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Policy competition in the 2002 French legislative and presidential elections

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Abstract. The French two-round system of presidential elections forces candidates to choose strategies designed to maximize their votes in two different, potentially conflicting strategic contexts: a first round contest between many candidates, and a second round between (typically) a left- and a right-oriented candidate. Following a constitutional change in 2000, furthermore, presidential elections are synchronized with legislative elections, more tightly linking presidential candidates to the policy platforms of the parties they represent. This article examines the consequences of policy positioning by presidential candidates, measuring, comparing and assessing positioning in the legislative elections and in the first and second presidential election rounds. The measures come from an expert survey taken in 2002, from content analysis of party manifestos and presidential speeches, and from the 2002 French National Election Survey. The findings provide hard empirical confirmation of two commonly perceived propositions: first, that Jospin's first-round loss resulted from strategic error in moving too close to the policy centre, and second, that Chirac's won an overwhelming second-round victory because he collected all of the voters from candidates eliminated in the first round.

Introduction

Party competition in France now takes place in the context of a major constitutional amendment, introduced in 2000 and designed to synchronize presidential and legislative elections while reducing the presidential term to five years, the same as the maximum term for the National Assembly.¹ The first election held according to the new constitutionally synchronized terms took place in 2002, with the presidential election taking place before the legislative elections, even though legislative elections were originally intended to precede the presidential election (Bruno et al. 2003). This new arrangement was designed specifically to reduce the frequency with which presidency and parliament are controlled by different parties, a form of divided government known in France as '*cohabitation*'. For political scientists, the new arrangement means that future French presidential and legislative elections will occur in quick succession in five-year cycles, a situation that provides an excellent natural laboratory for analyzing multiparty competition in two different strategic contexts.

The 2002 presidential election also produced what many regarded as a surprising result: the defeat of the incumbent Socialist prime minister, Lionel Jospin, in the first round of the presidential election. This resulted two weeks later in a runoff election between the incumbent president, the centre-right Jacques Chirac, and an established far right challenger, Jean-Marie Le Pen. Chirac went on to a victory of unprecedented magnitude, with his vote share leaping from under 20 per cent in the first round to over 80 per cent in the second, apparently gaining second-round votes from left-wing voters who found themselves without a candidate to support and faced with a choice of abstaining or voting for what for them was the lesser of two evils. Turnout also rose from 71.6 to 79.7 per cent between the two rounds.

One common explanation for the unexpected first-round defeat of Jospin is that he made a serious strategic error by campaigning as a centrist candidate (e.g., Kuhn 2002; Esquenazi 2003; Jaffré 2003). It is argued that, in doing so, Jospin moved into a space crowded with centrist candidates, diluting his share of the centrist vote while potentially alienating his party's more leftist core. The explanation for the Chirac's unprecedented victory, therefore, was not that he was an extremely popular choice – given that his first-round vote share was under 20 per cent – but that rather that he was the only choice on offer to anti-Le Pen voters in the second round. Instead of a typical second-round contest between candidates from the centre-left and centre-right, the contest between the far-right Le Pen and centre-right Chirac meant that Chirac was much closer than Le Pen in policy terms to supporters of most of the eliminated first-round candidates.

In this article we conduct a systematic empirical analysis of these informal explanations of the 2002 French presidential election (for reviews of these, see Gaffney 2004; Lewis-Beck 2003; Perrineau & Ysmal 2003). We begin by elaborating the institutional context of French presidential elections and analyzing the strategic implications of these from the perspective of a 'spatial' account of voting in two-round elections. We then provide empirical estimates of candidate and party positions, mapping the policy space of the 2002 French elections. To estimate the positions of the French parties, we draw on an original expert survey taken in 2002, showing not only the positions of French parties on numerous dimensions of policy, but also the relative importance that parties attached to each dimension. To estimate the positions of French presidential candidates, we apply techniques of computerized text analysis to candidate speeches, comparing the content of these to the content of party manifestos for the 2002 legislative elections. Finally, we draw on the 2002 French National Election Survey to estimate the distribution of voter ideal points on the most salient policy dimensions. Using these estimates of the policy positions of the various actors, we then evaluate the presidential

election outcome in spatial terms and draw conclusions about presidential and legislative electoral strategy under the new regime of French elections.

The French two-round presidential election system

The French two-round presidential election system allows any number of candidates to stand in the first round² in which a candidate must receive more than 50 per cent of the votes to be elected. Barring such a highly unusual outcome, the two candidates with the most votes in the first round go on to compete against each other in a second round, held two weeks later. In the 2002 presidential elections, there were 16 candidates in the first round, leading to a highly fragmented outcome in which no candidate received more than 20 per cent of the vote. The situation changed dramatically in the second round, however, with incumbent President Jacques Chirac receiving an overwhelming 82.2 per cent of the two-candidate vote (see Table 1). This dramatic

Table 1. Results of French presidential elections, 2002

Candidate	Party	Programme analyzed?	1st round %	2nd round %
Chirac	RPR	Yes	19.9	82.2
Le Pen	FN	Yes	16.9	17.8
Jospin	PS	Yes	16.2	
Bayrou	UDF	Yes	6.8	
Laguiller	LO	Yes	5.7	
Chevènement	PR	Yes	5.3	
Mamère	Verts	Yes	5.3	
Besancenot	LCR	No	4.3	
Sainte-Josse	CPNT	Yes	4.2	
Madelin	DL	Yes	3.9	
Hue	PCF	Yes	3.4	
Mégret	MNR	No	2.3	
Taubira	PRG	Yes	2.3	
Lepage	CAPVS	Yes	1.9	
Boutin	FRS	No	1.2	
Gluckstein	PT	No	0.5	

Notes: For abbreviations, see Table 2, except: RPR, Rassemblement pour la République; PR, Pôle Républicain; CAPVS, Citoyenneté Action Participation pour le 21^{ème} siècle; FRS, Forum des républicains sociaux; PT, Parti des Travailleurs.

Source: Kuhn (2002: 46).

concentration of votes between the two rounds of the presidential election underscores the fact that the very explicit two-stage election process confronts presidential candidates with important strategic decisions if they want to maximize their probability of eventual election.

For this reason, it is helpful to analyze the 2002 presidential election in the context of the Downsian spatial model of voting, which has been applied previously to French elections by Merrill and Grofman (1999: 103–105), as well as Chiche et al. (2000). Spatial models of political competition have formed one of the mainstays of formal political theory over the last few decades (e.g., Downs 1957; Enelow & Hinich 1984, 1990; Hinich & Munger 1994, 1997). As Dow (1998) notes, however, despite the theoretical sophistication of spatial theories of voting, these can be increasingly criticized for having made little real contribution to the empirical analysis of electoral competition. In multiparty electoral contexts, furthermore, spatial theory has provided even more limited empirical insight (Laver & Schofield 1998; Iversen 1994; Merrill 1995; Merrill & Grofman 1999). While we do not claim in what follows to offer a critical empirical test of a spatial voting model for French presidential elections, we do employ the spatial voting framework to provide an explicit theoretical structure within which to interpret the French presidential election of 2002.

Following the spatial model of voting, we can think of each French voter as having an ideal position in a multidimensional policy space. This space encompasses as many dimensions as necessary to capture the important debates in French politics. Reasoning backwards from the final stage of the election process – the two-candidate second round – we expect the winner to be the one candidate out of the two remaining in the competition whose position is closer to the ideal points of a majority of voters.³ While different models of party competition might make different predictions about the precise location of the vote-maximizing position in the closed two-candidate final round that looks very much like the classic Downsian setup, all models would agree that the winning position is likely to be relatively close to the centre of the distribution of electoral opinion. This is all we need for our present purposes.

In the more crowded candidate space of the first round, by contrast, presidential hopefuls must compete for votes in a much more complicated spatial contest in the common knowledge that it is well-nigh certain no candidate will win a majority of votes in the first round and that the top two candidates will thus proceed to the second round. If several candidates in a crowded field occupy positions close to the centre of the policy space, then it may well be that vote-maximizing positions for other candidates are to be found away from the centre. Given the short time between rounds (i.e., two weeks), it also seems reasonable to assume that candidates cannot dramatically change policy positions between the two rounds in any credible way. Even if they did try to

announce such changes, it is likely that these announcements would not be believed by voters, rendering the attempt pointless. This confronts presidential hopefuls *whose ultimate aim is to maximize second round votes*, with important strategic decisions about where to locate their first round policy positions.

There are, of course, likely to be candidates in the presidential election who have no real expectation of becoming president – indeed of making it through to the second round – but who nonetheless contest the first round for a variety of different reasons. Such reasons might include the desire to advertize and promote a particular policy platform, the desire to fly the party flag in anticipation of the legislative elections to follow, even personal vanity, among many other possibilities. We can think of these candidates as being non-strategic *in the context of the presidential election* since the policy positions they adopt in the first round are not geared to winning the eventual second-round election. Candidates with realistic ambitions to become president, however, must adopt policy positions that allow them to win enough votes to be one of the top two candidates in the first round. If successful in the first round, they must then pit *effectively this same policy position* against the position of the other successful first-round candidate. A policy position that wins enough votes to succeed in the first round may not be capable in the second round of beating the other first-round winner. A policy position that would win the presidency in the second round may not be capable of winning enough votes in the first round even to make it through to the second.

This strategic dilemma for serious presidential candidates has traditionally been resolved in France by what Kuhn (2002: 47) has called ‘the iron law of the two-ballot system’, which is to ‘secure the core vote in the first round before widening the base of support in the second’. If we accept the view that candidates cannot credibly change their policy positions in any dramatic way in the two weeks between rounds, then this widening of the base can only arise as a result the elimination of candidates whose policy positions attracted votes away from the first-round winners, and not as a result of any strategic move by the second-round candidate. This iron law has been based upon the understanding that the two candidates securing their bases well enough to make it through to the second round will do so from positions of broadly the centre-left and the centre-right of French public opinion, so that the second round will be a relatively balanced contest between two candidates who each appeal to roughly half of the electorate. Up until 2002, this was what almost always happened – the only exception being the 1969 presidential election in which two right-wing candidates (Pompidou and Poher) qualified for the second round. The iron law strategy thus contradicts the superficially attractive argument that candidates should anticipate the need to win the second-round election, accepting the impossibility of changing

policy between rounds, by moving their policy positions towards the centre in the first round. This would be the best thing to do if a first-round victory could be guaranteed, but the iron law rejects the idea of an early dash for the centre since this may lose votes in a crowded first-round field and put at risk the possibility of even being in the race during the second round.

The 2002 presidential election in France was seen as boiling down to a contest between an incumbent president of the centre-right (Jacques Chirac) and an outgoing prime minister of the centre-left (Lionel Jospin) coming after a period of *cohabitation* between left and right that marked the end of the final seven-year presidential term. Both candidates were expected to make it through the first round, and then to fight it out in the second, in a process that has been described as “predicted pre-selection” (Parodi, 2002). Indeed, many of the published opinion polls in the run-up to the presidential elections concentrated mainly on what the result of this anticipated second-round contest would be. It seems reasonable to infer from this that the common knowledge assumption prior to the first round was that the two realistic presidential hopefuls – and hence the two candidates with the need to resolve the strategic dilemma of picking policy positions to win *both* rounds of the election – were Jospin and Chirac. In the event, the first round election result was a shock. As can be seen from Table 1, Jospin was beaten into third place by the extreme right candidate, Jean-Marie Le Pen. The second round was a landslide win for Chirac, who won 82 per cent of the popular vote to Le Pen’s 18 per cent. Kuhn (2002: 47) suggests that this happened because Jospin for some reason failed to observe the iron law and ‘alienated sections of the traditional Socialist vote without attracting sufficient support from elsewhere’.

In what follows, we evaluate two propositions about the 2002 election that stem from a spatial account of French two-round presidential elections. The first is that Jospin’s first-round elimination resulted from a strategic error in which he moved his policy position away from the centre-left position of his own Socialist Party and towards that of Jacques Chirac in anticipation of a second-round contest with Chirac. The second is that Chirac’s second-round victory was so overwhelming because the elimination of first-round candidates served to expand the support base only of Chirac, and not at all of Le Pen.

Estimating the policy positions of French parties and presidential candidates

We evaluate the two propositions set out above by first estimating the policy positions of French political parties, then by estimating the policy positions of candidates in the presidential election, before comparing party and candidate

positions. We estimate the positions of the main French political parties on a range of important policy dimensions using a previously unpublished expert survey of French political scientists who were asked for their judgments of the positions of these parties at the time of the 2002 legislative elections. We estimate the policy positions of the French presidential candidates by conducting a content analysis of the election statements of the presidential candidates and comparing these with the content of the election manifestos of the main French parties using a computerized 'word scoring' technique for analyzing political texts (Laver et al. 2003). Since this is the first application of this technique both to French political texts and presidential election addresses, we are also interested methodologically in assessing how well it works in a new environment.

Estimating the policy positions of French parties in 2002 using an expert survey

We ultimately want to compare the content of French party manifestos to that of French presidential addresses, but this comparison must be substantively based on some solid external assessment of the policy positions of the French political parties. We estimated these policy positions by conducting an expert survey in which we asked French political scientists for their judgments about the policy positions of the French parties at the time of the 2002 legislative elections. This survey was part of a larger study of party policy positions in 47 democracies and followed the model of expert surveys conducted by Laver and Hunt (1992).⁴ We thus asked respondents to locate the main political parties on policy dimensions using 20-point scales with precisely defined endpoints. Unlike the original Laver and Hunt survey, however, for which all materials were only available in English, this survey of French experts was conducted entirely in French. A total of 182 political scientists, affiliated both to the Association Française de Science Politique and to a French university, were approached for their judgments of the positions of the French political parties on seven important policy dimensions.⁵ A total of 51 experts contributed to the survey for a response rate of 28 per cent – fairly typical for postal expert surveys of this type. Four of the seven dimensions analyzed were essentially the same as those estimated by Laver and Hunt for 1989: the trade-off between lower taxes and higher levels of public spending; 'social policy' on matters such as homosexuality and euthanasia; environmental policy; and decentralization. Three were new policy dimensions reflecting developments in the politics of France and other European states since the Laver and Hunt survey: immigration; globalization; and the European Union (EU). (A full list of precise scale and endpoint definitions can be found in the Appendix).

A complicating factor arose because, while we wanted to use our expert survey to estimate party positions at the time of the 2002 legislative elections that took place shortly after the presidential elections, there were important changes in the party system in the intervening period. The most significant of these was that the RPR, President Chirac's party, combined with a number of other small parties into a single party the Union pour la Majorité Présidentielle (UMP). This situation was further complicated by the fact the RPR did not formally disband until after the legislative elections. Because we wanted to make an explicit comparison with the presidential elections, we sought therefore to estimate the position of the RPR, which can be taken effectively as the position of the UMP.

Table 2 gives the results of first-round voting in the 2002 legislative elections and Table 3 reports our expert survey estimates of the positions of the six largest parties in the 2002 legislative elections.⁶ Each of these parties won more

Table 2. Results of French first-round legislative elections, 2002

Party	Votes	Percent
UMP – Union pour la Majorité Présidentielle	8,408,023	33.30
PS – Parti Socialiste	6,086,599	24.11
FN – Front National	2,862,960	11.34
UDF – Union pour la Démocratie Française	1,226,462	4.85
PCF – Parti communiste	1,216,178	4.82
Verts	1,138,222	4.51
Divers droite	921,973	3.65
CPNT – Chasse Pêche Nature et Traditions	422,448	1.67
PRG – Parti Radical de Gauche	388,891	1.54
LCR – Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire	320,467	1.27
LO – Lutte Ouvrière	301,984	1.20
Pôle Républicain	299,897	1.19
Autres écologistes	295,899	1.17
MNR – Mouvement National Républicain	276,376	1.09
Divers gauche	275,553	1.09
MPF – Mouvement pour la France	202,831	0.80
Divers	194,946	0.77
DL – Démocratie Libérale	104,767	0.41
RPF – Rassemblement pour la France	94,222	0.37
Extrême gauche	81,558	0.32
Extrême droite	59,549	0.24

Source: www.assemblee-nationale.fr/elections/.

Table 3. Expert survey estimates of policy positions of French political parties, 2002 (Mean, SE, N)

Policy dimension	PCF	V	PS	UDF	RPR/UMP	FN
Taxes v. Spending	2.4 0.17	4.6 0.23	7.1 0.39	14.0 0.38	14.3 0.31	16.7 0.42
Social	7.9 0.57	2.5 0.17	5.1 0.32	12.0 0.50	14.4 0.34	18.9 0.17
Immigration	5.8 0.42	2.4 0.21	6.3 0.32	10.5 0.34	12.4 0.43	19.3 0.17
Globalization	3.4 0.26	5.5 0.61	10.7 0.48	14.7 0.36	12.6 0.41	3.1 0.29
European Union	5.7 0.38	14.6 0.48	15.7 0.32	17.5 0.28	12.4 0.54	1.9 0.15
Environment	12.8 0.62	2.2 0.19	8.4 0.44	12.0 0.43	13.6 0.42	14.8 0.44
Decentralization	13.3 0.56	4.8 0.50	7.4 0.48	4.5 0.51	10.0 0.60	15.6 0.44

Note: For party abbreviations, see Table 2. N = 51.

Source: Expert survey conducted by authors.

than 4.5 per cent of the vote nationally. After these six, as Table 2 shows, there was a large group of parties each winning 1–2 per cent of the national vote and it would have been impracticable to include all of these in the expert survey. Table 4 reports our estimates of the relative importance of each dimension for each party, together with a weighted mean importance for each policy dimension. (This is derived for each dimension by weighting the importance score for each party by its share of the legislative vote in 2002 from Table 2.)

The parties are listed from left to right in Tables 3 and 4 according to their estimated positions on the main economic policy dimension (taxes/spending) and these positions have excellent face validity. The Communists anchor the left and the Front National anchors the right. On the highly correlated social policy and immigration scales (see Table 5), the Front National is even further to the right than it is on economic policy, but the liberal end of the scale is anchored by the Greens rather than the Communists. The environmental policy scale is anchored on the pro-environmental end by the Greens, as might be expected, and at the other end by the Front National once more. The globalization, EU and decentralization of decision-making scales show the expected convergence between social-democratic left and moderate right; the Communists and Front National join forces at the anti-(EU/globalization/decentralization) end of these scales, with the establishment parties clustered together at the other end.

Our measures of party positions on a range of substantively important policy dimensions raise the question of how best to characterize the overall dimensionality of the French policy space. Table 4 lists the means for the expert judgments of the importance to each political party of the policy dimensions in question, along with a mean importance score for each dimension weighted by party vote share. The most important overall dimensions were judged by the country specialists to be the EU (with a score of 14.6) and immigration (13.7), followed closely by the economic policy dimension, then by globalization and social policy. The environmental dimension had the lowest weighted importance (10.9). Besides mean positions, it is also clear that specific dimensions were regarded as highly important by specific parties: the environment by the Greens (19.4) and immigration by the National Front (19.2), for example.

These expert survey responses may be interpreted to produce a measure of the overall dimensionality of the French policy space. Table 5 shows that party positions on a number of the policy dimensions we investigated are highly intercorrelated. More precisely, Table 5 displays two clusters of policy dimensions. One cluster, dealing with taxes/spending, social policy, immigration and the environment, can be thought of as comprising a set of more traditional socio-economic policy dimensions. The other cluster, dealing with

Table 4. Expert survey estimates of policy salience, by party, 2002 (Mean, SE)

Policy dimension	Weighted importance	PCF	V	PS	UDF	RPR/UMP	FN
EU: larger/stronger	14.3 1.80	12.3 0.52	14.3 0.45	14.3 0.45	18.2 0.24	13.0 0.49	16.9 0.53
Immigration	13.7 2.50	12.9 0.53	15.6 0.53	12.9 0.42	11.1 0.45	12.7 0.45	19.2 0.40
Taxes v. Spending	13.4 1.30	16.5 0.69	12.7 0.76	13.4 0.48	13.9 0.47	13.9 0.53	11.2 0.79
Globalization	13.4 2.10	16.8 0.37	16.7 0.38	13.3 0.38	11.6 0.49	11.7 0.46	16.4 0.56
Social	12.6 2.50	10.8 0.70	17.4 0.35	14.4 0.46	11.7 0.55	10.2 0.62	14.9 0.72
Decentralization	12.2 2.70	8.8 0.52	14.7 0.56	13.3 0.43	16.8 0.32	12.8 0.54	7.0 0.59
Environment	10.9 3.30	10.2 0.65	19.4 0.14	13.1 0.44	10.5 0.48	10.0 0.52	5.9 0.62

Note: N = 51.

Source: Expert survey conducted by authors.

Table 5. Correlations between mean expert survey placements of six main parties on seven policy dimensions (weighted by vote share)

	Economic	Social	Environment	Decentralization	Immigration	European Union
Economic	1.00					
Social	0.93	1.00				
Environment	0.78	0.91	1.00			
Decentralization	0.46	0.72	0.73	1.00		
Immigration	0.91	0.96	0.85	0.76	1.00	
European Union	0.40	0.66	0.59	0.95	0.71	1.00
Globalization	0.16	0.09	0.02	0.62	0.21	0.79

Note: Bold correlations are significant at the 0.05 level.

globalization, the EU, and the decentralization of decision making, can be thought of as an internationalization/post-industrial politics dimension. These results closely match survey-based analyses of the policy preferences of French electorates since the mid-1990s (Grunberg & Schweisguth 1997). As this analysis has been more systematically investigated using exploratory factor analysis,⁷ a two-dimensional representation of the policy space is most appropriate. We construct a socio-economic policy scale that averages economic and immigration policy scores, and an 'internationalism' scale that averages EU and globalization scores. The latter scale nevertheless captures far less variance (about 2.5 times less in exploratory factor analyses) of party policy positions than the socio-economic dimension. We also note, from Table 4, that the four 'raw' policy dimensions forming the component parts of these scales are those rated as having the highest weighted mean salience by French country specialists. We therefore take these two scales as the two-dimensional representation of the French party space that captures most of the information in our expert survey data and use these in subsequent figures.

Estimating the policy positions on French presidential candidates in 2002 using computerized word scoring

Having estimated the policy positions of the main French political parties in the 2002 legislative elections, the next step is to estimate the positions of candidates in the 2002 presidential elections. To do this, we analyze the texts of policy platforms issued by the candidates using the computerized 'word scoring' technique set out in Laver et al. (2003), which contains a full description of what is involved.⁸ Briefly, the word scoring technique is a method for estimating the (unknown) positions of 'virgin' texts on *a priori* policy dimensions. Essentially, it does this by statistically comparing the patterns of word frequencies in the virgin texts under investigation, with the patterns of word frequencies in a set of 'reference' texts from well-known sources.

Once the analyst has access to external estimates of the positions of the reference texts on the *a priori* dimensions under investigation, as we have with our expert survey findings, or indeed is confident in being able to assume these, the word scoring technique proceeds as follows. First, the reference texts are analyzed in order to calculate a matrix of the relative frequencies of all words in the word universe of the set of reference texts. This in turn allows the calculation of a matrix of key conditional probabilities, each element of which is the probability that a reader is reading reference text *r* given that he or she is reading word *w*. For any given *a priori* policy dimension for which the positions of the authors of each reference text can be estimated, this allows the calculation of a vector of 'word scores', each element of which is in effect

an estimated policy position of text r , given that the reader is reading word w . The vector of word scores for any *a priori* policy dimension is thus a function of the policy positions and the patterns of relative words frequencies in the set of reference texts.

Having calculated the vector of word scores for a given dimension from the reference texts, the analyst is now in a position to investigate 'virgin' texts, about which no information whatsoever is available as regards the policy positions expressed in them. This is very simply achieved. The pattern of relative word frequencies in each virgin text is observed and this, combined with the vector of word scores for the dimension under investigation, allows the analyst to estimate the position of each virgin text on this dimension. Given overlapping patterns of word usage between texts, it is necessary to rescale the estimated positions of the virgin texts, if it is desired for presentational purposes to have these on the same metric as the 'input scores' used to determine the position of the reference texts.

Because this technique is purely statistical, it has three great advantages over more traditional methods of text analysis. It requires no substantive judgment calls during the process of data analysis and is thus perfectly replicable; it operates in any language, not needing predefined coding dictionaries; and it generates an estimate of the uncertainty associated with any estimated policy position. The analyst's crucial expert role when using the word scoring technique is at the research design stage: in identifying appropriate reference texts, and in picking good estimates or assumptions about the positions of these texts on the *a priori* dimensions under investigation. If the reference texts are inappropriate, or if their estimated or assumed policy positions are misleading, then this will produce misleading estimates of the positions of the virgin texts. The key, therefore, is to build on a solid foundation of well-chosen reference texts combined with solid estimates or assumptions about the policy positions of these.

Here, we take as our reference texts the parliamentary election manifestoes of French political parties in 2002. We were able to obtain nine manifestos for use as reference texts. These included the official election manifestos of the six largest parties we have already discussed, although the creation of the UMP immediately before the legislative election meant that we used the already issued manifesto of what had been Jacques Chirac's party when he contested the presidential election (the RPR). A seventh reference text was the long and detailed policy statement released by the Union en Mouvement (UEM), a grouping formed as part of the transition to the UMP and can be taken as having essentially the same policy position as the UMP that emerged from it. Finally, we included two additional manifestos published by small Eurosceptic rightist parties: Mouvement pour la France (MPF) and Rassemblement pour la

France (RPF). The larger the number of reference texts we include, provided that we have good estimates of the positions of these, the more information is included in the matrix of word scores we used to score virgin texts.⁹ The net result is that we had manifestos and independent expert estimates of policy positions for nine parties/groupings in the French legislature.

We take as our estimates of the positions of these reference texts the results of the expert survey we reported in the previous section. Our virgin texts are the policy programmes issued by the French presidential candidates in 2002. We were able to obtain presidential policy platforms in the forms of key campaign speeches for 12 of the 16 candidates in the election, including all main candidates. For all but one text (i.e., the Le Pen presidential address), the word length was above or about the 2,000-word minimum that Laver et al. suggest is most suited for producing reliable estimates. Fortunately, however, the Le Pen presidential programme, while short, had a sufficiently distinctive pattern of word use to allow it to be distinguished clearly from other texts. The varying lengths of texts will show up in varying widths of the confidence intervals surrounding the estimated policy positions of the texts involved.

Table 6 shows the word scored estimates of the policy positions of the policy platforms of the presidential candidates of the six main parties on the seven dimensions under investigation. These are shown in both 'raw' form and transformed to the same metric as the expert survey estimates of French party policy positions, together with associated confidence intervals around the estimates. Table 6 also shows the expert survey estimates of these party policy positions. It is thus possible to compare, on the same metric, the policy positions of the six main parties with the policy positions of their presidential candidates.

Comparing the policy positions of parties and presidential candidates

Table 6 contains information relating to the first main question this article sets out to address: whether Lionel Jospin did indeed move away from the policy position of his party and towards that of his anticipated second round rival, Jacques Chirac. Since the numbers in Table 6 are statistical estimations, we need to know whether we can be confident that a 'difference' between two numbers is the result of more than mere uncertainty in the estimation. With this in mind, compare the policy positions of Jospin's presidential statement with those of his legislative party, the PS. For six of the seven policy dimensions (the sole exception being decentralization), the difference between candidate and party positions is statistically significant in that the position of the PS lies outside the 95 per cent confidence intervals around the estimated position of

Table 6. Legislative party and presidential candidate positions, France, 2002

Candidate and party	Le Pen (FN)	Hue (PCF)	Jospin (PS)	Chirac (RPR)	Bayrou (UDF)	Mamère (Verts)
<i>Economic policy</i>						
Expert score for party	16.7	2.4	7.2	14.4	14.1	4.6
95% CI lower	15.87	2.07	6.41	13.81	13.27	4.11
95% CI upper	17.57	2.77	7.97	15.03	14.83	5.05
Wordscores estimate for presidential candidate	20.1	3.3	10.2	16.4	11.4	8.5
Transformed SE	1.912	0.467	0.418	0.628	0.249	0.297
Transformed 95% CI lower	16.29	2.39	9.38	15.13	10.90	7.87
Transformed 95% CI upper	23.94	4.25	11.05	17.64	11.90	9.06
<i>Social policy</i>						
Expert score for party	18.9	8.0	5.2	14.5	12.0	2.5
95% CI lower	18.54	6.87	4.51	13.82	10.97	2.14
95% CI upper	19.22	9.15	5.79	15.18	13.01	2.84
Wordscores estimate for presidential candidate	23.6	6.5	9.2	14.7	10.3	9.7
Transformed SE	1.471	0.311	0.302	0.451	0.183	0.220
Transformed 95% CI lower	20.64	5.87	8.64	13.75	9.92	9.24
Transformed 95% CI upper	26.52	7.11	9.85	15.55	10.65	10.12
<i>Immigration policy</i>						
Expert score for party	19.2	5.8	6.4	12.4	10.6	2.4
95% CI lower	18.90	4.91	5.77	11.47	9.86	1.98

95% CI upper	19.58	6.65	7.03	13.25	11.24	2.82
Wordscores estimate for presidential candidate	22.5	5.6	8.2	13.1	10.0	9.0
Transformed SE	1.605	0.334	0.314	0.475	0.197	0.237
Transformed 95% CI lower	19.29	4.91	7.58	12.15	9.56	8.55
Transformed 95% CI upper	25.71	6.24	8.84	14.05	10.35	9.49
<i>Globalization</i>						
Expert score for party	3.2	3.5	10.8	12.7	14.7	5.5
95% CI lower	2.57	2.96	9.90	11.91	13.97	4.28
95% CI upper	3.73	4.00	11.78	13.49	15.45	6.76
Wordscores estimate for presidential candidate	-0.8	8.3	13.1	12.2	9.7	7.5
Transformed SE	1.095	0.246	0.247	0.380	0.149	0.168
Transformed 95% CI lower	-3.02	7.77	12.65	11.41	9.38	7.14
Transformed 95% CI upper	1.36	8.75	13.63	12.93	9.97	7.81
<i>Environmental policy</i>						
Expert score for party	14.8	12.9	8.5	13.7	12.0	2.2
95% CI lower	13.93	11.69	7.64	12.78	11.13	1.79
95% CI upper	15.71	14.17	9.40	14.52	12.89	2.55
Wordscores estimate for presidential candidate	20.3	8.1	10.4	14.3	9.2	8.9
Transformed SE	1.329	0.287	0.268	0.394	0.168	0.209
Transformed 95% CI lower	17.66	7.57	9.84	13.56	8.85	8.44
Transformed 95% CI upper	22.98	8.72	10.92	15.13	9.52	9.27

Table 6. Continued.

Candidate and party	Le Pen (FN)	Hue (PCF)	Jospin (PS)	Chirac (RPR)	Bayrou (UDF)	Mamère (Verts)
<i>European Union</i>						
Expert score for party	1.9	5.7	15.7	12.5	17.5	14.7
95% CI lower	1.60	4.95	15.06	11.38	16.94	13.70
95% CI upper	2.22	6.51	16.36	13.56	18.08	15.64
Wordscores estimate for presidential candidate	-2.5	12.3	14.5	11.4	12.4	10.7
Transformed SE	1.214	0.243	0.248	0.378	0.150	0.174
Transformed 95% CI lower	-4.94	11.82	13.98	10.67	12.12	10.33
Transformed 95% CI upper	-0.08	12.79	14.97	12.18	12.72	11.03
<i>Decentralization</i>						
Expert score for party	15.6	13.3	7.5	9.9	4.5	4.8
95% CI lower	14.74	12.19	6.46	8.63	3.43	3.75
95% CI upper	16.50	14.47	8.44	11.07	5.51	5.79
Wordscores estimate for presidential candidate	19.3	8.3	7.1	9.1	7.9	9.2
Transformed SE	0.981	0.205	0.197	0.299	0.125	0.146
Transformed 95% CI lower	17.35	7.92	6.69	8.52	7.64	8.86
Transformed 95% CI upper	21.27	8.73	7.48	9.72	8.14	9.45
<i>Composite scales</i>						
Economy/Immigration	20.0	4.4	9.2	14.7	10.7	8.7
European Union/Globalization	22.7	10.7	7.2	9.2	10.0	11.9

the Jospin presidential candidacy. In this precise sense, Jospin does appear to have moved significantly away from the policy positions of his party during the 2002 presidential election. The substantive direction of this movement on different policy dimensions is also interesting. On matters of socio-economic policy (i.e., taxes versus spending, social policy, immigration), the direction of Jospin's movement is away from the centre-left and towards the centre. On the 'internationalism' policy dimensions (i.e., the EU and globalization), the direction of his movement is actually away from the centrist position of his party towards a more internationalist (pro-EU, pro-globalization) position. In each case, however, his movement can be seen as being away from the social-democratic core vote. Crucially in terms of our conjecture that Jospin moved his policy position in anticipation of a second-round contest with Chirac, every statistically significant policy difference took Jospin away from the position of his party and towards the position of Chirac.

Compare the situation of Jospin with that of his ostensible main rival and the eventual winner of the presidential election, Jacques Chirac. On four of the seven policy dimensions (social policy, immigration, globalization and the environment) there is no significant difference between Chirac's presidential policy positions and those of his party at the time of the presidential election, the RPR. On the remaining three dimensions, there is a distinct shift by Chirac, but this is not towards the centre of the policy space or the position his anticipated second round rival, Lionel Jospin. On economic policy, his presidential election statement is scored as being less centrist than, and to the right of, the RPR manifesto. He also adopted a somewhat less pro-EU and a somewhat more pro-decentralization position than the RPR. In general, when there is indeed a difference between Chirac and his party, this is on a smaller scale than the differences we observe for Jospin and such differences take him away from, rather than towards, both the centre of the policy space and his anticipated second round rival.

If we compare the situations of Jospin and Chirac, therefore, the expected contestants in the second round of the presidential election, we can see that Jospin moved away from his party much more sharply than did Chirac and, as far as the socio-economic policy dimension was concerned, made this sharp move towards the centre of the policy space, which, as we shall see, was crowded with other first-round candidates, none of whom had a realistic anticipation of eventual election.

Moving on to Le Pen, who did in the event win through to the second round of the presidential election, we see that his short, sharp address is estimated to be to the right of the much longer party manifesto of the Front National. Even though the shortness of the speech generates wide confidence intervals around the estimates of his policy positions, the rightwards shift of his presidential

election policy statement – often off one end or the other of the scale used in the expert survey – is typically large enough for us to conclude that this is statistically significant.

The net conclusion we can draw from these empirical findings is that, considering the three leading contenders in the first round of the 2002 presidential election, there is systematic evidence that Jospin moved sharply towards the centre on the socio-economic policy dimension, away from his left-of-centre party base and towards his anticipated second-round rival Jacques Chirac, while neither Chirac nor Le Pen made any move towards the centre. The latter two candidates seem to have been following the iron law of consolidating their popular base in the first round, while the word scoring analyses of presidential election platforms strongly imply that Jospin violated it.

Figure 1 summarizes much of the information in Table 6 and our discussion of this, showing a two-dimensional spatial representation of the policy positions of the six main French parties and their respective presidential




Figure 1. Party and presidential candidate positions on socio-economic policy and internationalism: Expert survey and Wordscore estimates (X-Dimension: Mean of economic and immigration policy scores, Y-Dimension: (Inverted) Mean of globalization and EU scores. Basis: 9 party reference texts to generate transformed word scores, 6 reference texts and 6 virgin texts for transformation).

candidates. The horizontal dimension shows positions on the socio-economic policy dimension combining party and candidate scores on economic and immigration policy; the vertical dimension shows positions on the internationalism dimension scores on the EU and globalization. (Remember that the socio-economic policy dimension captures far more of the variation in overall party policy positions than the 'internationalism' dimension.) Jospin's move towards the centre and away from his party on socio-economic policy can be clearly seen, as can the moves away from the centre by Chirac and Le Pen. Figure 1 also shows some striking shifts by the presidential candidates of the remaining 'big six' parties. Mamère, the candidate of the Greens, made an even bigger shift from his party and toward the centre than Jospin, for example. Hue, the Communist candidate, seems to have moved away from his party to what might have been seen as a more 'presidential' position less hostile to the EU and the consequences of globalization. The striking bottom-line conclusion to be drawn from Figure 1, however, is that the only two presidential candidates from the major parties that did not move in some way towards the centre of the policy space were the two who made it through to the second round of the contest. In this sense, Figure 1 provides systematic evidence that the iron law is well founded.

Comparing policy competition in the first and second round of the presidential elections

We now turn to the presidential programmes of all twelve candidates that we analyzed – six from the main parties and six others. Figure 2 plots the positions of the twelve candidates on the socio-economic and internationalism policy dimensions. (For the party affiliation of each candidate, see Table 1.) It also shows a 'Voronoi tessellation' of the positions of the set of candidates in each round of the election. This draws the lines bisecting the distance between each pair of candidate positions; the resulting 'territories' around each candidate position show areas of the policy space that are closer to this candidate than to any other. The dotted lines show the tessellation for the first-round candidates for whom we were able to estimate policy positions. The solid line shows the much simpler tessellation for the two candidates in the second round, whose names are shown in upper case.

First, we should note that the patterns revealed in Figure 2 provide a strong face validation of the application of computer word scoring to French presidential addresses. Each one of the estimated candidate positions has been derived purely from a statistical analysis of the patterns of word frequencies in each text, applying no knowledge whatsoever of either the identity of the

author of the text or of the French language. Thus the presidential text of the Communist candidate, Hue, was compared to the nine reference texts and, on the basis of the words it contained, located well to the left of the socio-economic policy dimension. Even more remarkably, the election text of Arlette Laguiller, the presidential candidate for the Trotskyist Lutte Ouvrière, was placed slightly to the left of Hue by computer word scoring. There was no reference text for Lutte Ouvrière; nonetheless, using nothing but the words in Laguiller's statement and comparing these to the words in the available reference texts, the word scoring technique located her on the far left of the policy space. In short, all of the positions in Figure 2 are a product solely of the words in the relevant presidential election texts.

As we might expect, the positions of some of the remaining candidates reflect the simplifications and assumptions we have made in order to be able to estimate positions in a common policy space containing all parties and candidates. The most striking anomaly can be seen in the very close positions estimated for St Josse (from Chasse Pêche Nature et Tradition) and Mamère (from Les Verts), who undoubtedly embody opposite poles in the French




Figure 2. Presidential candidates' Wordscore positions estimated on socio-economic policy and internationalism (X-Dimension: Mean of economic and immigration policy scores, Y-Dimension: (Inverted) Mean of globalization and EU scores. Basis: 9 party reference texts and all 12 candidates as virgin texts. Transformed scores plotted).

political space (Knapp 2004). One obvious explanation for this is that the environmental policy dimension that is most likely to embody this difference was not used in our estimation of candidate's policy positions for reasons noted above.¹⁰ This is a generic problem for spatial models and reflects the limits of any method used to estimate a common policy space when some party policy priorities do not fit into the dimensional structure used to describe the system as a whole.

The second main point to note from Figure 2 is that Jospin's move towards the centre on the socio-economic policy dimension took him into a segment of this dimension that was very crowded with other presidential candidates. Other things being equal, and assuming that socio-economic policy was indeed important to voters, this can only have lost him votes in the first round. Nonetheless, Jospin did have a distinctive policy position, mainly as a result of the fact that he was the most internationalist of the 12 candidates whose positions we estimated. This may well account for the fact that he did attract a substantial pool of votes taking him close, if not quite close enough, to making it through to the second round.

The third point to note is that the two first round winners – Chirac and Le Pen – did have policy positions that distinguished them clearly from the other candidates whose programmes we were able to analyze. This conclusion is somewhat exaggerated by the absence from our analysis of Boutin and Mégret, for whom we had no policy text, but who many would feel were located on the right of the policy space. It is also worth noting that one other candidate who appears in Figure 2 to have a very distinctive policy position almost certainly has an overestimated policy 'territory'. Arlette Laguiller's pool of available left-wing votes would almost certainly have been eaten into by Besancenot of the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire and Gluckstein of the Parti des travailleurs. Table 1 shows that both of these candidates (and especially Besancenot) won not insignificant numbers of first-round votes, but we unfortunately did not have access to texts of their presidential policy platforms.

Finally, compare the Voronoi tessellations for the first and second rounds of the presidential election shown as the dotted and solid lines, respectively, in Figure 2. This comparison gives us a clear answer to the second main question that we set out to answer concerning why Le Pen was unable to increase his pool of electoral support in the second round of the contest despite the elimination of 14 first-round candidates. Figure 2 shows quite clearly that the elimination of all of these candidates had no appreciable effect on the size of the 'territory' in the policy space commanded by Le Pen. Indeed the first-round elimination exclusively benefited Chirac, whose policy territory expanded to include areas commanding the vast majority of first-round votes.

Even knowing nothing of the density of the distribution of voters across this policy space, a comparison of the tessellations for the two rounds of the presidential election implies quite clearly that Le Pen would win effectively the same share of votes in each round.

Mapping the French voter space

While candidate positioning strongly hints at the first- and second-round presidential election outcomes, we have yet to examine any spatial mapping of voters. While previous attempts demonstrate just how difficult it can be to superimpose spatial maps of voter policy preferences on maps of candidate and party positions (e.g., Schofield et al. 1998; Benoit & Laver 2003), we can nonetheless examine the spatial distribution of the electorate and compare this to our estimates of candidate positioning. If our propositions about the outcome are to be supported, then we should find evidence of a fairly centrist electorate on the main policy dimensions with a noticeable cluster of support at the extreme end of at least one dimension (most likely immigration) for Le Pen and the xenophobic policies of this National Front Party.

For evidence on positions of the French electorate, we draw on the French National Election Survey (FNES: Panel Electoral Français) conducted in April–June 2002.¹¹ We first constructed four additive scales to summarize voter attitudes on, respectively: economic policy, immigration, Europe and internationalism. For direct comparability to the expert survey results, we have rescaled them to the 1–20 metric used in previous figures.¹²

Figure 3 provides two-dimensional density mappings of the French electorate on the two dimensions of socio-economic policy and internationalism. The ridges in the plots represent the 15th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles of voters from a combined sample of 3,051 respondents on the socio-economic dimension and 3,563 respondents on the internationalism dimension. The four panels of Figure 3 represent, reading from left to right, top row first, the policy focus of voters who planned to vote, respectively, for the RPR, the Front National, the Parti Socialiste and all parties combined.¹³ The density plots indicate two features relevant to our spatial interpretation of the French presidential election. First, the bottom right plots shows that voters overall were overwhelmingly centrist on domestic issues as represented by socio-economic policy. This explains both the crowded field of candidates in the centre, as well as the likely motivation of Jospin's move to the centre. We also see, however, that voters are relatively centrist on the internationalism dimension and attitudes towards Europe. This lends further support to the spatial explanation for the crowded position in the policy centre occupied by most presidential candidates.




Figure 3. Bivariate density plots of voter positions socio-economic policy and internationalism, by parties of top three presidential candidates (Source: FNES. Party labels refer to respondents identifying this party on Question 26. See text for scale explanation).

When we examine the spatial mappings of the core supporters of specific political parties, however, we see distinct differences in their policy preferences. Supporters of Chirac's party, the RPR, tended to be right-of-centre on both the socio-economic and internationalist dimensions. Supporters of Le Pen's Front National were even more extreme, occupying a space in the far right of both policy dimensions. The mappings for these two rightist parties present a marked contrast to the left-of-centre Parti Socialiste supporters, whose positions are distinctly left of centre on both dimensions.

While these mappings are exploratory and cannot in themselves form the basis of a definitive evaluation of Jospin's loss, they do offer a set of interesting clues about it. First, the leftist policy positions of PS supporters lends support to the explanation that Jospin lost at least some of these voters by moving to the centre on socioeconomic policy. It should be kept in mind that while the

voter positions have been rescaled to match those of the expert surveys, these are completely independent measures and we do not expect to observe perfect calibration. Indeed, given the pervasive tendency in election studies for voters to eschew the extreme ends of scales when locating their own policy preferences, it may be that PS voter preferences are ‘really’ further away from the centre than those reported in the election study. A second finding clearly suggested by the density plots in Figure 3 explains why so many candidates crowded the policy centre: quite simply that is where the voters’ preferences were. It also confirms our interpretation of Figure 2: Chirac won so overwhelmingly in the second round because the vast bulk of voters held policy ideal points closer to Chirac than to Le Pen. Le Pen held on to his first-round voters only, while Chirac aggregated votes from supporters of nearly all other first-round candidates.

Discussion

The French elections of 2002 present a unique opportunity to observe candidate and party positioning in two distinct electoral contexts offering different strategic incentives. The two-round system used for French presidential elections sets up a two-stage contest where candidate’s policy positions have different strategic implications in each round. Our spatial mapping of this dynamic, achieved by mapping the policy positions of French presidential candidates relative to those of their parties, has provided empirical support for the notion of Kuhn’s ‘iron law’. This suggests that successful candidates must stay close to the ideological heartland of support for their own party in order to make it through the first round; moving towards the ideological centre in anticipation of the second-round contest risks alienating a candidate’s core supporters and losing the first round. Our analysis thus provides systematic empirical support for the common informal explanation of the 2002 presidential outcome in France, which involved the ‘shock’ first-round defeat of the main social-democratic contender, Lionel Jospin, the landslide victory of Chirac in the second round, and the fact that Le Pen did not increase his vote share at all in the second round, despite the withdrawal of many candidates.

In addition to offering empirical support for the conventional wisdom surrounding the French presidential election outcome in 2002, we have also presented original measurements of the positions of the French parties and presidential candidates. Our expert survey offers a direct measure of party positions on seven dimensions of policy, as well as measures of the relative salience assigned to each issue by each party. Using this information, we were able to reduce the spatial representation of French party competition to two

main dimensions: a socio-economic left-right dimension and an internationalist left-right dimension combining attitudes towards the EU and globalization. Turning to the policy positions of the presidential candidates *vis à vis* those of their parties, our computerized content analysis of the presidential election speeches estimated policy positions for each presidential candidate and allowed these estimates to be compared directly with party positions. In addition to providing original measures not available from any other method or source, the candidate policy estimates offer a new and successful test of the 'word scores' (Laver et al. 2003) technique for computerized text analysis in an environment (presidential elections) and a language (French) not previously tested.

Despite offering a novel empirical look at spatial competition during the 2002 presidential election in France, our account remains preliminary. There are numerous substantive and methodological issues to be resolved when attempting to match estimates of policy positions of parties or candidates to estimates of voter positions constructed from surveys. For example, data on placements of party positions by survey respondents are typically far less extensive and comprehensive than expert survey data on these positions. In addition, the results of such placements are highly subjective to individual respondents and may scale or centre quite differently from the results of alternative methods of estimating party positions in the 'same' policy space. The few studies that have attempted to map both voters and parties into a single policy space have been forced to rely on approaches that suffer from additional complications. For example, Schofield et al. (1998) used Eurobarometer data to estimate voter positions and the European Political Parties Middle-level Elites survey to estimate party positions. In order to mate the two sources, they constructed policy scales indirectly using factor analytic techniques from batteries of related questions. Our preference is for expert surveys with anchored scales based on substantive policy options such as those reported in Benoit and Laver (2005) or Laver and Hunt (1992) as the *a priori* basis of policy dimensions, but much work remains to be done before we can reliably and practically map independent sources of party and voter policy positions into the same policy space. Our spatial examination of the 2002 French elections is a first step towards work of this type.

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Appendix. Expert Survey Scale Definitions in Original Language (scales are listed in the order in which they appeared in the survey)

Impôts et dépenses publiques

1. Favorable à une augmentation des dépenses publiques en faveur, par exemple, des services hospitaliers et éducatifs, même si celle-ci a pour conséquence une augmentation des impôts.
20. Favorable à une diminution des impôts même s'il est nécessaire, pour cela, de réduire les dépenses publiques pour les services hospitaliers et éducatifs, par exemple.

Politiques sociales

1. Favorable à des politiques libérales sur des sujets comme la sexualité et l'euthanasie.
20. Opposé à des politiques libérales sur des sujets comme la sexualité et l'euthanasie.

'Mondialisation'

1. Opposé à toutes les conséquences de la 'mondialisation'.
20. Favorable aux conséquences de la 'mondialisation'.

Union Européenne

1. Opposé à une Union Européenne plus grande et plus forte.
20. Favorable à une Union Européenne plus grande et plus forte.

Environnement

1. Favorable à la protection de l'environnement, même si cela a pour conséquence une réduction du taux de croissance économique.
20. Favorable à la croissance économique, même si cela a pour conséquence une détérioration de l'environnement.

Immigration

1. Favorable aux politiques aidant les immigrants à s'intégrer dans la société française.
20. Favorable aux politiques aidant les immigrants à retourner dans leurs pays d'origine.

Décentralisation

1. Favorable à la décentralisation de la plupart des décisions politiques.
20. Opposé à toute décentralisation des décisions politiques.

Notes

1. This constitutional reform only synchronizes terms and not dates of election. However, the synchronization of dates is now part of the definition of the new institutional equilibrium and is therefore not likely to be abandoned whatever may happen (early dissolution of the National Assembly, resignation or death of the president).
2. Candidacy is, however, restricted by the obligation of gathering 500 sponsorships from local officeholders.
3. Note that voters have no short-run incentive for strategic voting in the two-candidate final round.
4. The results of the larger study are reported in Benoit and Laver (2005).
5. The first mailing of the survey was on 14 October 2002; a second mailing and reminder was posted on 20 November 2002. We are grateful to Richard Balme and Pierre Muller for facilitating this process.
6. These are the means of the scores assigned by all experts.
7. Results are available upon request from the authors.
8. See <http://wordscores.com> for the Wordscores software and links to papers and articles more fully explaining the method. A full replication data set with the data and methods used in this article are also available at this website.
9. We therefore decided to include these three additional reference texts, and thus added the UEM, MPF and RPF to the list of parties that we asked experts to rank in our expert survey. These expert survey estimates can be found Benoit and Laver (2005).
10. The rightist estimated position of Jean-Pierre Chevènement (a former socialist) is also worthy of note, although others have commented that Chevènement's policy stance was very complex in 2002, embodying both leftist values and far more conservative statements (Gemie 2004).
11. The FNES (Panel Electoral Français) has been driven by CEVIPOF (Paris), CIDSP (Grenoble) and CECOP (Paris). It consists of three waves (April, May and June 2002). Interviews were conducted by telephone and the sample was designed in accordance with quotas method. A total of 4,107 persons formed the first wave sample; 4,017 the second; 2,013 the third. Some 1,417 persons have been interviewed three times. Wave 1 has been solely used in this study.

12. The derivation and content of these scales is available upon request from the authors.
13. Party identifications are taken from FNES Question 26, asking which party the respondent will vote for in the June legislative elections. A total of 4,107 respondents answered this question; the party-specific totals were RPR: 676, FN: 154, PS: 959.

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