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Hui CUI

Robert H. DENG

Singapore Management University, robertdeng@smu.edu.sg

Junzuo LAI

Xun YI

Surya NEPAL

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An efficient and expressive ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme with partially hidden access structures, revisited[☆]

Hui Cui^{a,b,*}, Robert H. Deng^b, Junzuo Lai^c, Xun Yi^a, Surya Nepal^d

^aSchool of Science, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT) University, Melbourne, Australia

^bSchool of Information Systems, Singapore Management University, Singapore

^cDepartment of Computer Science, Jinan University, Guangzhou, China

^dData 61, CSIRO, Sydney, Australia

A B S T R A C T

Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) has been regarded as one of the promising solutions to protect data security and privacy in cloud storage services. In a CP-ABE scheme, an access structure is included in the ciphertext, which, however, may leak sensitive information about the underlying plaintext and the privileged recipients in that anyone who sees the ciphertext is able to learn the attributes of the privileged recipients from the associated access structure. In order to address this issue, CP-ABE with partially hidden access structures was introduced where each attribute is divided into an attribute name and an attribute value and the attribute values of the attributes in an access structure are not given in the ciphertext. Though a number of CP-ABE schemes with partially hidden access structures have been proposed, most of them only enable restricted access structures, whereas several other schemes supporting expressive access structures are computationally inefficient due to the fact that they are built in the composite-order groups. To our knowledge, there has been little attention paid to the design of expressive CP-ABE schemes with partially hidden access structures in the prime-order groups. In this paper, we revisit this problem, and present an expressive CP-ABE scheme supporting partially hidden access structures in the prime-order groups with improved efficiency.

Keywords:

Cloud storage

Data security and privacy

Access control

1. Introduction

In recent years, there has been an increasing demand for storing data to the cloud [2–4]. Users may not like to store his/her data containing sensitive information to a public cloud without security and privacy guarantee, but they may need to share their data with others possessing certain attributes (or credentials). Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) [5] is a mechanism meeting this requirement, where each user is given a private attribute-key in terms of his/her attributes issued by an attribute authority (AA), each message is encrypted under an access structure (or access policy) over a set of attributes, and a user can decrypt a ciphertext with his/her private attribute-key if his/her attributes satisfy the access policy ascribed to this ciphertext.

Though a ciphertext generated by a CP-ABE scheme (e.g., [5–8]) does not reveal the identities of the recipients, anyone accessible to a ciphertext may learn some information about the underlying

message and the privileged recipients from the access structure clearly included in the ciphertext [9–11]. For example, in a cloud system storing electrical medical records (EMRs) [12,13] of patients as in Fig. 1, there is a ciphertext on an EMR under an access structure “(Patient: NR005289 AND Hospital: City Hospital) OR (Doctor: Cardiologist AND Hospital: General Hospital)”. The access structure defines that a patient numbered as NR005289 at the City Hospital or any Cardiologist at the General Hospital can decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the EMR, from which it is not difficult to conclude that a patient NR005289 in the City Hospital is suffering a heart problem. Definitely, cloud users do not expect such an information leakage, so it is crucial to build CP-ABE schemes with attributes hidden in the access structures.

It has been stated in [9] that a CP-ABE scheme with hidden access structures can be built from an attribute-hiding inner-product predicate encryption (IPE) scheme [14], but it is inefficient to implement a CP-ABE scheme with fully hidden access structures (where the attributes are completely hidden from the ciphertext) built from an attribute-hiding IPE scheme [7]. In order to have a trade off between fully hidden access structures and efficient CP-ABE, many CP-ABE schemes with partially hidden access structures (e.g., [9,15–18]) have been proposed. However, some schemes

[☆] This paper is an extension to the original publication in ProvSec 2016 [1].

* Corresponding author at: School of Science, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT) University, Melbourne, Australia.

E-mail address: hui.cui@rmit.edu.au (H. Cui).




Fig. 1. An architecture of a cloud storage system based on a CP-ABE scheme.

(e.g., [15–18]) only allow restricted access structures (expressed in AND gates), while other schemes (e.g., [9]) supporting expressive access structures are built in the inefficient composite-order groups (note that “a Tate pairing on a 1024-bit composite-order elliptic curve is roughly 50 times slower than the same pairing on a comparable prime-order curve, and this performance gap will only get worse at higher security levels” [19]). There exist techniques (e.g., [19]) to convert schemes in the composite-order groups to that in the prime-order groups, but they cause a significant degradation in the performance [20]. Consequently, it is desirable to construct expressive CP-ABE schemes with partially hidden access structures in the prime-order groups.

1.1. Our contributions

Generally, generic attribute names contain less sensitive information than concrete attribute values. Take the scenario in Fig. 1 as an instance, it is obvious that the attribute values “Cardiologist” and “NR005289” are more sensitive than the attribute names “Doctor” and “Patient”. Motivated by this observation, it has been suggested to use CP-ABE with partially hidden access structures [9,15] which divides each attribute into an attribute name and an attribute value, and the attribute values of an access structure are not included in the ciphertext. Specifically, the full access structure in Fig. 1 is replaced by a partially hidden access structure “(Patient: * AND Hospital: *) OR (Doctor: * AND Hospital: *)” to be included in the ciphertext.

One naive method to build a CP-ABE scheme with partially hidden access structures is to simply remove the attribute names from the access structure of the ciphertext. The resulting scheme, however, suffers off-line dictionary attacks [1], by running which an adversary can determine whether an attribute value is associated with an access structure if the space of the attribute values is not sufficiently large. To overcome this challenge and build an expressive CP-ABE scheme with partially hidden access structures in the prime-order groups, Cui et al. [1] applied the “randomness splitting” [21] technique to the Rouselakis–Waters CP-ABE scheme [20] to hide the sensitive attribute values from the ciphertext. In

this way, an access structure with only attribute names (i.e., attribute values are not present) is sent along with the ciphertext. Besides, to convince a user that he/she is a privileged user to the resulting “anonymous” ciphertext, Cui et al. [1] combined a commitment scheme [22] on the message to the corresponding ciphertext such that a user can check the correctness of the decryption result. In this paper, we revisit the expressive CP-ABE scheme with partially hidden access structures in the prime-order groups given in [1], and improve its efficiency by removing the commitment scheme without weakening the security. In the proposed expressive CP-ABE scheme with partially hidden access structures in the prime-order groups, the encryption and decryption algorithms add no exponentiation or pairing calculations to that of the underlying Rouselakis–Waters scheme [20], while the expressive CP-ABE scheme with partially hidden access structures in the prime-order groups in [1] adds several exponentiation operations to that of the underlying Rouselakis–Waters scheme [20].

In summary, the proposed expressive CP-ABE scheme with partially hidden access structures in this paper is similar to the one in [1] except that the former improves the efficiency of the latter by removing the commitment scheme yet allowing a user to check whether he/she is a privileged recipient of a ciphertext without including the associated attribute values.

1.2. Related work

Attribute-based encryption (ABE) was introduced by Sahai and Waters [23], which was then formulated into key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) and CP-ABE [24]. In a KP-ABE scheme, the ciphertext is associated with an attribute set and the private attribute-key is ascribed to an access policy, while the situation is reversed in a CP-ABE scheme. Nevertheless, a CP-ABE scheme is more flexible than a KP-ABE scheme because the access policy in the latter is determined once the user’s private attribute-key is issued. The first CP-ABE scheme was proposed by Bethencourt, Sahai and Waters [5], but it was secure under the generic group model. The first CP-ABE scheme secure in the standard model was presented by Cheung and Newport [6], but it only supported the access structures

in AND gates. The first CP-ABE scheme enabling advanced access structures was designed by Goyal et al. [25] based on the number theoretic assumption. The first large universe CP-ABE scheme in the prime-order groups was built by Rouselakis and Waters [20], where the size of the attribute space is polynomially unbounded. CP-ABE schemes with partially hidden access structures (e.g., [15,16,18]) were presented to better preserve privacy, but they were selectively secure or allowed restricted access structures (expressed in AND gates). Lai, Deng and Li [17] gave a fully secure CP-ABE scheme with partially hidden access structures, but it only supported the restricted access structures. Later, Lai, Deng and Li [9] proposed a fully secure and expressive CP-ABE scheme to partially hide access structures, but it had an efficiency issue due to the use of bilinear pairings in the composite-order groups. To overcome the inefficient implementation of the composite-order groups, Cui et al. [1] presented an expressive CP-ABE scheme with partially hidden access structures in the prime-order groups. In this paper, we revisit the expressive CP-ABE scheme with partially hidden access structures in the prime-order groups in [1], and further improve its efficiency.

1.3. Organization

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review the definitions that are related to this paper. In Section 3, we describe the framework for CP-ABE with partially hidden access structures, and then define its security model. In Section 4, we give a concrete expressive CP-ABE scheme with partially hidden access structures, and analyze its security and performance. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 5.

2. Preliminaries

We review some basic cryptographic notions and definitions that are to be used in this paper in this section.

2.1. Bilinear pairings and complexity assumptions

Let G be a group of a prime order p with a generator g . We say that $\hat{e}: G \times G \rightarrow G_1$ is a bilinear map [26] if it is Bilinear such that for all $g \in G$, and $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, it holds that $\hat{e}(g^a, g^b) = \hat{e}(g, g)^{ab}$, and Non-degenerate such that $\hat{e}(g, g) \neq 1$.

Decisional $(q-1)$ assumption [20]. The decisional $(q-1)$ problem is that for any probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm, given $\vec{y} =$

$$\begin{aligned} &g, g^{\mu}, \\ &g^{a^i}, g^{b_j}, g^{\mu \cdot b_j}, g^{a^i b_j}, g^{a^i/b_j^2} \quad \forall (i, j) \in [q, q], \\ &g^{a^i/b_j} \quad \forall (i, j) \in [2q, q] \text{ with } i \neq q+1, \\ &g^{a^i b_j/b_j^2} \quad \forall (i, j, j') \in [2q, q, q] \text{ with } j \neq j', \\ &g^{\mu a^i b_j/b_j^2}, g^{\mu a^i b_j/b_j^2} \quad \forall (i, j, j') \in [q, q, q] \text{ with } j \neq j', \end{aligned}$$

it is difficult to distinguish $(\vec{y}, \hat{e}(g, g)^{a^{q+1}\mu})$ from (\vec{y}, Z) , where $g \in G$, $Z \in G_1$, $a, \mu, b_1, \dots, b_q \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ are randomly chosen.

Decisional linear assumption [27]. The decisional linear problem is that for any PPT algorithm, given $g, g^{x_1}, g^{x_2}, g^{x_1 x_3}, g^{x_2 x_4}$, it is difficult to distinguish $(g, g^{x_1}, g^{x_2}, g^{x_1 x_3}, g^{x_2 x_4}, Z)$ from $(g, g^{x_1}, g^{x_2}, g^{x_1 x_3}, g^{x_2 x_4}, Z)$, where $g, Z \in G$, $x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4 \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ are randomly chosen.

2.2. Pseudo-random functions

Let $H: K_\lambda \times D_\lambda \rightarrow R_\lambda$ be a pseudo-random function (PRF) [28] under a security parameter λ with arbitrary finite sets K_λ , D_λ and R_λ . The advantage of an adversary \mathcal{A} against the PRF H is

$$\text{Adv}_{H, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{PRF}}(\lambda) = \Pr[\text{REAL}_H^{\mathcal{A}} \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[\text{RAND}_H^{\mathcal{A}} \Rightarrow 1],$$

where the security games are given in Fig. 2. If the advantage of any PPT adversary is negligible in the security parameter λ , then H is a secure PRF.

2.3. Symmetric encryption

A symmetric encryption (SE) scheme \mathcal{SE} with a key space \mathcal{K} and a message space \mathcal{M} is composed of an encryption algorithm $\mathcal{SE}.\text{Enc}(K, M)$ which outputs a ciphertext CT on input a key K (in the key space) and a message M (in the message space), and a decryption algorithm $\mathcal{SE}.\text{Dec}(K, \text{CT})$ which outputs M or a failure symbol \perp on input a key K and a ciphertext CT.

The scheme \mathcal{SE} is secure under chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA secure), if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , the advantage function

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{SE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{IND-CPA}}(\lambda) = \Pr \left[b' = b \mid \begin{array}{l} K \leftarrow \mathcal{K}; b \leftarrow \{0, 1\} \\ (M_0, M_1, \text{state}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda) \\ \text{CT}^* \leftarrow \mathcal{SE}.\text{Enc}(K, M_b) \\ b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{par}, M_0, M_1, \text{state}, \text{CT}^*) \end{array} \right] - 1/2$$

is negligible in the security parameter λ , where $|M_0| = |M_1|$.

2.4. Access structures and linear secret sharing schemes

Access structures [8,29]. Denote $\{P_1, \dots, P_n\}$ as a set of parties. A collection $\mathbb{A} \subseteq 2^{\{P_1, \dots, P_n\}}$ is monotone if $\forall B, C$: if $B \in \mathbb{A}$ and $B \subseteq C$, then $C \in \mathbb{A}$. An (monotone) access structure is a (monotone) collection \mathbb{A} of non-empty subsets of $\{P_1, \dots, P_n\}$, i.e., $\mathbb{A} \subseteq 2^{\{P_1, \dots, P_n\}} \setminus \{\emptyset\}$. The sets that are in \mathbb{A} are known as the authorized sets, and the sets that are not in \mathbb{A} are known as the unauthorized sets.

Linear secret sharing schemes (LSSSs) [8,29]. Let P be a set of parties, \mathbb{M} be an $l \times n$ matrix (i.e., the matrix \mathbb{M} has l rows and n columns), and $\rho: \{1, \dots, l\} \rightarrow P$ be a function mapping a row to a party for labeling. A secret sharing scheme Π over a set of parties P is a linear secret-sharing scheme (LSSS) over \mathbb{Z}_p if (1) the shares for each party form a vector over \mathbb{Z}_p ; and (2) there exists an $l \times n$ matrix \mathbb{M} called the share-generating matrix for Π . For $x = 1, \dots, l$, the x -th row of the matrix \mathbb{M} is labeled by a party $\rho(i)$ with $\rho: \{1, \dots, l\} \rightarrow P$ being a function to map a row to a party for labeling. Assuming that the column vector $\vec{v} = (\mu, r_2, \dots, r_n)$, where $\mu \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ is the secret to be shared and $r_2, \dots, r_n \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ are randomly chosen, and then $\mathbb{M}\vec{v}$ is the vector of l shares of the secret μ according to Π . The share $(\mathbb{M}\vec{v})_i$ belongs to the party $\rho(i)$.

Note that every LSSS enjoys the linear reconstruction property [29]. Let Π be an LSSS for an access structure \mathbb{A} , and \mathbf{A} be an authorized set. Define $I \subseteq \{1, \dots, l\}$ as $I = \{i | \rho(i) \in \mathbf{A}\}$. Then the vector $(1, 0, \dots, 0)$ is in the span of rows of a matrix \mathbb{M} indexed by I , and there exist constants $\{w_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p\}_{i \in I}$ such that, for any valid shares $\{v_i\}$ of a secret μ according to Π , it holds that $\sum_{i \in I} w_i v_i = \mu$. These constants $\{w_i\}$ can be found in polynomial time with respect to the size of the share-generating matrix \mathbb{M} [30]. On the other hand, for an unauthorized set \mathbf{A}' , such constants $\{w_i\}$ do not exist. Also, in this case, if $I' = \{i | \rho(i) \in \mathbf{A}'\}$, there exists a vector \vec{w} such that its first component w_1 is any non-zero element in \mathbb{Z}_p and $\langle \mathbb{M}_i, \vec{w} \rangle = 0$ for all $i \in I'$, where \mathbb{M}_i is the i -th row of the matrix \mathbb{M} [20].

Boolean formulas. Access structures can be described in terms of monotonic boolean formulas as well. LSSS access structures can be derived from representations as boolean formulas, which are more general. There are generic methods to convert a monotonic boolean formula into an LSSS matrix¹. A boolean formula can be represented as an access tree, in which the AND or OR gates are denoted by the interior nodes, and the attributes are denoted by

¹ For the details about how to convert a boolean formula into an equivalent LSSS matrix, please refer to [29].

<u>proc Initialize</u>	<u>proc $H(x)$</u>	<u>proc Initialize</u>	<u>proc $H(x)$</u>
$K \leftarrow K_\lambda$	Return $H_k(x)$	CoinTab $\leftarrow \emptyset$	If CoinTab[x] = \perp then
Return 1^λ		Return 1^λ	CoinTab[x] $\leftarrow R_\lambda$
<u>proc Finalize(b)</u>		<u>proc Finalize(b)</u>	Return CoinTab[x]
Return b		Return b	

Fig. 2. Games defining security for a PRF. Left: Game REAL. Right: Game RAND.

the leaf nodes. The number of rows in an LSSS matrix will be equal to the number of leaf nodes in its corresponding access tree.

3. System architecture and security model

In this section, the framework and the corresponding security model of ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption with partially hidden access structures are described.

3.1. Framework

A CP-ABE scheme with partially hidden access structures consists of a setup algorithm Setup, a private attribute-key generation algorithm KeyGen, an encryption algorithm Encrypt and a decryption algorithm Decrypt.

- Setup(1^λ) \rightarrow ($pars, msk$). Taking the security parameter λ as the input, this algorithm, running by the AA, outputs the public parameter $pars$ and the master private key msk .
- KeyGen($pars, msk, \mathbf{A}$) $\rightarrow K_{\mathbf{A}}$. Taking the public parameter $pars$, the master private key msk and an attribute set \mathbf{A} as the input, this algorithm, running by the AA, outputs a private attribute-key $K_{\mathbf{A}}$.
- Encrypt($pars, M, (\mathbb{M}, \rho, \{A_{\rho(i)}\})$) $\rightarrow CT$. Taking the public parameter $pars$, a message M and an access structure $(\mathbb{M}, \rho, \{A_{\rho(i)}\})$ where the function ρ associates the rows of the matrix \mathbb{M} to generic attribute names, and $\{A_{\rho(i)}\}$ are the corresponding attribute values as the input, this algorithm, running by the data owner, outputs a ciphertext CT .
- Decrypt($pars, CT, K_{\mathbf{A}}$) $\rightarrow M/\perp$. Taking the public parameter $pars$, a ciphertext CT under an access structure $(\mathbb{M}, \rho, \{A_{\rho(i)}\})$ and a private attribute-key $K_{\mathbf{A}}$ over an attribute set \mathbf{A} as the input, this algorithm, running by the user, outputs a message M if the attributes \mathbf{A} satisfy the access structure $(\mathbb{M}, \rho, \{A_{\rho(i)}\})$, or a failure symbol \perp otherwise.

A CP-ABE scheme with partially hidden access structures is said to be correct, meaning that for all messages M (in the message space), all attribute sets \mathbf{A} (in the attribute space) satisfying access structures $(\mathbb{M}, \rho, \{A_{\rho(i)}\})$, if $(pars, msk) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$, $K_{\mathbf{A}} \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(pars, msk, \mathbf{A})$, $CT \leftarrow \text{Encrypt}(pars, M, (\mathbb{M}, \rho, \{A_{\rho(i)}\}))$, then $\text{Decrypt}(pars, CT, K_{\mathbf{A}}) = M$.

3.2. Security definitions

A CP-ABE scheme with partially hidden access structures should preserve confidentiality and anonymity. Below we review the security definitions for these two requirements, following the description in [1].

- **Confidentiality.** The security game for confidentiality is defined by the following game between a challenger algorithm \mathcal{C} and an adversary algorithm \mathcal{A} .
 - Setup. Algorithm \mathcal{C} runs the setup algorithm to obtain the public parameter $pars$ and the master private key msk . It keeps the master private key msk and gives the public parameter $pars$ to algorithm \mathcal{A} .

- Phase 1. Algorithm \mathcal{A} adaptively issues queries to the key generation oracle. For each query on an attribute set \mathbf{A}_i , algorithm \mathcal{C} returns a private attribute-key $K_{\mathbf{A}_i}$ to algorithm \mathcal{A} .
- Challenge. Algorithm \mathcal{A} outputs two messages M_0^*, M_1^* of the same size and an access structure $(\mathbb{M}^*, \rho^*, \{A_{\rho^*(i)}\})$ with the constraint that there is no attribute set \mathbf{A}_i in the key generation queries in Phase 1 satisfying the challenge access structure $(\mathbb{M}^*, \rho^*, \{A_{\rho^*(i)}\})$. Algorithm \mathcal{C} randomly chooses a bit $\beta \in \{0, 1\}$, generates the challenge ciphertext CT^* of the message M_β^* under the access structure $(\mathbb{M}^*, \rho^*, \{A_{\rho^*(i)}\})$, and sends the challenge ciphertext CT^* to algorithm \mathcal{A} .
- Phase 2. Algorithm \mathcal{A} continues issuing queries on attribute sets to the key generation oracle with the restriction that the attribute sets cannot satisfy the challenge access structure in the challenge phase. Algorithm \mathcal{C} responds as in Phase 1.
- Guess. Algorithm \mathcal{A} makes a guess $\beta' \in \{0, 1\}$ for β , and it wins the game if $\beta' = \beta$.
- **Anonymity.** The security game for anonymity is defined under chosen-plaintext attacks (ANON-CPA) between a challenger algorithm \mathcal{C} and an adversary algorithm \mathcal{A} as follows.
 - Setup. Algorithm \mathcal{C} runs the setup algorithm to obtain the public parameter $pars$ and the master private key msk . It forwards the public parameter $pars$ to algorithm \mathcal{A} and keeps the master private key msk .
 - Phase 1. Algorithm \mathcal{A} issues key generation queries to algorithm \mathcal{C} . For each key generation query on an attribute set \mathbf{A}_i , algorithm \mathcal{C} returns a private attribute-key $K_{\mathbf{A}_i}$ to algorithm \mathcal{A} .
 - Challenge. Algorithm \mathcal{A} outputs a message M^* , two access structures $(\mathbb{M}^*, \rho^*, \{A_{\rho^*(i)}\}_0)$ and $(\mathbb{M}^*, \rho^*, \{A_{\rho^*(i)}\}_1)$ (i.e., the access matrix (\mathbb{M}^*, ρ^*) can be satisfied by the attribute sets $\{A_{\rho^*(i)}\}_0$ and $\{A_{\rho^*(i)}\}_1$ with the constraint that there are no key generation queries in Phase 1 that can satisfy $(\mathbb{M}^*, \rho^*, \{A_{\rho^*(i)}\}_0)$ or $(\mathbb{M}^*, \rho^*, \{A_{\rho^*(i)}\}_1)$. Algorithm \mathcal{C} randomly chooses a bit $\beta \in \{0, 1\}$, and sends a challenge ciphertext CT^* for the message M^* under the access structure $(\mathbb{M}^*, \rho^*, \{A_{\rho^*(i)}\}_\beta)$ to algorithm \mathcal{A} .
 - Phase 2. Algorithm \mathcal{A} continues issuing the key generation queries to algorithm \mathcal{C} except that any attribute set \mathbf{A}_i satisfying the access structure $(\mathbb{M}^*, \rho^*, \{A_{\rho^*(i)}\}_0)$ or $(\mathbb{M}^*, \rho^*, \{A_{\rho^*(i)}\}_1)$ are disallowed. Algorithm \mathcal{C} responds as in Phase 1.
 - Guess. Algorithm \mathcal{A} makes a guess $\beta' \in \{0, 1\}$ for β , and it wins the game if $\beta' = \beta$.

The advantage of algorithm \mathcal{A} in the above confidentiality (or anonymity) game is defined to be $\Pr[\beta = \beta'] - 1/2$. A CP-ABE scheme with partially hidden access structures is said to be indistinguishable (or anonymous) under the chosen-plaintext attacks if any PPT adversary has at most a negligible advantage in the security parameter λ . Also, a CP-ABE scheme with partially hidden access structures is said to be selectively indistinguishable (or anonymous) if an Init stage is added before the Setup phase where algorithm \mathcal{A} commits to the challenge access structure $(\mathbb{M}^*, \rho^*,$

$\{A_{\rho^*(i)}\}$) (or the challenge access structures $(\mathbb{M}^*, \rho^*, \{A_{\rho^*(i)}\}_0)$ and $(\mathbb{M}^*, \rho^*, \{A_{\rho^*(i)}\}_1)$).

4. Expressive ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption with partially hidden access structures in prime-order groups

In this section, a concrete expressive CP-ABE scheme with partially hidden access structures in the prime-order groups, as well as its security and efficiency analysis are given.

4.1. Construction

We present an expressive CP-ABE scheme supporting partially hidden access structures in the prime-order groups \mathcal{ABE} by improving the scheme \mathcal{ABE}' in [1]. Assume that $\mathcal{SE} = (\mathcal{SE}.Enc, \mathcal{SE}.Dec)$ is a symmetric encryption scheme with a key space \mathcal{K} and a message space \mathcal{M} . Let G be a group of a prime order p with a generator g , and $\hat{e}: G \times G \rightarrow G_1$ be a bilinear map.

- **Setup.** Similar to that in \mathcal{ABE}' [1], this algorithm takes the security parameter λ as the input. It computes $g_1 = g^{d_1}$, $g_2 = g^{d_2}$, $g_3 = g^{d_3}$, $g_4 = g^{d_4}$, where $u, h, v, w \in G$, $d_1, d_2, d_3, d_4, \alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ are randomly chosen. The master private key is $msk = (d_1, d_2, d_3, d_4, g^\alpha)$, and the public parameter is $pars = (H, H', g, u, h, w, v, g_1, g_2, g_3, g_4, \hat{e}(g, g)^\alpha)$ where H is a collision-resistant hash function to map elements in G_1 to elements in \mathcal{K} and H' is a pseudo-random function to map elements in G_1 and \mathcal{M} to elements in \mathcal{M} .
- **KeyGen.** This algorithm is the same as that in \mathcal{ABE}' [1], which takes the public parameter $pars$, the master private key msk and an attribute set \mathbf{A}^2 as the input. Let k be the size of \mathbf{A} such that $A_1, \dots, A_k \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ are the attribute values of \mathbf{A} . It computes

$$K_1 = g^\alpha w^{d_1 d_2 r + d_3 d_4 r'}, \quad K_2 = g^{r d_1 d_2 + r' d_3 d_4},$$

$$K_{i,1} = ((u^{A_i} h)^{r_i} v^{-r})^{d_2}, \quad K_{i,2} = ((u^{A_i} h)^{r_i} v^{-r})^{d_1}, \quad K_{i,3} = g^{d_1 d_2 r_i + d_3 d_4 r'_i},$$

$$K_{i,4} = ((u^{A_i} h)^{r'_i} v^{-r'})^{d_4}, \quad K_{i,5} = ((u^{A_i} h)^{r'_i} v^{-r'})^{d_3},$$

where $r, r', r_1, \dots, r_k, r'_1, \dots, r'_k \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ are randomly chosen. It outputs a private attribute-key $K_A = (K_1, K_2, \{K_{i,1}, K_{i,2}, K_{i,3}, K_{i,4}, K_{i,5}\}_{i \in [1, k]})$.

- **Encrypt.** This algorithm mostly follows that in \mathcal{ABE}' [1], which takes the public parameter $pars$, a message M and an access structure $(\mathbb{M}, \rho, \{A_{\rho(i)}\})$ as the input. It randomly chooses a vector $\vec{v} = (\mu, y_2, \dots, y_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$ of which the values are used to share μ , and computes $v_i = \vec{v} \cdot \mathbb{M}_i$ (for $i = 1, \dots, l$), where \mathbb{M}_i is the vector corresponding to the i -th row of the matrix \mathbb{M} . Then, it randomly chooses $R \in G_1$, $s_{i,1}, \dots, s_{i,l}, s_{1,2}, \dots, s_{l,2}, z_1, \dots, z_l \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, and computes $k = H(R)$, $\tau = H'(R, M)$,

$$C = R \cdot \hat{e}(g, g)^{\alpha \mu}, \quad D = g^\mu, \quad E = \mathcal{SE}.Enc(k, M),$$

$$C_i = w^{v_i} v^{z_i}, \quad D_{i,1} = g_1^{z_i - s_{i,1}}, \quad E_{i,1} = g_3^{z_i - s_{i,2}},$$

$$D_{i,2} = g_2^{s_{i,1}}, \quad E_{i,2} = g_4^{s_{i,2}}, \quad F_i = (u^{A_{\rho(i)}} h)^{-z_i}.$$

It outputs a ciphertext $CT = ((\mathbb{M}, \rho), C, D, \{(C_i, D_{i,1}, D_{i,2}, E_{i,1}, E_{i,2}, F_i)\}_{i \in [1, l]}, E, \tau)$.

- **Decrypt.** This algorithm mostly follows that in \mathcal{ABE}' [1], which takes the public parameter $pars$, a ciphertext $((\mathbb{M}, \rho), C, D, \{(C_i, D_{i,1}, D_{i,2}, E_{i,1}, E_{i,2}, F_i)\}_{i \in [1, l]}, E, \tau)$ and a private attribute-key K_A for an attribute set \mathbf{A} as the input. It computes a set of minimum subsets of attributes satisfying (\mathbb{M}, ρ) as $I_{\mathbb{M}, \rho}$. Denote $\{w_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p\}_{i \in \mathcal{I}}$ as a set of constants such that if $\{v_i\}$ are

valid shares of the secret μ in terms of the matrix \mathbb{M} , then $\sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} w_i v_i = \mu$. For an $\mathcal{I} \in I_{\mathbb{M}, \rho}$, it computes

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{\hat{e}(D, K_1)}{\prod_{i \in \mathcal{I}} (\hat{e}(C_i, K_2) \hat{e}(D_{i,1}, K_{i,1}) \hat{e}(D_{i,2}, K_{i,2}) \hat{e}(F_i, K_{i,3}) \hat{e}(E_{i,1}, K_{i,4}) \hat{e}(E_{i,2}, K_{i,5}))^{w_i}} \\ &= \frac{\hat{e}(g, g)^{\alpha \mu} \hat{e}(g^\mu, w)^{r_1 d_1 d_2} \hat{e}(g^\mu, w)^{r_2 d_3 d_4}}{\prod_{i \in \mathcal{I}} (\hat{e}(g, w^{v_i})^{d_1 d_2 r_1 + d_3 d_4 r_2})^{w_i}} = \hat{e}(g, g)^{\alpha \mu}. \end{aligned}$$

It cancels out this value from C to have R' , and computes $M' = \mathcal{SE}.Dec(H(R'), E)$. It outputs M' if $\tau = H'(R', M')$, or \perp otherwise.

4.2. Security proof

Theorem 1. Assuming that H' is a secure pseudo-random function, the decisional $(q-1)$ assumption holds in G , the decisional linear assumption holds in G , the scheme \mathcal{SE} is IND-CPA secure, and then the proposed scheme \mathcal{ABE} is selectively indistinguishable and anonymous.

Proof. The proof is reduced via a sequence of games by concluding that these games are computationally indistinguishable from each other. To simplify the description, the access structures are removed from the ciphertexts. Denote $(C^*, D^*, \{(C_i^*, D_{i,1}^*, D_{i,2}^*, E_{i,1}^*, E_{i,2}^*, F_i^*)\}_{i \in [1, l]}, E^*, \tau^*)$ as the challenge ciphertext given to the adversary during an attack in the real world. Let Z be a random element of G_1 , and $\{Z_{i,1}\}, \{Z'_{i,1}\}$ be sets of random elements of G . Denote Z_E^*, Z_τ^* as the elements randomly chosen from the ciphertext space and the message space of \mathcal{SE} , respectively. A sequence of games $\text{Game}_0, \text{Game}_1, \dots, \text{Game}_l, \text{Game}_{l+1}, \dots, \text{Game}_{2l+1}, \text{Game}_{2l+2}, \text{Game}_{2l+3}$ are defined which differ on which challenge ciphertext is given to the adversary, where Game_0 is the original game, Game_1 changes the term C^* to Z , and Game_2 to Game_{l+1} change the term $D_{i,1}^*$ to $Z_{i,1}$ one by one for $i \in [1, l]$, and Game_{l+2} to Game_{2l+1} change the term $E_{i,1}^*$ to $Z'_{i,1}$ one by one for $i \in [1, l]$, Game_{2l+2} changes the term E^* to Z_E^* , and Game_{2l+3} changes the term τ^* to Z_τ^* .

- **Game₀:** The challenge ciphertext is $CT_0^* = (C^*, D^*, \{(C_i^*, D_{i,1}^*, D_{i,2}^*, E_{i,1}^*, E_{i,2}^*, F_i^*)\}_{i \in [1, l]}, E^*, \tau^*)$.
- **Game₁:** The challenge ciphertext is $CT_1^* = (Z, D^*, \{(C_i^*, D_{i,1}^*, D_{i,2}^*, E_{i,1}, E_{i,2}, F_i^*)\}_{i \in [1, l]}, E^*, \tau^*)$.
- **Game₂:** The challenge ciphertext is $CT_2^* = (Z, D^*, (C_1, Z_{1,1}, D_{1,2}^*, E_{1,1}^*, E_{1,2}^*, F_1^*), \{(C_i^*, D_{i,1}^*, D_{i,2}^*, E_{i,1}^*, E_{i,2}^*, F_i^*)\}_{i \in [2, l]}, E^*, \tau^*)$.
- **Game_{l+1}:** The challenge ciphertext is $CT_{l+1}^* = (Z, D^*, \{(C_i, Z_{i,1}, D_{i,2}^*, E_{i,1}^*, E_{i,2}^*, F_i^*)\}_{i \in [1, l]}, E^*, \tau^*)$.
- **Game_{l+2}:** The challenge ciphertext is $CT_{l+2}^* = (Z, D^*, (C^*, Z_{1,1}, D_{1,2}^*, Z'_{1,1}, E_{1,2}^*, F_1^*), \{(C_i^*, Z_{i,1}, D_{i,2}^*, E_{i,1}^*, E_{i,2}^*, F_i^*)\}_{i \in [2, l]}, E^*, \tau^*)$.
- **Game_{2l+1}:** The challenge ciphertext is $CT_{2l+1}^* = (Z, D^*, \{(C_i^*, Z_{i,1}, D_{i,2}^*, Z'_{i,1}, E_{i,2}^*, F_i^*)\}_{i \in [1, l]}, E^*, \tau^*)$.
- **Game_{2l+2}:** The challenge ciphertext is $CT_{2l+2}^* = (Z, D^*, \{(C_i^*, Z_{i,1}, D_{i,2}^*, Z'_{i,1}, E_{i,2}^*, F_i^*)\}_{i \in [1, l]}, Z_E^*, \tau^*)$.
- **Game_{2l+3}:** The challenge ciphertext is $CT_{2l+3}^* = (Z, D^*, \{(C_i^*, Z_{i,1}, D_{i,2}^*, Z'_{i,1}, E_{i,2}^*, F_i^*)\}_{i \in [1, l]}, Z_E^*, Z_\tau^*)$.

The proof is completed by showing that the games $\text{Game}_0, \text{Game}_1, \dots, \text{Game}_{2l+1}, \text{Game}_{2l+2}$ and Game_{2l+3} are computationally indistinguishable from each other. \square

Lemma 1. Assuming that the decisional $(q-1)$ assumption holds in G , and then there is no adversary that distinguishes between the games Game_0 and Game_1 .

Proof. Assume that there exists an adversary algorithm \mathcal{A} that can distinguish Game_0 from Game_1 . Then we can build a challenger algorithm \mathcal{C} that solves the decisional $(q-1)$ problem. The proof

² Each attribute is denoted as $N_i = A_i$, where N_i is the generic attribute name and A_i is the corresponding attribute value.

Table 1
Comparison of the storage overheads.

Schemes	Public parameter	Master private key	Private attribute-key	Ciphertext
\mathcal{ABE}' [1]	11	5	$5k + 3$	$6l + 3 + \mathbb{A} $
\mathcal{ABE}	12	5	$5k + 3$	$6l + 4 + \mathbb{A} $

is similar to that in [1] except that the term E^* in the challenge ciphertext is calculated using the scheme \mathcal{SE} with an additional element τ^* , and we omit the details here. \square

Lemma 2. *Assuming that the decisional linear assumption holds in G , and then there is no adversary that distinguishes between the games Game_{j+1} and Game_j for $j \in [1, l]$.*

Proof. Assume that there exists an adversary algorithm \mathcal{A} that can distinguish Game_j from Game_{j+1} . Then we can build a challenger algorithm \mathcal{C} that solves the decisional linear problem. The proof is similar to that in [1] except that the term E^* in the challenge ciphertext is calculated using the scheme \mathcal{SE} with an additional element τ^* , and we omit the details here. \square

Lemma 3. *Assuming that the decisional linear assumption holds in G , and then the advantage of an adversary that can distinguish between the games Game_{j+l+1} and Game_{j+l} for $j \in [1, l]$ is negligible.*

Proof. This proof follows almost the same as that of Lemma 2, except that the simulation is done over the parameters g_3 and g_4 instead of g_1 and g_2 . Thus, we omit the details here. \square

Lemma 4. *Assuming that the symmetric encryption scheme \mathcal{SE} is IND-CPA secure, and then the advantage of an adversary that can distinguish between the games Game_{2l+1} and Game_{2l+2} is negligible.*

Proof. This game Game_{2l+2} is the same as that in the game Game_{2l+1} except that in the challenge phase, algorithm \mathcal{C} randomly chooses Z_E^* in the ciphertext space of \mathcal{SE} in place of E^* rather than creating E^* as required. In the view of algorithm \mathcal{A} , this game Game_{2l+2} is identical to the game Game_{2l+1} except that algorithm \mathcal{A} breaks the security of the scheme \mathcal{SE} . \square

Lemma 5. *Assuming that H' is a secure pseudo-random function, and then the advantage of an adversary that can distinguish between the games Game_{2l+2} and Game_{2l+3} is negligible.*

Proof. This game Game_{2l+3} is the same as that in the game Game_{2l+2} except that in the challenge phase, algorithm \mathcal{C} randomly chooses $Z_r^* \in \mathcal{M}$ in place of τ^* rather than generating τ^* as required. In the perspective of algorithm \mathcal{A} , this game Game_{2l+3} is identical to the game Game_{2l+2} except that algorithm \mathcal{A} breaks the security of the pseudo-random function H' . \square

This completes the proof of Theorem 1.

4.3. Performance evaluation and implementation

In this paper, we propose an expressive CP-ABE scheme supporting partially hidden access structures in the prime-order groups, which improves the efficiency of the one given in [1]. Denote l as the number of attributes in an access structure, k as the size of an attribute set possessed by each user, χ_1 as the number of elements in $I_{\mathbb{M}, \rho} = \{I_1, \dots, I_{\chi_1}\}$, χ_2 as $|I_1| + \dots + |I_{\chi_1}|$. Let $|\mathbb{A}|$ be the size of an access structure. Table 1 shows the storage complexity of the proposed \mathcal{ABE} and the scheme \mathcal{ABE}' in [1] in terms of the sizes of the public parameter, the master private key, the private attribute-key and the ciphertext. It is straightforward to see that the proposed scheme \mathcal{ABE} almost has the same storage overheads as the scheme \mathcal{ABE}' in [1]. Table 2 compares the

Table 2
Comparison of the computational costs.

Schemes	Encrypt		Decrypt	
	Expo	Pairing	Expo	Pairing
\mathcal{ABE}' [1]	$8l + 4$	0	$\leq \chi_2 + 2\chi_1$	$\leq 6\chi_2 + \chi_1$
\mathcal{ABE}	$8l + 2$	0	$\leq \chi_2$	$\leq 6\chi_2 + \chi_1$

Table 3
Computational costs of exponentiation and pairing operations.

Elliptic Curves (ms)	Expo of G	Expo of \hat{G}	Expo of G_1	Pairing
SS512	1.853	1.896	0.174	2.555
MNT159	0.649	5.351	1.212	9.237


computational costs incurred by the encryption and decryption algorithms between the scheme \mathcal{ABE}' in [1] and the scheme \mathcal{ABE} proposed in this paper. It is not difficult to see that the proposed scheme \mathcal{ABE} is more efficient than the scheme \mathcal{ABE}' in [1].

The scheme \mathcal{ABE}' in [1] and the scheme \mathcal{ABE} in this paper are implemented in the Charm framework [31]. Both of them are transformed into that in the asymmetric setting (note that the assumptions and the security proofs in the symmetric groups can be converted to the asymmetric setting in a generic way [20]) before the implementation, since the Charm framework is designed under the asymmetric groups. Thus, three groups G , \hat{G} and G_1 are used in the pairing function as $\hat{e}: G \times \hat{G} \rightarrow G_1$.


The experiments are conducted on a laptop running the 64-bit Ubuntu 16.04 with the Intel Core i5-4210U CPU @ 1.70GHz and 8.00 GB RAM. The Charm-0.43, the Python 3.4 and the PBC library (for the underlying cryptographic operations) are installed for the implementation.

The algorithms of both schemes \mathcal{ABE} and \mathcal{ABE}' are simulated over elliptic curves SS512 (a symmetric curve with a 512-bit base field) and MNT159 (an asymmetric curve with a 159-bit base field) to provide the security level of 80-bit. The average running time for exponentiation (i.e., Expo) and pairing operations over the groups of two curves is summarized in Table 3.


We focus on the computational overheads of the Encrypt and Decrypt algorithms in both schemes, as the computational overheads of the Setup and KeyGen algorithms in the schemes \mathcal{ABE} and \mathcal{ABE}' are close to each other. The performances of the encryption and decryption algorithms in the proposed scheme \mathcal{ABE} and the scheme \mathcal{ABE}' in [1] are shown in Fig. 3 in terms of the SS512 and MNT159 curves, respectively. With respect to the MNT159 curve, the average computation time of running the Encrypt algorithm to generate a ciphertext with an access policy of 1 attribute to 10 attributes ranges from 0.08s to 0.60s for the scheme \mathcal{ABE}' in [1] and 0.05s to 0.40s for the proposed scheme \mathcal{ABE} , and the average computation time of running the Decrypt algorithm to decrypt a ciphertext with an access policy of 1 attribute to 10 attributes ranges from 8s to 61s for the scheme \mathcal{ABE}' in [1] and 8s to 40s for the proposed scheme \mathcal{ABE} . Concerning the SS512 curve, the average computation time of running the Encrypt algorithm of generating a ciphertext with an access policy of 1 attribute to 10 attributes ranges from 0.03s to 0.30s for the scheme \mathcal{ABE}' in [1] and 0.03s to 0.20s for the proposed scheme \mathcal{ABE} , and the average computation time of running the Decrypt algorithm to get the message from a ciphertext with an access policy of 1 attribute to 10 attributes ranges from 3s to 26s for the scheme \mathcal{ABE}' in [1] and 2s to 21s for the proposed scheme \mathcal{ABE} .




(a) Encrypt-SS512



(b) Encrypt-MNT159



(c) Decrypt-SS512



(d) Decrypt-MNT159

Fig. 3. Performance of the schemes ABE and ABE' .

5. Conclusions

Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) has been considered as a useful technique to provide data security and privacy in cloud storage scenarios, as it enables data owners to upload their data in encrypted forms to the cloud while sharing them with users possessing certain credentials or attributes. However, a ciphertext produced by a CP-ABE scheme includes a clear access structure, which may leak some information about the privileged recipients or the underlying message of the ciphertext. To solve this problem, it has been suggested to use CP-ABE with partially hidden access structures (e.g., [9,15–18]) to generate the ciphertext such that the sensitive attribute values in the access structure of a ciphertext can be hidden from the public view. Unfortunately, many existing CP-ABE schemes with partially hidden access structures (e.g., [9,15–18]) either only support restricted access structures or are built in the inefficient composite-order groups. To our knowledge, there are few expressive CP-ABE schemes with partially hidden access structures that are built in the prime-order groups. In this paper, we revisited the expressive CP-ABE scheme with partially hidden access structures in [1], and improved its efficiency. After analyzing the security of the proposed scheme, we evaluated its performance by simulating its algorithms and those in [1].

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Hui Cui received her Ph.D. degree in the School of Computing and Information Technology, University of Wollongong, Australia. She then worked as a research fellow in the Secure Mobile Centre under the School of Information Systems, Singapore Management University, Singapore. Now, she is a research fellow in the School of Science, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia.



Robert H. Deng has been a Professor at the School of Information Systems, Singapore Management University since 2004. Prior to this, he was Principal Scientist and Manager of Infocomm Security Department, Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore. His research interests include data security and privacy, multimedia security, network and system security. He has served/is serving on the editorial boards of many international journals in security, such as IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, the International Journal of Information Security, and IEEE Security and Privacy Magazine. He is the chair of the Steering Committee of the ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS). He received the University Outstanding Researcher Award from the National University of Singapore in 1999 and the Lee Kuan Yew Fellow for Research Excellence from the Singapore Management University in 2006. He was named Community Service Star and Showcased Senior Information Security Professional by (ISC)2 under its Asia-Pacific Information Security Leadership Achievements program in 2010. He is Fellow of IEEE. conferences and journals, and served in the program committees for over 80 international conferences and workshops. Yingjiu Li is a senior member of the ACM and a member of the IEEE Computer Society. The URL for his web page is <http://www.mysmu.edu/faculty/yjli/>.