of this process, we aggregated first order (open) codes into second order themes. For example, we grouped responses such as "would imply I am only in it for the money" and "would give the impression that I was interested in the job for financial reasons" under the second order category of "concerns about seeming greedy." Similarly, we placed responses such as "doing so would be taboo" and "asking for a raise … contradicts the premises of the job" under the second order category of "perceived inappropriateness." Such rationales almost exclusively appeared under the "no" category for compensation demands.

By contrast, we observed that responses under the "yes" category for making compensation demands typically focused on candidates' qualifications and right to ask. An example statement is "Yes, I would be comfortable asking for a higher salary. I have a proven history of company loyalty, and as previously stated, I believe that is what the company is looking for." The second and third authors independently checked the logic of the emergent themes and discussed and resolved any disagreements about categorization. As we moved through this process, we remained open to adjusting the emerging categories based on similarities and differences surfacing between responses, our interpretations of the data, and our knowledge of the existing literature. In total, this initial coding process yielded 54 first order codes that were grouped into 25 second order themes.

By continuing to move back and forth between the data and theory in this manner, we further grouped all second order themes into 10 final, third order theoretical dimensions that reflected the mechanisms driving participant decisions of whether to negotiate. At this stage, two research assistants blind to the experimental conditions independently coded the third order dimensions against each open-ended response. Cohen's kappa (McHugh 2012) indicated a 97% initial agreement rate between the author team and the research assistants,

and all remaining differences were discussed and resolved. As our primary interest lay in job candidates' reticence to negotiate, we summarized the codes that emerged for all the reasons why participants said "no" to speaking up about pay. Perceived motivational norm violation emerged as a key mechanism driving "no" responses, particularly within the social impact condition. Specifically, the social impact condition accounted for 70% of all mentions of this rationale ($n = 52$), whereas the control condition accounted for only 30% of all mentions ($n = 22$). This finding provided initial support for our prediction that perceptions of violating organizational norms by speaking up about pay are especially salient when organizations emphasize social impact. Illustrative quotes include the following:

> "I would not feel comfortable. I imagine the culture at such organizations would be different, and doing so would be taboo."

> "You are supposed to be 'doing it for the kids,' which would make you look selfish if you asked."

> "I don't think I would. Unfortunately, a position like this would put A LOT of emphasis on being empathetic and making social impact. These qualities can be seen as opposing to the desire to make money."

> "I would not feel comfortable asking the hiring manager to give me a higher salary for the job because I feel like that would give the impression that I was interested in the job for financial reasons instead of the social impact of the organization. I feel like asking for a higher salary would likely make the organization less interested in hiring me."

We present other mechanisms for "no" decisions in Figure 2, shedding further light on participant cognitions around the phenomenon. Table A in Online Supplement III presents illustrative quotes for each theme. For instance, apart from worrying about norm violation, participants might be less willing to negotiate if they presume that organizations emphasizing social impact have insufficient financial resources to fund a higher salary because they are committing funds to further their social mission. One participant mentioned, "I would not feel comfortable asking the hiring manager to give me a higher salary for the job because I would assume finances are already tight for such an organization … " This rationale—which we term *perceived financial infeasibility*—was more prevalent within the social impact condition ($n = 15$) than the control condition ($n = 5$).

Second, participants may be willing to accept a lower wage for positive reasons as well, such as for work they perceive as meaningful, a finding consistent with prior research (e.g., Burbano 2016, Hu and Hirsh 2017). Work that gives an individual a sense of purpose and meaning can be intrinsically motivating and thereby serve as a valuable nonpecuniary benefit in an integrative negotiation. An example quote is "I think it would be very meaningful to me to work for a company in the first place that is helping people, so I wouldn't need to be compensated monetarily" This rationale was also more prevalent among participants in the social impact ($n = 18$) versus control ($n = 7$) condition.

Third, participants may draw positive inferences about organizations that emphasize social impact, such as presuming they would be trustworthy, provide fair wages, or treat employees well—that is, factors indicative of perceived organizational support (Eisenberger et al. 1986). One participant, for instance, mentioned, "I would also expect that I received benefits consistent with other jobs in the industry and region, and these would adequately compensate me for not asking for a higher starting salary." Mention of such perceived organizational support appeared within both the social impact ($n = 1$) and control ($n = 3$) conditions. Separately, rationales unrelated to characteristics of the organization were grouped under a single third order category, and there did not appear to be large differences in their occurrence between experimental conditions.[2]

Discussion
Study 1 provided initial support for our predictions that exposure to an organization's social impact framing can deter job candidates from feeling that it is appropriate to discuss the pecuniary rewards of work, potentially resulting in lower compensation demands. Although several reasons surfaced why candidates might not ask for higher pay, chief among them was perceived motivational norm violation, particularly within the social impact condition. The qualitative aspects of this study had the advantage of allowing participants to share their thoughts in an organic and unconstrained manner, while also allowing alternative reasons to emerge for candidates' reticence to speak up about pay. In subsequent studies, we examine these additional mechanisms—potentially representing concurrent explanations—alongside our proposed mechanism: perceived motivational norm violation.

Study 2
Method
Sample and Procedure. In Study 2, we sought to formally test our main theoretical model with an experimental design. Participants were 438 undergraduate business students at a Mid-Atlantic university who took part for course credit ($M_{age} = 20.19$, $SD_{age} = 1.53$; 54% male, 46% female).

The study had two parts: a presurvey and a main study. Participants completed the presurvey two weeks prior to the in-person main study. The purpose was to capture as a control variable participants' baseline pay expectations without any experimental manipulation for an on-campus job such as the purportedly real one to which they would soon be exposed in the main study.

Figure 2. Study 1 Rationales Provided for Reticence to Negotiate

Notes. *N* = 392. The gray box with dotted lines highlights the focal mechanism.

Specifically, as members of the undergraduate student population came from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds and were engaged in a range of majors—some of which were associated with higher salaries than others—they were likely to have different pay expectations from work. Further, certain participants may have been international students with less awareness of pay scales for various jobs in the United States. Thus, by capturing participants' baseline pay expectations, we could more accurately assess the extent to which variance in compensation demands in the main study were driven by our experimental manipulations rather than other factors.

The main study followed a between-subjects design with participants randomly assigned to one of the two experimental conditions. Specifically, participants read that the business school's Office of Career Services was working with hiring companies to recruit students for

short-term tasks, some of which could develop into longer term work opportunities. Participants were then asked to watch an introductory video by the purported founder and CEO of the hiring company, Mark Chaplain, describing his organization. We employed a trained actor to play this role.

Next, participants read that the founder was recruiting students for an on-campus "tabling job," in which they would be required to supervise the company's recruiting table in the business school's hallway, hand out job-related material, and put up company posters. After watching the video and reading about the company, participants answered the focal survey questions.

Manipulation of Social Impact Framing. In the social impact framing condition ($n = 226$), the company founder in the video described his organization, "TeachToChange," as a mission-driven company "dedicated to making the world a better place through quality education and mentorship." The organization was said to pair passionate after-school teachers with troubled students to help them get back on track. Toward the end of the video the founder said, "Our work is meaningful because we're driven by a higher purpose to shape and change the lives of young people for the better."

In the control condition ($n = 212$), we sought to ensure that the company was described equally positively, differing only in that it focused on other valued aspects of work—specifically, on work-related skills and competence.[3] This was important as our theory suggests that a positive depiction of an organization, alone, is insufficient to engender job candidate concerns about perceived motivational norm violation. Rather, we expect such concerns to arise specifically when social impact is made salient. Thus, in the control condition, participants watched a video of similar length with the same founder describing an organization called "AfterTeach." In this video, the founder described his organization as one that "hires skilled teachers with experience for after-school tutoring services." Toward the end of the video the founder said, "Our work is important because we base our learning methods on the latest research in education rather than on our own preferences." Videos as well as the video scripts (Online Supplement I) are available on this project's OSF page.

As the study involved deception (we told participants the job opportunity was real), immediately after the study was over, participants were provided with a thorough debrief. This included an apology for the deception, which we explained was necessary to avoid biasing responses, information about how participants could withdraw their data if desired, and contact details for both the principal investigator and institutional review board (IRB) office if participants wished report any concerns.

Measures

We measured all items on a scale of $1 =$ "strongly disagree" to $7 =$ "strongly agree" unless otherwise stated.

Manipulation Check. To assess our manipulation of social impact framing, participants responded to four items about the extent to which TeachToChange (AfterTeach) "has a meaningful impact on society," "believes that its work serves a greater purpose," "highlights the meaningfulness of work to employees," and "expects employees to deeply care about the work itself" ($\alpha = 0.85$).

Perceived Motivational Norm Violation. We conducted a content validation study using methods recommended by Colquitt et al. (2019) to ensure that the items we developed for perceived motivational norm violation reflect its conceptualization. Details of the study are available in Online Supplement II. Here, we report the final three-item measure: "Making a high first offer would be against the norms of the company," "Making a high first offer would be against the values of the company," and "It would seem inappropriate to make a high first offer with this company" ($\alpha = 0.81$). For related measures in the content validation study, we included, among others, the full set of alternative explanations uncovered in Study 1, which we subsequently test in Studies 3–5. The present study includes a subset of those alternative measures, as described.

Negotiation Comfort (DV1). We operationalized our dependent variable, compensation demands, in two ways. The first measure was an indicator of participants' comfort negotiating for a higher wage. Specifically, we told participants that the company founder was currently offering students $10 per hour for the tabling job, which was just above the minimum wage in the state at the time of data collection. They read that the founder would be looking at profiles of all students for the position and would respond to each candidate individually via email to finalize details such as work hours and the final wage, depending upon the tasks they would be undertaking. After we told participants that wage may or may not be negotiable, they answered a question about their propensity to engage in a negotiation: "Given what you know about this company, would you feel comfortable asking Mark for a higher hourly rate for the work?" ($0 =$ "no," $1 =$ "yes").

Pay Requested (DV2). As our second measure of compensation demands, participants reported on a sliding scale ($10–$20) the exact hourly rate they would request from the founder for the job, for which the wage initially offered was $10 per hour. This measure is in line with prior research on economic measures of negotiation behavior (Thompson 1990), including research on first

offers and pay demands (e.g., Galinsky and Mussweiler 2001, O'Shea and Bush 2002).

Control Variable. As mentioned, during a presurvey conducted two weeks earlier, we measured as a control variable participants' baseline pay expectations before any exposure to any experimental manipulation. Specifically, participants read that companies often recruit students for on-campus jobs and need help with "tabling," which involves handing out company information materials to students and putting up posters. We told participants that the current minimum wage in the state was $9.25/hour. We then asked them to indicate on a sliding scale ($9.25–$20) the exact hourly rate they would request for the job. We used this control variable when analyzing effects on the second operationalization of the dependent variable, *pay requested*.

Alternative Explanations. Study 1 uncovered several potential explanations that could drive a negative effect of social impact framing on compensation demands. Here, we accounted for two such explanations. First, as mentioned in Study 1, participants might presume that organizations devoted to social impact goals have less money for employee compensation. Accordingly, we measured perceived financial infeasibility using four items (e.g., "TeachToChange (AfterTeach) can afford to pay employees reasonably high salaries" and "TeachToChange (AfterTeach) is struggling with financial resources" (reverse coded); $\alpha = 0.72$). Additionally, organizations emphasizing social impact may treat employees favorably, such as by being supportive and trustworthy. We measured these characteristics with five items from Burbano's (2016) measure of trustworthiness (e.g., "TeachToChange (AfterTeach)'s background information was a signal to me that the company … is

'trustworthy,' 'not greedy,' and 'will pay what it has promised'"; $\alpha = 0.81$).

Results

Figure 3 shows responses by condition for Study 2 variables. Descriptive statistics and correlations are in Online Supplement III, Table B. Throughout this research, we use ordinary least squares regression for continuous outcomes, reporting their unstandardized regression coefficients, standard errors, and significance. We also report eta-squared (η^2) values as an additional measure of effect size. For binary outcomes, we use logistic regression and report the odds ratio as a measure of effect size along with its significance. Furthermore, for mediation analyses, we use structural equation modeling with 5,000 bootstrapped replications and report bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals.

Our manipulation was effective as participants in the experimental condition reported to a greater extent that the company emphasized social impact ($M = 4.45$, $SD = 0.58$) relative to those in the control condition ($M = 4.30$, $SD = 0.62$), $b = 0.15$, $p = 0.008$.

Supporting Hypothesis 1 that social impact framing elicits perceived motivational norm violation, participants exposed to social impact framing reported to a greater extent that speaking up about pay would be a deviation from organizational norms and values ($M = 3.08$, $SD = 0.89$) relative to those in the control condition ($M = 2.84$, $SD = 0.84$), $b = 0.24$, $SE = 0.08$, $p = 0.005$, $\eta^2 = 0.02$.

Supporting Hypothesis 2 that social impact framing is negatively associated with compensation demands, social impact framing was negatively linked with the first operationalization of the dependent variable, negotiation comfort (odds ratio = 0.57, $p = 0.008$). Specifically, the odds of saying "yes" to being comfortable negotiating were 43% lower in the social impact (versus control)

Figure 3. Study 2 Responses by Condition

Notes. Social impact framing condition $n = 226$; control condition $n = 212$. ns = nonsignificant. Error bars are 99% confidence intervals.
  *$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; †$p < 0.10$.

condition. We found a similar pattern for the second operationalization of the dependent variable, pay requested. Controlling for baseline expectations, participants in the social impact framing condition requested lower pay ($M = 11.32$, $SE = 0.15$) relative to those in the control condition ($M = 11.71$, $SE = 0.15$), $b = -0.38$, $SE = 0.21$, $p = 0.071$, $\eta^2 = 0.16$, although, as the p-value of 0.07 indicates, the results were noisier.[4] Jointly, these results provide tentative, causal support for Hypothesis 2.

Finally, we tested Hypothesis 3 that perceived motivational norm violation mediates the negative effect of social impact framing on compensation demands. Perceived norm violation was negatively associated with both operationalizations of the dependent variable, negotiation comfort ($b = -0.58$, $SE = 0.12$, $p < 0.001$, odds ratio $= 0.56$) and pay requested ($b = -0.44$, $SE = 0.12$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta^2 = 0.19$). Bootstrapped mediation analysis (5,000 resamples) showed a negative indirect effect of social impact framing via the mediator on negotiation comfort ($b = -0.13$, $SE = 0.06$, $CI_{95\%}$ $[-0.27, -0.05]$) and pay requested ($b = -0.09$, $SE = 0.05$, $CI_{95\%}$ $[-0.21, -0.02]$). Thus, Hypothesis 3 was supported.

Robustness Check. In a separate analysis, we included both perceived financial infeasibility of higher pay and perceived trustworthiness (organizational support) as additional mechanisms to test for potential effects via concurrent explanations. Results via the focal mechanism remained unchanged in direction and significance. Social impact framing still had a negative effect on negotiation comfort via perceived norm violation ($b = -0.13$, $SE = 0.05$, $CI_{95\%}$ $[-0.26, -0.04]$). Meanwhile, there was no effect on negotiation comfort via perceived trustworthiness ($b = 0.02$, $SE = 0.02$, $CI_{95\%}$ $[-0.01, 0.09]$) although a significant negative indirect effect emerged via perceived financial infeasibility ($b = -0.09$, $SE = 0.05$, $CI_{95\%}$ $[-0.21, -0.02]$). Similarly, social impact framing still negatively affected pay requested via perceived norm violation, ($b = -0.08$, $SE = 0.05$, $CI_{95\%}$ $[-0.21, -0.02]$). Meanwhile, there was no effect on pay requested via perceived trustworthiness ($b = 0.01$, $SE = 0.02$, $CI_{95\%}$ $[-0.01, 0.09]$) or financial infeasibility ($b = -0.05$, $SE = 0.04$, $CI_{95\%}$ $[-0.15, 0.00]$).

Discussion

In Study 2, we found support for our theory using a laboratory experiment with psychological and mundane realism (Aronson and Carlsmith 1968). Specifically, by presenting students with a purportedly real on-campus job opportunity, we increased the odds of capturing their genuine attitudes and behaviors in the situation. A limitation, however, was that the study exclusively sampled students rather than a more broad-based adult population. Additionally, we only tested a subset of the potential concurrent explanations. The design of Study 2, which asked about perceptions of norm violation

before the dependent measures, could also have artificially strengthened negative effects via priming (Molden 2014). Finally, we could not ensure that our final sample only included participants who were unaware of the deception. For these reasons, we constructively replicated Study 2 with Study 3—a field experiment in an online labor market. This study (a) utilized a larger, adult sample with greater age and occupational diversity, (b) included the full set of concurrent explanations, (c) mitigated concerns about priming effects by randomly alternating the position of the mediator before and after the dependent variable, and (d) included a naivety check question.

Study 3
Method
Sample and Procedure. In Study 3, we sought to formally test our main theoretical model and establish its external validity using a preregistered labor market field experiment in which workers were asked to bid on a purportedly real task. The initial sample comprised 1,800 MTurk workers.[5] By using this subject pool—one that was not constrained to an undergraduate population at a single university—we were able to collect a larger sample than in Study 2 and thereby use a higher powered design with more reliable estimates (Button et al. 2013). Following our preregistration, after excluding participants who failed the attention and manipulation checks ($n = 176$), correctly guessed the purpose of the study ($n = 94$), and declined permission for use of their data ($n = 5$), we had a final sample of 1,525 participants ($M_{age} = 40.04$, $SD_{age} = 12.63$; 37% male, 62% female, 1% nonbinary).

The study followed a between-subjects design with participants randomly assigned to one of the two experimental conditions (social impact framing versus control). For this study, our research team posed as a real hiring organization—a start-up education company. Participants read that, in addition to providing after-school tutoring for middle- and high-school students, the company creates learning materials designed to be relatable and engaging. As part of that effort, the company was said to be recruiting MTurk workers to create high-quality sentence examples for words that seventh graders should know when building their vocabulary. For instance, if the word given to the participant was "reiterate," a sentence the participant might create is, "The teacher asked the student to reiterate her question as it was noisy in the classroom." Each task comprised 10 words. We told participants that they could use a dictionary to understand the definition of a given word, but the sentence must be their own.

To generate the perception that participants could potentially be hired by the organization on a longer term basis (i.e., that there was more at stake than simply

being selected and paid for the current task), participants were told that, if selected following the current screening survey, they could be asked to complete the same task on an ongoing basis of once per week over the next three months. The survey began with some nonfocal, filler measures that were part of the purported screening process. These included items about participants' skills (e.g., "People tell me I'm a good writer" and "I have strong math skills") and personality (e.g., "I excel at identifying opportunities").

Manipulation of Social Impact Framing. We manipulated social impact framing using the same stimuli as in Study 1, in which participants watched an introductory video of the founder and CEO of the company describe the hiring organization. Again, in the social impact framing condition ($n = 686$), the company was described as "TeachToChange," whereas in the control condition ($n = 742$), the company was "AfterTeach" (for details, see Online Supplement I on OSF).

As the study involved deception, we provided participants with a thorough debrief. This included an apology for the deception, which we explained as being necessary to avoid biasing responses. We also provided information about how participants could withdraw their data if desired along with contact details for the principal investigator and the IRB office to report any concerns. We gave participants who passed all attention checks a $1.50 bonus, which is the same payment they would have received if the task had been real and they were hired for it.

Measures

All items were on a scale of $1 =$ "strongly disagree" to $7 =$ "strongly agree" unless otherwise stated. Survey questions unrelated to the task bid measures were said to be for the company's internal research purposes only and would not be used to make hiring decisions. Additionally, to ensure that results were not driven by priming, we randomly counterbalanced the order of the mediator, perceived motivational norm violation, to appear either before or after the bid measures. Controlling for placement of the mediator did not alter the pattern of results described.

Manipulation Check. To assess our manipulation of social impact framing, at the end of the survey, participants responded to one item about whether the founder of TeachToChange (AfterTeach) had made the following statement: "Our work is meaningful because we're driven by a higher purpose to shape and change the lives of young people for the better" ($0 =$ "no," $1 =$ "yes").

Perceived Motivational Norm Violation. We measured perceived motivational norm violation by adapting the three-item scale finalized in our content validation study

as described earlier within the measures for Study 2. Sample item: "It would be against the company's values to ask for a lot of money for the task" ($\alpha = 0.92$).

Willingness to Negotiate (DV1). We utilized two interrelated measures of compensation demands. First, we told participants that the company was currently offering $1.50 for the task but that they could request a different (higher) amount. As participants had just completed filler questions about themselves, in addition to being exposed to the experimental manipulation, in order to enhance realism we told participants, "As with all hiring decisions, many factors will influence which MTurkers we select for this ongoing task. Your bid is just one of those factors." We then asked participants to report their willingness to negotiate on a binary scale (e.g., Small et al. 2007): "As part of this screening application, would you like to request a higher amount for the task?" ($0 =$ "No, I am not requesting higher payment—I accept the $1.50 offer," $1 =$ "Yes, I am opting to request higher payment—I will enter my requested amount on the next page").

Pay Requested (DV2). On the following screen, participants who had selected "yes" to requesting higher payment were asked, "Please enter your final payment request (bid) to us for this task" (sliding scale of $1.50 to $4). For participants who selected "no" to requesting higher payment, we imputed the initial (default) offered amount of $1.50 as the final bid.

Alternative Explanations. Study 3 accounted for all additional explanations uncovered in Study 1. First, we adopted the four-item perceived financial infeasibility scale from Study 2 to the current context (e.g., "TeachToChange (AfterTeach) is struggling with financial resources to be able to pay a higher task rate to MTurkers who ask"; $\alpha = 0.86$). Additionally, we measured perceived work meaningfulness, as prior research as well as our Study 1 suggest that this could influence participant willingness to forgo higher pay. Specifically, we used four items from Steger et al. (2012) with sample items "I expect that I would … 'find working at TeachToChange (AfterTeach) to be meaningful,' 'discover TeachToChange (AfterTeach) as a company with a satisfying purpose'" ($\alpha = 0.92$). Finally, organizations emphasizing social impact may provide other, nonmonetary benefits, such as fair and supportive treatment of employees. We, thus, measured perceived organizational support using five items from Eisenberger et al. (1986), with sample items "I believe that if I were an employee at TeachToChange (AfterTeach), the company would … 'really care about my well-being,' and 'make help available when I have a problem'" ($\alpha = 0.89$).

Results

Figure 4 shows responses by condition for Study 3 variables. Descriptive statistics and correlations are in Online Supplement III, Table C. Our manipulation was effective among all participants in the data set as, following our preregistration, we removed any participants who did not correctly identify the company's emphasis on social impact.

Supporting Hypothesis 1, workers in the social impact framing condition reported to a greater extent that mentioning pay would be a deviation from organizational norms ($M = 4.42$, $SD = 1.48$) than those in the control condition ($M = 3.48$, $SD = 1.37$), $b = 0.85$, $SE = 0.07$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta^2 = 0.10$.

Supporting Hypothesis 2, social impact framing was negatively associated with willingness to negotiate, $b = -0.54$, $SE = 0.11$, $p < 0.001$; the odds of saying "yes" to bidding higher than the offered \$1.50 were 42% lower in the social impact (versus control) condition (odds ratio = 0.58). Similarly, participants in the social impact framing condition requested significantly lower pay ($M = 1.82$, $SD = 0.65$) relative to those in the control condition ($M = 1.93$, $SE = 0.69$), $b = -0.12$, $SE = 0.03$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta^2 = 0.08$.[6] Thus, Hypothesis 2 was supported for both operationalizations of the dependent variable.

Finally, supporting Hypothesis 3, perceived motivational norm violation mediated the negative effect of social impact framing on compensation demands. Mediation analysis using 5,000 bootstrap-based replications showed a negative indirect effect of social impact framing via perceived motivational norm violation on both willingness to negotiate ($b = -0.46$, $SE = 0.06$, $CI_{95\%}$ [−0.58, −0.36]) and pay requested ($b = -0.12$, $SE = 0.01$, $CI_{95\%}$ [−0.15, −0.09]).

Robustness Check. In a separate analysis, we included the alternative explanations as concurrent mechanisms to test the robustness of the main mediation model.

Results remained unchanged in direction and significance. Specifically, social impact framing still had a negative indirect effect on willingness to negotiate via perceived motivational norm violation ($b = -0.35$, $SE = 0.05$, $CI_{95\%}$ [−0.46, −0.26]). Meanwhile, there was no effect on willingness to negotiate via perceived work meaningfulness or organizational support (all 95% CIs excluded zero). There was, however, a significant negative indirect effect via perceived financial infeasibility ($b = -0.44$, $SE = 0.06$, $CI_{95\%}$ [−0.56, −0.34]).

Similarly, when including the other mechanisms in the model, social impact framing still had a negative effect on the second operationalization of the dependent variable, pay requested, via perceived motivational norm violation ($b = -0.07$, $SE = 0.01$, $CI_{95\%}$ [−0.10, −0.05]). Again, there was no effect on willingness to negotiate via either perceived work meaningfulness or organizational support (all 95% CIs excluded zero). However, there was a significant negative indirect effect via perceived financial infeasibility as well ($b = -0.12$, $SE = 0.02$, $CI_{95\%}$ [−0.15, −0.09]).

Notably, the placement of the mediator measure either before or after the dependent variable did not change the pattern of results (interaction p-value = 0.979).

Discussion

In Study 3, we found additional and ecologically valid support for our theory in a field experiment. Specifically, by presenting participants with a supposedly real task similar to the types of tasks they encounter in their everyday work on the MTurk platform, we increased the odds of capturing participants' genuine attitudes and behaviors. This was bolstered by our inclusion of only those participants who reported not knowing the true purpose of the study.

Interestingly, perceived financial infeasibility emerged as a concurrent mechanism that partially mediated the

Figure 4. Study 3 Responses by Condition

Notes. Social impact framing condition $n = 686$; control condition $n = 742$. ns = nonsignificant. Error bars are 99% confidence intervals.
*$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; †$p < 0.10$.

negative effect of social impact framing on negotiation for monetary job rewards. This occurred despite our including any specific or explicit mention about the organization's financial position, charitable giving, or capacity to pay higher wages in our manipulations. This raises the possibility that organizations using a social impact framing not only inhibit compensation demands by eliciting perceptions of norm violation among job candidates regarding asking for higher pay, but also by spurring the heuristic that engaging in business for the sake of the greater good necessarily entails less money available to pay workers.

Whereas Studies 2 and 3, as field experiments, had both strong internal and external validity, we nonetheless sought to replicate our effects in a different sample of adults in Study 4, a scenario-based simulation. In this study, we took the further conservative approach of placing both the manipulation check and mediator after the dependent measures for all participants.

Study 4
Method
Sample and Procedure. Participants were 900 adults recruited from Prolific. After excluding those who failed comprehension and attention check questions, we had a final sample of 835 respondents ($M_{age} = 32.16$, $SD_{age} = 10.89$). The sample comprised 392 men (47%), 435 women (52%), and 8 nonbinary participants (1%). More than 56% of participants had a bachelor's degree or higher, and participants were from a range of occupations (e.g., retail, construction, healthcare).

We told participants that they would take part in a work simulation in the role of a job candidate. After reading about their role as a middle-school teacher applying for jobs, we asked them to watch a video of a company founder providing information about an organization to which they were applying. Videos were the same as those utilized in Studies 2 and 3. There were 408 participants in the social impact framing condition

("TeachToChange") and 427 participants in the control condition ("AfterTeach"). After watching the video, participants responded to survey questions.

Measures
All measures were on a scale of 1 = "strongly disagree" to 7 = "strongly agree" unless otherwise stated. We utilized three operationalizations for the dependent variable as described. The dependent variables followed directly after the video manipulation, and all other measures were placed after the dependent variables. For the manipulation check and mediator, we utilized the same measures as those described in Study 2.

Negotiation Comfort (DV1). As in Study 3, participants indicated to what extent they would feel comfortable asking for additional forms of monetary compensation for the work being offered, such as a signing bonus (1 = "not at all comfortable" to 7 = "extremely comfortable").

Willingness to Negotiate (DV2). As in Study 3, participants indicated how likely they would be to ask for more money for the job (1 = "not at all likely to ask" to 7 = "extremely likely to ask").

Pay Requested (DV3). We used a Likert-type scale for pay requested, asking participants, "If you were to ask for more money, how much more would you ask for?" (1 = "no more, I would not ask for more money" to 7 = "a great deal more").

Alternative Explanations. We used the same three measures described in Study 3.

Results
Figure 5 shows responses by condition for Study 4 variables. Descriptive statistics and correlations are in Online Supplement III, Table D. The manipulation was effective as participants in the social impact condition

Figure 5. Study 4 Responses by Condition

Notes. Social impact framing condition $n = 408$; control condition $n = 427$. ns = nonsignificant. Error bars are 99% confidence intervals.
*$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; †$p < 0.10$.

reported company emphasis on social impact ($M = 6.21$, $SD = 0.62$) more so than those in the control condition ($M = 5.94$, $SD = 0.67$), $b = 0.28$, $SE = 0.04$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta^2 = 0.04$.

Supporting Hypothesis 1, participants in the social impact framing condition reported to a greater extent that speaking up about pay would violate organizational norms ($M = 5.04$, $SD = 1.38$) than those in the control condition ($M = 4.12$, $SD = 1.44$), $b = 0.92$, $SE = 0.10$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta^2 = 0.10$.

In support of Hypothesis 2, social impact framing was also negatively associated with all three operationalizations of compensation demands. Participants in the social impact condition reported that they would be less comfortable inquiring about more pay ($M = 3.70$, $SD = 1.67$) relative to those in the control condition ($M = 4.39$, $SD = 1.52$), $b = -0.69$, $SE = 0.11$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta^2 = 0.05$. They also reported being less willing to negotiate pay ($M = 3.40$, $SD = 1.51$) compared with those in the control condition ($M = 4.04$, $SD = 1.43$), $b = -0.64$, $SE = 0.10$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta^2 = 0.05$. Finally, the amount any potential additional pay requested was lower in the social impact condition ($M = 2.62$, $SD = 1.28$) relative to the control condition ($M = 3.08$, $SD = 1.18$), $b = -0.47$, $SE = 0.09$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta^2 = 0.03$.

Supporting Hypothesis 3, mediation analyses (5,000 resamples) demonstrated that perceived motivational norm violation mediated the negative indirect effect of social impact framing on all three measures of compensation demands: negotiation comfort ($b = -0.53$, $SE = 0.06$, CI$_{95\%}$ [-0.66, -0.41]), willingness to negotiate ($b = -0.52$, $SE = 0.06$, 95% CI [-0.65, -0.41]), and pay requested ($b = -0.34$, $SE = 0.04$, CI$_{95\%}$ [-0.44, -0.26]).

Robustness Check. As a robustness check, we included all three potential alternative or concurrent explanations as additional mechanisms in our model. Results via perceived motivational norm violation remained unchanged in direction and significance. Online Supplement III (Figure B) displays mediation analysis via the focal and additional explanations. Social impact framing had a negative effect on all three dependent variables via perceived norm violation: negotiation comfort ($b = -0.50$, $SE = 0.06$, CI$_{95\%}$ [-0.63, -0.39]), willingness to negotiate ($b = -0.47$, $SE = 0.06$, CI$_{95\%}$ [-0.59, -0.35]), and pay requested ($b = -0.31$, $SE = 0.04$, CI$_{95\%}$ [-0.40, -0.23]). Meanwhile, neither work meaningfulness nor perceived organizational support mediated the effect of social impact framing on compensation demands (95% CIs included zero). Perceived financial infeasibility similarly did not mediate the effect on pay requested ($b = -0.02$, $SE = 0.02$, CI$_{95\%}$ [-0.05, 0.01]); however, it partially mediated the effect on negotiation comfort ($b = -0.05$, $SE = 0.02$, CI$_{95\%}$ [-0.11, -0.01]) and willingness to negotiate ($b = -0.06$, $SE = 0.02$, CI$_{95\%}$ [-0.11, -0.02]).

Discussion

Study 4 provides additional support for our theory in a sample that included working adults. We ruled out the possibility of priming effects driving results by measuring all mechanisms after the dependent variable. We also demonstrated that our focal mechanism, perceived motivational norm violation, mediated the effect of social impact framing on compensation demands when accounting for other explanations. Perceived financial infeasibility once again emerged as another relevant mechanism, albeit this time less consistently. This provides further support for the additional novel finding from our research that social impact framing can spur perceptions of organizations' inability to pay higher wages even when no information is provided about organization's financial situation or charitable giving.

A limitation of Study 4 was that, as with Studies 2 and 3, it examined the phenomenon within the context of a single industry—education. It is possible that participants perceive higher standards for prosociality and, thus, pressures to forgo pay, when working in this industry. Additionally, we only examined participants' reticence to negotiate for monetary work rewards, which is just one of several issues up for discussion in job entry negotiations (De Dreu et al. 2000). To demonstrate the generalizability of our theory across industries and examine our research question regarding the unique effects of social impact framing on monetary (versus nonmonetary) job rewards, we conducted Study 5—a preregistered stimulus sampling study in which we tested the effect across multiple industries and also asked participants to report their negotiation behavior for several different job rewards.

Study 5
Method
Sample and Procedure. Study 5 aimed to demonstrate the generalizability of our theory across different industries and occupations, while also examining the relative strength of effects for monetary (versus nonmonetary) job rewards. We recruited 1,703 participants from Prolific. Following our preregistration, we excluded participants with duplicate IPs ($n = 18$) and those who failed the attention check ($n = 49$), leaving a final sample of 1,636 participants ($M_{age} = 37.10$, $SD_{age} = 12.15$; 49% male, 49% female, 2% nonbinary). We instructed participants to take on the role of a job candidate in a workplace simulation. We then exposed participants to the description of the hiring organization.

Manipulation of Social Impact Framing. We employed a between-subjects design in which we randomly assigned participants to one of two experimental conditions in which we manipulated the description of the

hiring organization (social impact framing versus control). To examine effects across industries and occupations, within each condition, we showed participants a company description pertaining to one of four different industries (stimuli): education, finance, food manufacturing, and healthcare. For each industry, we were careful to ensure that the business model described remained the same across social impact and control conditions, and we did not mention anything regarding the company's financial position or charitable giving. Rather, the only differences between the two conditions were around the company's mission and purpose. For instance, the finance stimulus in both experimental conditions described a microfinance organization that "raises capital from investors in wealthier countries like the U.S. to provide loans to farmers, artisans, and entrepreneurs in developing countries worldwide." However, in the social impact condition, working at the company was said to be "first and foremost about helping and giving back to others," whereas in the control condition it was said to be "first and foremost about being highly competent and delivering results." All company descriptions across stimuli are on the project's OSF page.

Measures

We measured all items on a scale of 1 = "strongly disagree" to 7 = "strongly agree" unless otherwise stated. As mentioned earlier, job entry negotiations typically involve multiple considerations apart from salary. For this reason, in this study, we examined participant responses regarding both monetary and nonmonetary job rewards. Specifically, drawing from the New Recruit exercise by Neale (1997), we asked participants about the extent to which they would perceive norm violation and make requests for three monetary job rewards (salary, bonus, and moving expense coverage) and three nonmonetary job rewards (health insurance coverage, vacation time, and job role). All questions were repeated with reference to each of the six job rewards. To avoid survey fatigue, we utilized one-item scales for each of the two dependent variables regarding compensation demands.

Manipulation Check. We used four items to assess the efficacy of our manipulation, with sample item "[Organization name] believes that its work serves a greater purpose" ($\alpha = 0.92$).

Perceived Motivational Norm Violation. We used the same three items described in the previous studies to assess perceptions of norm violation for each of the six job rewards (e.g., "It would seem against the company's values to try to negotiate [job reward] for the job" ($\alpha_{\text{salary}} = 0.92$, $\alpha_{\text{bonus}} = 0.97$, $\alpha_{\text{moving}} = 0.97$, $\alpha_{\text{health}} = 0.97$, $\alpha_{\text{vacation}} = 0.98$, $\alpha_{\text{jobrole}} = 0.97$).

Negotiation Comfort (DV1). Participants responded to the following question for each job reward: "Based on what [Organization] values as a company and the types of employees it is seeking, to what extent do you feel comfortable asking the hiring manager for [job reward]?" (1 = "not at all comfortable," 7 = "extremely comfortable").

Willingness to Negotiate (DV2). For each job reward, we additionally measured compensation demands with the following question: "Based on what [Organization] values as a company and the types of employees it is seeking, to what extent are you likely to ask the hiring manager for [job reward]?" (1 = "not at all likely to ask," 7 = "extremely likely to ask").

Alternative Explanations. We assessed the three potential alternative mechanisms using the same measures described in Studies 3 and 4 ($\alpha_{\text{infeasible}} = 0.88$, $\alpha_{\text{meaningful}} = 0.95$, $\alpha_{\text{POS}} = 0.91$).

Results

Main Analysis. In line with one of the key goals of this study, we analyzed results by aggregating responses for the monetary and nonmonetary job rewards.[7] Figure 6 show responses by condition for each of these two types of job rewards, whereas Table 1 shows descriptive statistics and correlations for Study 5 variables. Figures 7 and 8 show mediated effects on both monetary and nonmonetary job rewards.

The manipulation was effective as participants in the experimental condition reported to a greater extent that the company emphasized social impact ($M = 6.59$, $SD = 0.60$) than participants in the control condition ($M = 4.78$, $SD = 1.76$), $b = 2.11$, $SE = 0.07$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta^2 = 0.39$.

We first examine Hypotheses 1–3, which concern only monetary job rewards. In support of Hypothesis 1, participants in the social impact framing condition perceived greater motivational norm violation in negotiating for monetary job rewards ($M = 3.81$, $SD = 1.37$) than those in the control condition ($M = 2.83$, $SD = 1.20$), $b = 0.98$, $SE = 0.06$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta^2 = 0.13$.

Supporting Hypothesis 2, social impact framing was also negatively associated with both operationalizations of compensation demands. Specifically, participants in the social impact condition reported that they would be less comfortable negotiating for monetary rewards ($M = 4.15$, $SD = 1.42$) than those in the control condition ($M = 4.81$, $SD = 1.22$), $b = -0.66$, $SE = 0.07$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta^2 = 0.06$. They also reported being less likely to negotiate for monetary rewards ($M = 4.17$, $SD = 1.42$) than those in the control condition ($M = 4.82$, $SD = 1.24$), $b = -0.65$, $SE = 0.07$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta^2 = 0.06$.

Furthermore, in support of Hypothesis 3, mediation analysis using 5,000 bootstrap-based replications showed a negative indirect effect of social impact framing via

Figure 6. Study 5 Responses by Condition

Monetary Job Rewards

□ Control   ▨ Social Impact Framing

Non-Monetary Job Rewards

□ Control   ▨ Social Impact Framing

Notes. Social impact framing condition $n = 810$; control condition $n = 826$. ns = nonsignificant. Error bars are 99% confidence intervals.
*$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; [†]$p < 0.10$.

**Table 1.** Study 5 Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations

Variables	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. *Social impact framing*[a]	0.50	0.50										
2. *Perceived financial infeasibility*	3.18	1.15	0.38**	(0.88)								
3. *Perceived work meaningfulness*	5.45	1.18	0.27**	0.17**	(0.95)							
4. *Perceived organizational support*	4.50	1.24	0.25**	0.18**	0.71**	(0.91)						
5. *Perceived motivational norm violation: monetary*	3.32	1.38	0.37**	0.52**	0.10**	0.10**	(0.94)					
6. *Negotiation comfort: monetary (DV1)*	4.48	1.36	−0.24**	−0.49**	−0.11**	−0.11**	−0.73**	(0.80)				
7. *Negotiation willingness: monetary (DV2)*	4.50	1.37	−0.24**	−0.47**	−0.11**	−0.14**	−0.69**	0.91**	(0.76)			
8. *Perceived motivational norm violation: nonmonetary*	3.20	1.22	−0.08**	0.21**	−0.11**	−0.13**	0.48**	−0.36**	−0.33**	(0.89)		
9. *Negotiation comfort: nonmonetary (DV3)*	4.54	1.24	0.11**	−0.17**	0.07**	0.07**	−0.29**	0.51**	0.48**	−0.69**	(0.63)	
10. *Negotiation willingness: nonmonetary (DV4)*	4.45	1.28	0.10**	−0.15**	0.06*	0.05*	−0.24**	0.43**	0.48**	−0.64**	0.91**	(0.60)

Notes. $N = 1,636$. Standardized reliability estimates (alphas) appear in parentheses along the diagonal.
[a]0 = control condition, 1 = social impact framing condition.
[†]$p < 0.10$; *$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$.

Figure 7. Study 5 Mediation Models for Effects on Requests for Monetary Job Rewards

Notes. Gray boxes and solid lines are for the focal mechanism, whereas white boxes and dashed lines are for the concurrent explanations. Independent variable coded as 0 = control, 1 = social impact framing. Standard errors shown in parentheses. Effects from each mechanism to the dependent variable are reported, controlling for the independent variable (social impact framing). Bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals from 5,000 bootstrap samples are reported for each indirect effect.

perceived motivational norm violation on both negotiation comfort ($b = -0.72$, $SE = 0.05$, $\text{CI}_{95\%}$ [-0.83, -0.62]) and willingness ($b = -0.68$, $SE = 0.05$, $\text{CI}_{95\%}$ [-0.78, -0.58]) for monetary job rewards.

Supplementary Analysis. We also examined the question of whether the predicted effects of social impact framing would operate more strongly for monetary (versus nonmonetary) job rewards. We found that effects on nonmonetary job rewards were, in fact, in the opposite direction as those for monetary job rewards. Specifically, participants in the social impact condition perceived less motivational norm violation to negotiate for nonmonetary job rewards ($M = 3.10$, $SD = 1.22$) compared with those in the control condition ($M = 2.29$, $SD = 3.10$), $b = -0.19$, $SE = 0.06$, $p = 0.002$. They also reported feeling more comfortable negotiating for nonmonetary job rewards $M = 4.67$, $SD = 1.23$) than those in the control condition ($M = 4.40$, $SD = 1.24$), $b = 0.27$,

$SE = 0.06$, $p < 0.001$. Additionally, they were more likely to negotiate for nonmonetary job rewards ($M = 4.57$, $SD = 1.26$) than participants in the control condition ($M = 4.33$, $SD = 1.28$), $b = 0.24$, $SE = 0.06$, $p < 0.001$.

Robustness Checks. We examined the effects of alternative mechanisms in our model. The pattern of results via norm violation remained unchanged when including all additional explanations in the model. We found that perceived financial infeasibility partially negatively mediated the effect of social impact framing on comfort and willingness to negotiate for both monetary and nonmonetary job rewards (all 95% CIs excluded zero). Additionally, perceived organizational support also partially negatively mediated the effect of social impact framing on willingness to negotiate for monetary job rewards. However, each of these effects was significantly smaller than the negative effect via perceived norm violation (all 95% CIs of the bootstrapped differences excluded zero).

Figure 8. Study 5 Mediation Models for Effects on Requests for Nonmonetary Job Rewards

Notes. Gray boxes and solid lines are for the focal mechanism, whereas white boxes and dashed lines are for the concurrent explanations. Independent variable coded as 0 = control, 1 = social impact framing. Standard errors shown in parentheses. Effects from each mechanism to the dependent variable are reported, controlling for the independent variable (social impact framing). Bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals from 5,000 bootstrap samples are reported for each indirect effect.

We further examined whether effects were stronger for certain stimuli (industries) relative to others. There was no significant interaction of social impact framing and stimulus on any of the variables with one exception: a significant interaction on the mediator, perceived norm violation, for nonmonetary job rewards ($b = -0.13$, $SE = 0.05$, $p = 0.017$). We examined all 28 possible pairwise comparisons, including 10 significant contrasts. We found that certain stimuli in the social impact condition generated especially strong perceptions of norm violation than other stimuli in the control condition, which was to be expected (e.g., health in the social impact framing condition versus marketing in the control condition). Despite some such specific contrasts emerging, we did not observe any meaningful patterns of theoretical relevance. Moreover, the pattern and significance of hypothesized effects remained unchanged when controlling for stimulus type in the model.

Discussion

Study 5 provided additional support for our theory, demonstrating that effects are generalizable across industries and occupations as well as unique to job candidate requests for monetary job rewards. Our finding that job candidates are more willing to request nonmonetary rewards when social impact framing is salient could be driven by several possibilities. The first is that candidates feel more emboldened to request nonmonetary rewards as a "fair trade-off" in multi-issue negotiations with various job rewards on the table. The second is that job candidates perceive that social impact organizations are willing to take care of employees in other (nonmonetary) ways. This is demonstrated in part by the finding that the mechanism of perceived organizational support partially negatively mediated the effect of social impact framing on willingness to negotiate for monetary job rewards. It suggests that participants were

willing to forgo monetary rewards in part owing to the perception that the organization would be otherwise (nonmonetarily) supportive.

Additionally, we again found that perceived financial infeasibility partially (albeit more weakly) mediated the negative effect of social impact framing on negotiation for monetary job rewards. This provides increasingly robust support for the notion that social impact framing generates perceptions among job candidates that the hiring organization cannot afford higher pay even when no information is provided about the organization's financial situation.

General Discussion

Our findings demonstrate a potential negative consequence of social impact framing for job candidates' economic welfare. Organizations today are increasingly presenting their work as being in service and support of the broader community. Although the opportunity to make a social impact comes with many benefits, job candidates can feel pressure to self-censor about their desires for material work rewards as they anticipate that doing so would be viewed as incompatible with organizational ideals to value work primarily for the intrinsic reward of contributing to society. As a result, candidates self-censor on matters of pay and make lower compensation demands. Results from five studies using diverse methodologies provide support for our theory. Our research suggests that workers may incur material costs when joining organizations that strongly signal their dedication to advancing the social good because of fear that their compensation demands would be seen as violating the organization's motivational norms.

Theoretical Implications

Our research contributes to scholarship on social impact framing and implicit theories of work motivation with implications for job candidates' financial outcomes. First, we note that organizations use social impact framing in part because of research demonstrating it to be a useful tool in making workers feel more satisfied with their jobs and motivating them to perform better. This illustrates a common way in which organizational decision makers utilize knowledge on human psychology and needs—most notably, familiarity with the benefits of task significance—to achieve results that are desirable for employers and employees alike. We propose that it is possible, however, that large-scale organizational sense-giving practices that target employee psychology (perhaps with positive intent) may undermine benefits to workers in other overlooked domains.

Specifically, contemporary organizational scholarship paints an entirely wholesome view of the outcomes of social impact framing for job candidates by presuming that they are more than willing to forego some pay in exchange for the potential to experience meaningfulness in their work (Burbano 2016, Hu and Hirsh 2017). Indeed, research on compensatory wages has long noted that nonpecuniary benefits such as meaningfulness relate to occupational wage differentials (Daymont and Andrisani 1984). Our research contrasts with this past work by shedding light on a qualitatively different—and decidedly less positive—mechanism that operates concurrently to drive the same effect. Specifically, we demonstrate that strong organizational emphasis on social impact can also make job candidates feel that it would be inappropriate to ask for more pay, thereby making them less inclined to do so. Our findings thus paint a more complete picture of the reasons driving job candidate pay forfeiture when organizations communicate their purpose to serve the greater good. We acknowledge, however, that for certain individuals, the trade-off may be entirely voluntary. It is also possible that, in general, the negative effects are constrained to financial outcomes rather than overall well-being, when accounting for all compromises and potential benefits of the work.

Another key finding that emerged from our studies is that job candidates perceive organizations that use social impact framing to have less money available for compensation. We observed this via concurrent mediation through perceived financial infeasibility on some of the dependent variables in addition to the predicted mediation via perceived motivational norm violation. Most interestingly, this seems to occur on a heuristic basis as it manifests even when we did not mention anything about the organization's financial position or charitable giving. Indeed, we deliberately designed our experimental stimuli to only manipulate the framing of the organization's work, rather than the business model or nature of the work itself. Altogether, this suggests a more complex perceptual process than initially hypothesized. It also implies that more information about the organization's financial position might embolden job candidates to negotiate more assertively.

Results from our studies also contribute to the literature on employee financial inclusion (Carr et al. 2008, Meuris and Leana 2015). Work for pay constitutes one of the primary means by which most individuals earn their livelihoods, and a key way of attaining extrinsic rewards is to successfully navigate interactions with one's employer. Those who fail to self-advocate can miss tremendous cumulative gains over their lifetimes. Moreover, although both meaningfulness and high salaries are considered valued job attributes, people consistently choose the latter over the former when presented with tradeoffs (Ward, 2023). Our findings show that an organization's otherwise worthwhile mission to improve the lives of others can unwittingly hinder economic outcomes for those who seek to work within the organization itself. We further note that the phenomenon we

uncover could negatively affect individuals beyond the focal job candidate as workers—particularly those in poorer households—frequently have dependents who rely on them for their economic welfare and progress (Lanjouw and Ravallion 1995).

We further highlight that scholarship on work motivation to date has paid significant attention to ways in which extrinsic rewards might undermine intrinsic work motivation (e.g., Deci 1971, Cerasoli et al. 2014). In the present research, we instead lend scrutiny to the question of how the expectation to possess high intrinsic motivation—as commonplace and presumed for work that makes a social impact—influences job candidates' abilities to meet their extrinsic concerns. This perspective—that is, one that is concerned with the improvement of workers' material outcomes—is relatively understudied within the motivation literature (e.g., Gerhart and Fang 2015).

Finally, we point out that although negotiations are embedded within a social and cultural context, negotiations research pays relatively little attention to how the broader milieu influences the aspirations of negotiating parties and the extent to which each party is likely to push for its concerns. Rather, perspectives on negotiations focus on the conflicts of interest inherent among individuals with competing priorities, with an examination of contextual factors (e.g., national and organizational culture) only recently becoming more common (for a review, see Brett and Thompson 2016). As such, focusing primarily on individual- and dyadic-level considerations can prevent a fuller understanding of factors that explain why workers take a reticent approach when given the opportunity to bargain their wage. Our research on the effect of organizations' social impact framing on employee negotiation behavior thus responds to calls to study the social context of negotiations (Thompson et al. 2010, Boothby et al. 2023).

Practical Implications

Our findings imply that organizational initiatives designed to elicit positive outcomes for job candidates in one area (i.e., the enhancement of intrinsic motivation by emphasis on social impact) may clash with drivers of their outcomes in other areas (i.e., their comfort advocating for material work rewards). This presents a conundrum for organizations. To the extent that organizations are genuine in their efforts to do good for society, it is favorable to publicize such efforts and encourage both internal and external stakeholders to support them. Moreover, the deliberate shaping of attitudes toward work—such as via the promotion of social impact—is often a necessary reality of organizational life (Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991), with benefits including the creation of a consistent work culture and the facilitation of smooth work operations. It would thus be facile to suggest that organizations ought to deemphasize the importance of social impact, which remains an important work motivator (Hackman and Oldham 1976, Grant 2008). We do,

however, recommend that organizations be cognizant of the potential unintended negative consequences of this emphasis for workers in the domain of their financial rewards.

To tackle this issue, organizations can take several steps. First, they might raise awareness about managerial biases against job candidates' questions about extrinsic work rewards, particularly when those biases can cost organizations high-performing workers (Derfler-Rozin and Pitesa 2020). Indeed, the motivation to work to provide for one's family, for instance, is shown to compensate for low intrinsic motivation and positively impact job performance (Menges et al. 2017). Relatedly, organizations might be careful not to romanticize work passion and intrinsic motivation to the extent that they are seen as the only viable motivators and internalized by job candidates such that they feel compelled to self-censor about pay. Third, assuming organizations are not interested in deliberately suppressing pay via emphasis on social impact, they can create greater transparency around their norms and values around pay-related concerns, as well as about the organization's financial position and capacity to reward workers monetarily when deserved. Finally, organizations can focus on meting out monetary rewards primarily based on objective work performance as opposed to via job entry negotiations, which are known to elicit many managerial biases (Hardy et al. 2022).

Limitations and Future Directions

Our multimethod approach—involving qualitative research, field experiments, and simulation-based studies—allowed for a rich, in-depth examination of the proposed phenomenon, including internally and externally valid tests of the theory. Effect sizes in our study range from small (Studies 2 and 4) to medium and large (Studies 3 and 5). These differences likely are due to variations across studies in sample (e.g., students versus working adults), sample size, and methodology (e.g., field versus laboratory studies). We note that the phenomenon could have implications for job candidates' material progress even if objective effect sizes are small, as small salary increases can have a large compounding effect over the long term. For example, prior research finds that those who negotiate an extra $5,000 in starting salary can, assuming conservative raises and interest rates, accumulate as much as $560,000 more than their peers over the course of a career (Babcock and Laschever 2003, Marks and Harold 2011). More generally, even small biases in hiring evaluations can lead to significant rates of hiring discrimination (Hardy et al. 2022).

To obtain more precise estimates of the magnitude of the effect, future research might explore the phenomenon in real-life interview settings across organizations that vary in their emphasis on social impact. This would enable scholars to better understand how the processes described unfold within the contexts in which they

occur. It is further possible that social impact framing has larger negative economic effects than uncovered in our studies, as perceptions of norm violation could also impel workers to regularly agree to take upon additional responsibilities or overtime hours without requesting greater monetary rewards for doing so (e.g., Bunderson and Thompson 2009). Moreover, other variables known to impact negotiation outcomes—such as job candidates' gender and bargaining power (Brett and Thompson 2016)—could play a role in exacerbating effects.

One limitation of our research is that it examines perceived—rather than real—organizational norms. To the extent that job candidates might be incorrect in their evaluations of organizational norms, they could benefit from greater awareness of their own perceptual biases and try to overcome their fear of asking for higher pay. However, if job candidates' perceptions are correct, they might indeed risk being hired for the job by speaking up about pay. Future research might examine the extent to which there is a (mis-)match between job candidates' perceptions about organizational norms in social impact contexts and the actual norms that govern such workplaces.

Relatedly, results from our research also raise questions of whether (a) managers do, in fact, perceive discussions of and requests for pay in contexts where social impact is emphasized as being a violation of organizational norms, and (b) managers are inclined to deliberately engage in communication about social impact for the explicit purpose of suppressing employee pay. On the one hand, prior literature suggests that managers might be aware that social impact framing can strategically be used to inhibit employees' expressions of their material needs and desires from work. Indeed, scholars argue that employers' emphasis on work passion can, at times, serve as means of normative control that is primarily geared toward attaining valued work outcomes (Jachimowicz and Weisman 2022). Social information processing theory posits that organizations often manipulate the salience of information about intrinsic and extrinsic justifications for work to engender specific affective responses from employees about their jobs (O'Reilly and Roberts 1975, Salancik and Pfeffer 1978). Further, people view poor treatment of workers, such as asking employees to work extra hours without pay, as more legitimate when workers are presumed to be passionate about their work (Kim et al. 2020). On the other hand, managers may well be emphasizing social impact with benevolent intentions, such as simply to increase job candidates' future engagement and well-being. Under those conditions, it is unlikely that managers would simultaneously seek to improve workers' well-being as well as exploit them. Future research might thus examine the extent to which managers are aware of the capacity for social impact framing to inhibit job candidate compensation demands, and the extent to which they use this knowledge to their advantage as a negotiation tactic in wage discussions.

Our research also relies on the assumption that hiring managers cannot fully identify whether a job candidate is asking for lower pay as an impression management tactic to cover up extrinsic motivations. If managers could accurately gauge the true nature of job candidates' work motivations, then candidates' behavior of asking for lower pay may not succeed in signaling intrinsic motivation. A great deal of research suggests, however, that managers are often not, in fact, privy to job candidates' use of impression management tactics, including outright deception or faking (Hogue et al. 2013, Roulin et al. 2016). This suggests that candidates can potentially pretend to be less motivated by money at the outset and then later ask for a pay raise when the opportunity arises after having secured the job. Future research might examine the extent to which recursive mentalizing (De Freitas et al. 2019)—that is, job candidates' awareness of managers' awareness of their true work motivations—influences candidates' asks for monetary rewards.

Finally, although we focus on job candidates in this research, it may be useful to also consider the experiences of employees who have already secured the job. Would workers be just as reticent to negotiate pay in a social impact context after having already being hired? As part of our research process, we made an initial foray into this question via a field survey (see Online Supplement V for details). Our data suggest that social impact framing continues to breed negotiation discomfort even among current employees. However, this does not necessarily translate to weakened negotiation behavior, perhaps because current employees feel relatively less vulnerable than do job candidates.

Conclusion

This research highlights a potential financial drawback for employees of organizations' strong emphasis on socially impactful work. Over five studies, we demonstrate that, when organizations utilize social impact framing, job candidates perceive that asking for monetary job rewards constitute a norm violation, and they consequently make lower compensation demands. This effect does not, however, hold for nonmonetary job rewards. A key contribution of this research is revealing that employees' acceptance of lower pay does not necessarily or solely arise from a willingness to trade money for meaningful work as prior research has suggested, but rather (or additionally) from concerns about violating organizational norms that appear to disfavor speaking up on matters of pay. Altogether, this research serves as a note of caution for managers, showing that there may be unintended negative consequences of otherwise well-intentioned campaigns to motivate job candidates by highlighting the importance of making prosocial contributions through work.

Endnotes

[1] As a robustness check, we also analyzed responses using a three-category coding scheme in which any "yes" response that reflected some degree of uncertainty were grouped under a third category coded as "maybe" (i.e., 0 = "no," 1 = "yes," 2 = "maybe"). The pattern of results remained unchanged.

[2] As shown in Figure 2 and Online Supplement III, Table A, participants also provided rationales unrelated to characteristics of the organization. For instance, some participants described reticence to make compensation demands because of personal characteristics, such as lack of confidence, gender, or race. Others did not see any reason to ask for a higher wage because they perceived that the market wage offered was fair. Others said they would avoid negotiating because they perceived an uncertain economic environment such that others would be willing to work for less or could be hired instead. Responses within this group were varied with each having a relatively low count. By placing them in a single group, we were able to separate them out from rationales that were more clearly and directly driven by participant interpretations of the organizational context.

[3] A pretest following a between-subjects design was conducted on a separate sample of 274 participants recruited via MTurk to test for any differences in the extent to which the company in each condition was described positively. Participants watched either of the two videos and responded to four items on a scale of 1 = "strongly disagree" to 5 = "strongly agree." Sample items included "This company is described very positively," and "This company has favorable attributes" ($\alpha = .79$). As intended, there was no significant difference in the extent to which the company in the social impact framing condition ($M = 4.63$, $SD = 0.49$) was described positively relative to the one in the control condition ($M = 4.55$, $SD = 0.52$), $t(272) = -1.27$, $p = 0.20$.

[4] Although we did not have predictions around whether social impact framing is more likely to manifest as complete self-censoring (binary DV1) versus a reduction in pay requested (DV2), our data allowed us to assess the interplay between these two variables in an exploratory manner. Specifically, as the effect of social impact framing on pay requested (DV2) is conditional on the decision of whether to negotiate (DV1), we used a hurdle model to test the effect on pay requested specifically among participants who said "yes" to negotiating. Consistent with results described earlier, social impact framing had a negative effect on "clearing the hurdle" of opting to bid a higher amount ($b = -0.34$, $SE = 0.23$, $p < .001$). However, it did not after this point—that is, among those who opted to negotiate—impact the amount requested ($b = 0.30$, $SE = 0.41$, $p = 0.469$). This suggests that the negative effect of social impact framing on compensation demands manifests primarily as the decision to not speak up to negotiate.

[5] Following our preregistration, we collected an initial sample of 1,700 participants. After dropping participants based on the exclusion criteria, we collected data from an additional 100 participants to have a final sample of at least 1,500 participants who met the inclusion criteria.

[6] As in Study 2, we used a hurdle model to conduct an exploratory test of the effect of social impact framing on pay requested (DV2) conditional on the decision of whether to negotiate (DV1). Consistent with the main results described earlier, the first stage of the hurdle model showed that social impact framing negatively impacted the decision to ask for more pay ($b = -0.34$, SE = 0.07, $p < 0.001$). However, among those who chose to negotiate, it did not impact pay requested ($b = 0.01$, $SE = 0.06$, $p = 0.84$). This, again, suggests that social impact framing primarily effects compensation demands through the decision to not try to negotiate pay at all.

[7] Reliabilities for the aggregated monetary job rewards scales were as follows: norm violation ($\alpha = 0.94$), negotiation comfort ($\alpha = 0.80$), and negotiation willingness ($\alpha = 0.76$). Reliabilities for the aggregated nonmonetary job rewards scales were as follows: norm violation ($\alpha = 0.89$), negotiation comfort ($\alpha = 0.63$), and negotiation willingness ($\alpha = 0.60$). As reliabilities for the two nonmonetary DVs were lower than 0.70, we additionally conducted separate analyses for each of the nonmonetary job rewards (health, vacation, and job role). These analyses can be found in Online Supplement IV.

References

Amabile TM (1993) Motivational synergy: Toward new conceptualizations of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in the workplace. *Human Resource Management Rev.* 3(3):185–201.

Aronson E, Carlsmith JM (1968) Experimentation in social psychology. Lindzey G, Aronson E, eds. *Handbook of Social Psychology*, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA), 1–79.

Audi R (2005) Intrinsic value and meaningful life. *Philos. Papers* 34(3):331–355.

Babcock L, Laschever S (2003) *Women Don't Ask: Negotiation and the Gender Divide* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ).

Baumeister RF (1991) *Meanings of Life* (Guilford Press, New York, NY).

Bolino MC, Kacmar KM, Turnley WH, Gilstrap JB (2008) A multilevel review of impression management motives and behaviors. *J. Management* 34(6):1080–1109.

Boothby EJ, Cooney G., Schweitzer ME (2023). Embracing complexity: A review of negotiation research. *Annual Rev. Psych.* 74:299–332.

Bourdieu P (1991) *Language and Symbolic Power* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA).

Brett J, Thompson L (2016) Negotiation. *Organ. Behav. Human Decision Processes* 136:68–79.

Brickson SL (2005) Organizational identity orientation: Forging a link between organizational identity and organizations' relations with stakeholders. *Admin. Sci. Quart.* 50(4):576–609.

Bunderson JS, Thompson JA (2009) The call of the wild: Zookeepers, callings, and the double-edged sword of deeply meaningful work. *Admin. Sci. Quart.* 54(1):32–57.

Burbano VC (2016) Social responsibility messages and worker wage requirements: Field experimental evidence from online labor marketplaces. *Organ. Sci.* 27(4):1010–1028.

Burke RJ (2005) Backlash in the workplace. *Women Management Rev.* 20(3):165–176.

Button KS, Ioannidis JP, Mokrysz C, Nosek BA, Flint J, Robinson ES, Munafò MR (2013) Power failure: Why small sample size undermines the reliability of neuroscience. *Nat. Rev. Neuroscience* 14(5):365–376.

Campbell DT (1965) Ethnocentrism and other altruistic motives. Levine D, ed. *Nebraska Sympos. Motivation*, vol. 13 (University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, NE), 283–311.

Carr SC, MacLachlan M, Reichman W, Klobas J, Berry MON, Furnham A (2008) Organizational psychology and poverty reduction: Where supply meets demand. *J. Organ. Behav.* 29(7): 843–851.

Carroll AB (1974) Corporate social responsibility: Its managerial impact and implications. *J. Bus. Research.* 2(1):75–88.

Carroll R, Prickett S, eds. (2008) *The Bible: Authorized King James Version* (Oxford University Press, New York).

Cerasoli CP, Nicklin JM, Ford MT (2014) Intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives jointly predict performance: A 40-year meta-analysis. *Psych. Bull.* 140(4):980–1008.

Charmaz K (2014) *Constructing Grounded Theory* (Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA).

Cho Y, Jiang WY (2022) How work orientation impacts objective career outcomes via managerial (mis) perceptions. *Acad. Management J.* 65(4):1353–1382.

Chung J, Monroe GS (2003) Exploring social desirability bias. *J. Bus. Ethics* 44(4):291–302.

Colquitt JA, Sabey TB, Rodell JB, Hill ET (2019) Content validation guidelines: Evaluation criteria for definitional correspondence and definitional distinctiveness. *J. Appl. Psych.* 104(10):1243–1265.

Davis-Blake A, Pfeffer J (1989) Just a mirage: The search for dispositional effects in organizational research. *Acad. Management Rev.* 14(3):385–400.

Daymont TN, Andrisani PJ (1984) Job preferences, college major, and the gender gap in earnings. *J. Human Resources* 19(3): 408–428.

De Dreu CKW, Weingart LR, Kwon S (2000) Influence of social motives on integrative negotiation: A meta-analytic review and test of two theories. *J. Personality Soc. Psych.* 78(5):889–905.

De Freitas J, Thomas K, DeScioli P, Pinker S (2019) Common knowledge, coordination, and strategic mentalizing in human social life. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA* 116(28):13751–13758.

Deci EL (1971) Effects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation. *J. Personality Soc. Psych.* 18(1):105–115.

Deci EL (1972) The effects of contingent and non-contingent rewards and controls on intrinsic motivation. *Organ. Behav. Human Performance* 8(2):217–229.

Deci EL, Koestner R, Ryan RM (1999) A meta-analytic review of experiments examining the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation. *Psych. Bull.* 125(6):627–668.

Dempsey SE, Sanders ML (2010) Meaningful work? Nonprofit marketization and work/life imbalance in popular autobiographies of social entrepreneurship. *Organ.* 17(4):437–459.

Derfler-Rozin R, Pitesa M (2020) Motivation purity bias: Expression of extrinsic motivation undermines perceived intrinsic motivation and engenders bias in selection decisions. *Acad. Management J.* 63(6):1840–1864.

Eisenberger R, Huntington R, Hutchison S, Sowa D (1986) Perceived organizational support. *J. Appl. Psych.* 71(3):500–507.

Frank RH (1996) What price the moral high ground? *Southern. Econom. J.* 63(1):1–17.

Fried Y, Ferris GR (1987) The validity of the job characteristics model: A review and meta-analysis. *Personnel Psych.* 40(2):287–322.

Galinsky AD, Mussweiler T (2001) First offers as anchors: The role of perspective-taking and negotiator focus. *J. Personality Soc. Psych.* 81(4):657–669.

Galinsky AD, Maddux WW, Gilin D, White JB (2008) Why it pays to get inside the head of your opponent: The differential effects of perspective taking and empathy in negotiations. *Psych. Sci.* 19(4):378–384.

Gerhart B, Fang M (2015) Pay, intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation, performance, and creativity in the workplace: Revisiting long-held beliefs. *Annual Rev. Organ. Psych. Organ. Behav.* 2(1): 489–521.

Gioia DA, Chittipeddi K (1991) Sensemaking and sensegiving in strategic change initiation. *Strategic Management J.* 12(6):433–448.

Grant AM (2008) The significance of task significance: Job performance effects, relational mechanisms, and boundary conditions. *J. Appl. Psych.* 93(1):108–124.

Gunia BC, Swaab RI, Sivanathan N, Galinsky AD (2013) The remarkable robustness of the first-offer effect: Across culture, power, and issues. *Personality Soc. Psych. Bull.* 39(12):1547–1558.

Haar J, Spell CS (2003) Where is the justice? Examining work-family backlash in New Zealand: The potential for employee resentment. *New Zealand J. Employee Relations* 28(1):59–74.

Hackman JR, Oldham GR (1976) Motivation through the design of work: Test of a theory. *Organ. Behav. Human Performance* 16(2): 250–279.

Hackman JR, Oldham GR (1980) *Work Redesign* (Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA).

Hardy JH III, Tey KS, Cyrus-Lai W, Martell RF, Olstad A, Uhlmann EL (2022) Bias in context: Small biases in hiring evaluations have big consequences. *J. Management* 48(3):657–692.

Hartley JF (1983) Ideology and organizational behavior. *Internat. Stud. Management Organ.* 13(3):7–34.

Hogue M, Levashina J, Hang H (2013) Will I fake it? The interplay of gender, Machiavellianism, and self-monitoring on strategies for honesty in job interviews. *J. Bus. Ethics* 117(2):399–411.

Hu J, Hirsh JB (2017) Accepting lower salaries for meaningful work. *Frontiers Psych.* 8:1649.

Huising R (2014) The erosion of expert control through censure episodes. *Organ. Sci.* 25(6):1633–1661.

Inspire (2018) Indeed. Accessed April 18, 2021, https://osf.io/mzhn8/?view_only=4d1f19b423ee4d2aa4f2b29f3a21a40a.

Jachimowicz JM, Weisman H (2022) Divergence between employer and employee understandings of passion: Theory and implications for future research. *Res. Organ. Behav.* 42:100167.

Judge TA, Ferris GR (1992) The elusive criterion of fit in human resources staffing decisions. *Human Resource Planning* 15(4).

K12 (2021) Accessed April 14, 2021, https://web.archive.org/web/20210411191231/https://www.k12.com/about-k12/company-mission.html.

Kaplan S (2020) Beyond the business case for social responsibility. *Acad. Manag. Discov.* 6(1):1–4.

Kim JY, Campbell TH, Shepherd S, Kay AC (2020) Understanding contemporary forms of exploitation: Attributions of passion serve to legitimize the poor treatment of workers. *J. Personality Soc. Psych.* 118(1):121–148.

Klare M (2002) *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict* (Henry Holt and Company, New York).

Klein E (Host) (2021) The case against loving your job. The Ezra Klein Show. *The New York Times Online* (November 19). Accessed November 20, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/19/opinion/ezra-klein-podcast-sarah-jaffe.html.

Kolk A (2003) Trends in sustainability reporting by the Fortune Global 250. *Bus. Strategy Environ.* 12(5):279–291.

Kwon M, Lee Cunningham, J, Jachimowicz JM (2023) Discerning Saints: Moralization of Intrinsic Motivation and Selective Prosociality at Work. *Acad. Management J.* ePub ahead of print January 23, https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2020.1761.

Lanjouw P, Ravallion M (1995) Poverty and household size. *Econom. J. (London)* 105(433):1415–1434.

Lee M, Huang L (2018) Gender bias, social impact framing, and evaluation of entrepreneurial ventures. *Organ. Sci.* 29(1):1–16.

Leslie LM, Manchester CF, Park TY, Mehng SA (2012) Flexible work practices: A source of career premiums or penalties? *Acad. Management J.* 55(6):1407–1428.

Marks M, Harold C (2011) Who asks and who receives in salary negotiation. *J. Organ. Behav.* 32(3):371–394.

McGregor D, Cutcher-Gershenfeld J (1960) The human side of enterprise. (McGraw-Hill, New York, NY), 166–171.

McHugh ML (2012) Interrater reliability: The kappa statistic. *Biochemia Medica* 22(3):276–282.

McKinsey (2021) Accessed April 14, 2021, https://web.archive.org/web/20210413161216/https://www.mckinsey.com/about-us/overview.

Menges JI, Tussing DV, Wihler A, Grant AM (2017) When job performance is all relative: How family motivation energizes effort and compensates for intrinsic motivation. *Acad. Management J.* 60(2):695–719.

Meuris J, Leana CR (2015) The high cost of low wages: Economic scarcity effects in organizations. *Res. Organ. Behav.* 35:143–158.

Meyer RD, Dalal RS, Hermida R (2010) A review and synthesis of situational strength in the organizational sciences. *J. Management* 36(1):121–140.

Molden DC (2014) Understanding priming effects in social psychology: What is "social priming" and how does it occur? *Soc. Cognition* 32:1–11.

Moore E (2018) The do's and don'ts of showing passion in an interview. *Glassdoor.* Accessed April 20, 2021, https://osf.io/mzhn8/?view_only=4d1f19b423ee4d2aa4f2b29f3a21a40a.

Morgeson FP, Humphrey SE (2006) The work design questionnaire (WDQ): Developing and validating a comprehensive measure

for assessing job design and the nature of work. *J. Appl. Psych.* 91(6):1321–1339.

Morrison EW (2011) Employee voice behavior: Integration and directions for future research. *Acad. Management Ann.* 5(1): 373–412.

Neale MA (1997) New recruit: Teaching materials for negotiations and decision making. Northwestern University Dispute Resolution Research Center. https://new.negotiationexercises.com/.

Nesterak E (2022) Incorrect ideas about 'why we work' warp our organizations … and our views of human nature. *Behav. Sci.* Accessed May 30, 2022, https://web.archive.org/web/20220830161834/https://behavioralscientist.org/misunderstanding-why-we-work-warps-our-organizations-and-our-view-of-human-nature/.

NPR (2014) 'Silicon Valley' asks: Is your startup really making the world better? Accessed January 9, 2016, http://web.archive.org/web/20161226025758/http://www.npr.org/2014/04/17/304150243/silicon-valley-asks-is-your-startup-really-making-the-world-better.

Ng TW, Yam KC, Aguinis H (2019) Employee perceptions of corporate social responsibility: Effects on pride, embeddedness, and turnover. *Personnel Psych.* 72(1):107–137.

O'Reilly CA, Roberts KH (1975) Individual differences in personality, position in the organization, and job satisfaction. *Organ. Behav. Human Performance* 14(1):144–150.

O'Shea PG, Bush DF (2002) Negotiation for starting salary: Antecedents and outcomes among recent college graduates. *J. Bus. Psych.* 16(3):365–382.

Patagonia (2021). Accessed April 18, 2021, https://web.archive.org/web/20210411032501/https://www.patagonia.com/activism/.

Peer E, Brandimarte L, Samat S, Acquisti A (2017) Beyond the Turk: Alternative platforms for crowdsourcing behavioral research. *J. Experiment. Soc. Psych.* 70:153–163.

Porter LW, Lawler EE (1968) *Managerial Attitudes and Performance* (Richard D. Irwin, Homewood, IL).

Promislo MD, Deckop JR, Giacalone RA, Jurkiewicz CL (2010) Valuing money more than people: The effects of materialism on work–family conflict. *J. Occupational Organ. Psych.* 83(4):935–953.

Roberson L (1990) Functions of work meanings in organizations: Work meanings and work motivation. Brief AP, Nord WR, eds. *Meanings of Occupational Work* (Lexington Books, Blue Ridge Summit, PA), 107–134.

Rothausen TJ, Gonzalez JA, Clarke NE, O'Dell LL (1998) Family-friendly backlash—Fact or fiction? The case of organizations on-site child care centers. *Personnel Psych.* 51(3):685–706.

Roulin N, Krings F, Binggeli S (2016) A dynamic model of applicant faking. *Organ. Psych. Rev.* 6(2):145–170.

Rowthorn RE (1977) Conflict, inflation and money. *Cambridge J. Econom.* 1(3):215–239.

Rudman LA (1998) Self-promotion as a risk factor for women: The costs and benefits of counterstereotypical impression management. *J. Personality Soc. Psych.* 74(3):629–645.

Rudman LA, Glick P (2001) Prescriptive gender stereotypes and backlash toward agentic women. *J. Soc. Issues* 57(4):743–762.

Rudman LA, Phelan JE (2008) Backlash effects for disconfirming gender stereotypes in organizations. *Res. Organ. Behav.* 28:61–79.

Salancik GR, Pfeffer J (1978) A social information processing approach to job attitudes and task design. *Admin. Sci. Quart.* 23(2):224–253.

Sarangi S, Slembrouck S (2014) *Language, Bureaucracy and Social Control* (Routledge, New York).

Sharma G, Good D (2013) The work of middle managers: Sensemaking and sensegiving for creating positive social change. *J. Appl. Behav. Sci.* 49(1):95–122.

Shaw JD, Gupta N (2015) Let the evidence speak again! Financial incentives are more effective than we thought. *Human Resource Management J.* 25(3):281–293.

Sheldon KM, Turban DB, Brown KG, Barrick MR, Judge TA (2003) Applying self-determination theory to organizational research. *Research in Personnel and Human Resource Management,* vol. 22 (Emerald Group Publishing, Bingley, UK), 357–393.

Small, DA, Gelfand M, Babcock L, Gettman H (2007) Who goes to the bargaining table? The influence of gender and framing on the initiation of negotiation. *J. Personality Soc. Psych.* 93(4):600–613.

Steger MF, Dik BJ, Duffy RD (2012) Measuring meaningful work: The work and meaning inventory (WAMI). *J. Career Assessment* 20(3):322–337.

Stevens CK, Kristof AL (1995) Making the right impression: A field study of applicant impression management during job interviews. *J. Appl. Psych.* 80(5):587–606.

Strauss A, Corbin J (1998) *Basics of Qualitative Research Techniques* (Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA).

Thompson L (1990) Negotiation behavior and outcomes: Empirical evidence and theoretical issues. *Psych. Bull.* 108(3):515–532.

Thompson LL, Wang J, Gunia BC (2010) Negotiations. *Annu. Rev. Psych.* 61:491–515.

TOMS (2021) Accessed April 14, 2021, https://web.archive.org/web/20210414025201/https://www.toms.com/.

Vohs KD, Mead NL, Goode MR (2006) The psychological consequences of money. *Sci.* 314(5802):1154–1156.

Ward S (2023) Choosing money over meaningful work: Examining relative job preferences for high compensation versus meaningful work. *Personality Soc. Psych. Bull.* Forthcoming.

Wells GL, Windschitl PD (1999) Stimulus sampling and social psychological experimentation. *Personality Soc. Psych. Bull.* 25(9): 1115–1125.

Wilmers N, Zhang L (2022) Values and inequality: Prosocial jobs and the college wage premium. *Amer. Soc. Rev.* 87(3):415–442.

Wolfe RJ, McGinn KL (2005) Perceived relative power and its influence on negotiations. *Group Decision Negotiation* 14(1):3–20.

Wrzesniewski A, Dekas K, Rosso B (2009) Calling. Lopez SJ, Beauchamp A, eds. *The Encyclopedia of Positive Psychology* (Blackwell. Hoboken, NJ), 115–118.

Insiya Hussain is an assistant professor of management at the McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin. She received her PhD from the University of Maryland. Her research examines the challenges employees face when speaking up to organizational leaders with ideas, issues, and concerns, as well as how they can be more effective in doing so.

Marko Pitesa is associate professor of organizational behavior and human resources at Singapore Management University. He received his PhD from the Grenoble Ecole de Management. His research examines workplaces from the perspective of inclusion and ethics with a particular focus on understanding the sources of economic disadvantage and inequality in organizations.

Stefan Thau is a professor of organizational behavior at INSEAD, Singapore. He received his PhD from the University of Groningen in the Netherlands. He studies social interactions and decisions in organizations.

Michael Schaerer is associate professor of organizational behavior and human resources at the Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University. He received his PhD from INSEAD. His research focuses on social sustainability with particular emphasis on social inequality (power, status, gender), employee well-being and productivity, and social impact.