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How do Filipinos remember their history? A descriptive account of Filipino historical memory

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How do Filipinos Remember Their History? A Descriptive Account of Filipino Historical Memory

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Abstract

How do Filipinos remember their history? To date this question still has no systematic answer. This article provides quantitative, descriptive results from two nationally representative surveys that show how Filipinos view three of the country's major historical events: the Spanish colonization of the Philippines; martial law under President Ferdinand Marcos; and the 1986 People Power Revolution. The descriptive results include several takeaways, including: first, the modal response towards all three events was indifference (versus positive or negative feelings); second, positive feelings towards martial law were highest among those who were alive at that time; third, the distribution of feelings towards these historical events was similar across individuals with different educational achievement; and finally, a surprising proportion of respondents expressed positive feelings towards both martial law and People Power. We discuss the potential limitations of our study and conclude by considering the implications of these results for the Philippines' contemporary politics.

Keywords

colonization, Ferdinand Marcos Sr., historical memory, martial law, People Power, Philippines

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How do Filipinos remember their history? This seems like a straightforward question, but to date it is a question with no systematic answer. Knowing what Filipinos think about their past is a necessary step in any serious attempt at understanding Filipino political identity and attempts to reconstruct or re-imagine that identity. As a matter of practical politics, it is also clearly important. The 2022 presidential elections saw the re-emergence of the Marcos family at the pinnacle of Philippine politics, with Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos Jr. retaking the presidency his father once held. Explanations for the Marcoses' rehabilitation have naturally considered the attempts by the Marcos family and its allies to re-frame the period of martial law, and the changing perceptions of Filipinos towards this era. Opposition candidates and supporters have attempted to "reeducate" Marcos voters, under the premise that historical misunderstandings and informational deficits are to blame for the Marcos resurgence.1 The political past is thus a battleground for the country's political future. But beyond such events' functionalist importance to politics, an understanding of the Philippines' major historical events is a potentially important component of a shared national identity. As much as one cannot conceive of US politics without the Declaration of Independence and the Civil War, or a South African identity without apartheid, or a Singaporean identity without Lee Kuan Yew, colonialism, martial law and People Power are major parts of the Philippines' political history.

This article provides quantitative, descriptive results from two nationally-representative surveys that show how Filipinos currently view three of the country's major historical events: the Spanish colonialism of the Philippines (1565-1898); martial law under President Ferdinand Marcos (1972-81); 2 and the 1986 People Power Revolution.3 We do not attempt to explain why Filipinos view these events and people the way that they do in this article. That is work for future research. Instead, the authors hope to establish a baseline of facts, as well as some initial potential interpretations and takeaways, that future work can then draw on for further theorizing about how history shapes contemporary politics, society and, ultimately, collective national identity.4

It is worth noting at the outset that this exercise comes with some limitations. First, these descriptive accounts are snapshots taken at a certain point in time. Furthermore, these surveys were conducted in January and February 2022, relatively close to the May 2022 presidential elections. The election campaign may have shaped opinions on historical events such as martial law and those opinions might change after the elections. Those opinions may also differ from opinions one, three or five years ago. Given this possibility, we also explore views about Spanish colonialism, an event that was not politically salient during the last election.5 If the views we captured in these surveys are merely an ephemeral product of electioneering then we would expect to see a different pattern of responses in assessments of martial law and People Power vis-avis Spanish colonialism. Second, it is possible that answers that tend towards indifference (when respondents answer something like "neither agree nor disagree") are the product of a lack of attention or effort on the part of respondents rather than ambivalence. To address this concern, we compare the distribution of attitudes regarding our events of interest with attitudes towards President Rodrigo Duterte's drug war.6 If a lack of effort or inattention drives indifference, we would expect to see similar levels of ambivalence towards the drug war.

Despite these limitations, this exercise has merit. Snapshots are exactly that: they provide descriptive accounts of attitudes at a given point in time. This exercise is thus a first step, which will serve as a baseline by which we can compare descriptive data in succeeding years. To elaborate, this exercise produces a set of baseline results regarding the historical memory of Filipinos towards some of its major historical events. As we will show, this simple exercise is also sufficient to complicate or rebut some widely held presumptions about the enduring legacies of politically relevant events such as

martial law and People Power. Indeed, in both cases, we find indifference to be the modal response among our respondents. Examining the perceptions of Filipinos towards Spanish colonialism also allows for a deeper understanding of public perceptions regarding the country's colonial past. Finally, we hope that this analysis will lead to future work that will allow us to more deeply understand how Filipinos view their past, how memories of the past are re-imagined and reconstituted over time, and how such memories shape political attitudes and behaviours in the present.

Collective Memory and Politics

While an immense body of scholarship has examined the nature and role of collective memory in society, it remains a contested concept.7 In this article we focus on collective memory as "collected memory", or "the aggregated individual memories of members of a group".8 In adopting this approach to studying collective memory, we recognize that not all members of a group have equal influence within their society and that the remembrances of some can garner greater attention than those of others.9 Indeed, our goal in this study is not to suggest that there exists a single collective memory for Filipino society, but rather to map out the landscape of remembrance among a representative sample of Filipinos regarding certain pivotal events in their country's history.

Existing research into the political behavioural legacies of historical events often assumes that a given historical event is salient in a specific way (i.e., viewed either positively or negatively) within a population. This assumption of a prevalent collective memory within the population is usually the necessary precursor for expectations of enduring historical legacies. However, empirical work in this space does not always explicitly assess how individuals within the population perceive such historical events. For example, we might not expect to recover a meaningful enduring legacy from a traumatic historical event if the population is largely ambivalent towards the said event or if the population no longer views the event as traumatic. Even if an enduring legacy is recovered, it might be driven by only a particular segment of the population, or perhaps a smaller-than-imagined segment of the population-insights that might be hidden if we rely on common assumptions instead of mapping the collective memory landscape. Similarly, the success or failure of a politician's attempts to evoke a specific historical event will also depend on the continued salience of the event for the electorate. We address this lacuna by explicitly mapping how the Filipino population views pivotal events in their country's history.

Data Sources and Analysis

We use data from two waves of nationally representative surveys conducted by Pulse Asia, one of the Philippines' leading survey research firms, in January and February 2022. Together the two survey waves yield a dataset of 2,400 total respondents, 284 from the National Capital Region (NCR), 1,060 from the balance of Luzon (the rest of Luzon outside of the NCR), 560 from Mindanao and 496 from the Visayas. The sample consists of 1,200 male and 1,200 female respondents.10

Following standard procedures and best practices for public opinion surveys, Pulse Asia employed a multi-stage probability sampling for its surveys.11 The first stage involved a decision on the sub-

national areas and the distribution of the total sample for each of these areas. The sub-national areas are NCR, the balance of Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao.

In the second stage, the team randomly selected cities/ municipalities in each of these sub-national areas. For the NCR, all the cities and the single municipality were covered in the survey. For the other sub-national areas, a total of 15 cities/municipalities were allocated to the regions in proportion to household population size. Sample cities/municipalities were selected without replacement and with probability proportional to household population size.

In the third stage, the survey team randomly selected barangays (villages) in the probabilistically identified cities/municipalities. The allocated number of barangays were distributed among the sample cities/municipalities in such a way that each city/municipality was assigned a number of barangays roughly proportional to its household population size. However, it was ensured that each city/ municipality was assigned at least one sample barangay. Sample barangays within each sample city/municipality were randomly selected without replacement.

For the fourth stage, within each sample barangay, five households were selected using interval sampling. In the sample urban barangays, a random corner was identified, a random start generated and every sixth household was sampled. In rural barangays, the designated starting point could be a school, the barangay captain's house, a church/chapel or a barangay/municipal hall, and every other household was sampled.

For the last stage, in each selected household, a respondent was randomly chosen from among household members who were 18 years of age and older, using a probability selection table. To ensure that half of the respondents were male and half were female, only male family members were pre-listed in the probability selection table of odd-numbered questionnaires, while only female members were pre-listed for even-numbered questionnaires. In cases where there was no qualified respondent of a given gender, the interval sampling of households was continued until five sample respondents were identified.

Major Historical Events

As part of the survey we asked respondents about their views of three major historical events in the Philippines: Spanish colonialism, martial law under Ferdinand Marcos, and the People Power Revolution that ultimately drove Marcos from power. In this section we discuss each of these events and respondents' attitudes towards them.

The Spanish Colonization of the Philippines

The Spanish colonization of the Philippines, from 1565 to 1898, spans the vast majority of the country's existence as a nation. The Portuguese (turned Spanish) navigator Ferdinand Magellan first

set foot on the islands in 1521. Twenty-one years later, in 1542, Ruy López de Villalobos returned and claimed dominion over the islands, naming the Philippines after King Philip of Spain. The Spanish initially kept mainly to the major cities, such as Manila and Cebu, but over the next few centuries there was a slow expansion of Spanish rule from these major outposts into the rest of the country. Spanish colonialism left several enduring marks on the country. Most obvious is the prevalence of Catholicism. First introduced by Spanish friars, the Philippines is overwhelmingly Catholic, with over 80 per cent of the country identifying as such.12 The Spanish language has also infiltrated the Filipino language to a considerable degree. Moreover, Spanish colonialism fixed the boundaries of the Philippines itself, turning an archipelago of villages and tribes into a centralized, if not fully controlled, nation-state.13

The history of the Philippines under Spain is part of the curriculum in elementary schools, high schools and universities all over the country. Students are taught to remember many important dates and people, both real and imagined. Examples include the Philippine national hero Jose Rizal, 12 June 1898 (the date of Philippine independence from Spain) and Padre Damaso, the fictional Spanish friar and major antagonist of the country's national novel Noli Me Tángere. Indeed, a class about Jose Rizal is mandated for all university students. As such, one would expect most Filipinos to have both some feelings towards Spanish colonialism, as well as a view on whether colonialism was beneficial to the country or not.

Spanish colonialism is, of course, also an object of significant scholarly attention. Classic historical accounts have focused on the many acts of oppression that the Spanish colonizers enacted on the native Filipino population, which included taking their land, subjugating their people and at times forcibly converting them to Catholicism.14 Another work has quantitatively examined the longrun impacts of missionary-led Spanish colonization, arguing, for example, that municipalities that had a historical Catholic mission are richer today than municipalities without these Spanish Catholic missions.15

But what do the Filipino people actually think of Spanish colonialism? Our survey asked two questions: how respondents felt about Spanish colonialism (Question 1), and their assessment of the impact of Spanish colonialism (Question 2). Both questions were constructed on a five-point scale, with possible answers to the first question ranging from "Strongly negative" to "Strongly positive", and to the second question ranging from "Extremely not beneficial" to "Extremely beneficial".

The results for the first question are displayed in Figure 1. It is noteworthy that a significant, and largest, share (48.46 per cent) of participants could not say whether they had positive or negative feelings towards Spanish colonialism. Moreover, 21.79 per cent of respondents had negative feelings towards Spanish colonialism, while a similar number (23.08 per cent) had positive feelings about the period. Few had strong feelings, either positive or negative, towards this historical event.

The results for the second question, displayed in Figure 2, were mostly similar. The modal (most common) response (50.04 per cent) was that Filipinos could not say if Spanish colonialism was beneficial or not. Few respondents believed that colonialism was either extremely harmful (i.e., not beneficial) or extremely beneficial, with 1.67 per cent and 2 per cent selecting these positions,

respectively. One notable difference, however, is that substantially more people considered Spanish colonialism to be beneficial (27 per cent) than not beneficial (16.83 per cent).

One way to break down these results is by educational attainment. The logic for doing so is straightforward: years of schooling in Philippine history could certainly mold respondents' views on Spanish colonialism, implying that more educated voters may have a different opinion than less educated ones. Moreover, the classroom is the only place where most Filipinos are ever exposed to this part of their history. Figures 3 displays the results for feelings towards Spanish colonialism that are broken down by the respondents' educational attainment.16 The major takeaway is that while there were some interesting differences across the groups, educational attainment did not appear to dramatically alter views about Spanish colonialism. Across all categories, the modal result of indifference reproduced itself. To illustrate, consider two groups that occupy the two opposite ends of the educational spectrum: respondents with only elementary schooling and those who graduated from college. Respondents in both groups were much more likely to be ambivalent about Spanish colonization (i.e. viewing it as neither positive nor negative). Among those respondents who reported either a positive or negative opinion, both the highest and least educated were more likely to see colonization in a positive rather than negative light. This same pattern held for all other education groupings. Looking across all of the groups, there is a large gap between the number of respondents who reported ambivalence and those who registered either positive or negative feelings towards colonialism. The partial exception to this pattern was those with vocational education. Though the modal response was still ambivalence, the majority of vocationally-educated respondents (59.2 per cent) expressed either positive (28.8 per cent) or negative views (30.4 per cent) towards colonialism. This was also the only group for which negative responses (slightly) outweighed positive responses.

Another meaningful way to break down the results is by geography. In this case we grouped the results according to the major regions of the Philippines: the NCR, balance of Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. In particular, the historical differences among these regions' experience with Spanish colonialism could reasonably lead to differences in how the respondents of these regions perceive colonialism today. For example, the NCR region (and Manila specifically) was among the first areas to be occupied by the Spanish and functioned as the seat of the Spanish government in the country. As such, we might expect a negative perception of Spanish colonialism in the NCR, as the area was the most directly subjugated during Spanish colonial rule.17 On the other hand, Mindanao was left mostly uncolonized, despite attempts by the Crown to colonize and Christianize the region. The Sultanate of Sulu was able to ward off Spanish influence for most of the colonial period and the region remains home to the vast majority of Filipino Muslims today. As such, we might assume that respondents from Mindanao would hold a particularly negative perception of Spanish colonialism, given the Spaniards' attempt to introduce a competing religion and the region's historical hostility towards Spanish colonialism in general.

Neither assertion is supported by the data. In fact, the regional results mirrored quite closely the overall results (see Figures 4a and 4b). Most obviously, the modal response for each regional group was that they could not say if Spanish colonialism was positive or negative, or whether it was beneficial or not. Looking specifically at Mindanao, we found that, perhaps surprisingly, more respondents believed that Spanish colonialism had a beneficial impact than those who believed otherwise (see Figure 4b). This could be attributed to the fact that Mindanao was the target of extensive resettlement efforts under the United States and subsequent Filipino governments, which worked to populate Mindanao with Christian settlers from Luzon and the Visayas.18 It is possible that

indigenous Mindanaoans may hold different views of Spanish colonialism compared to descendants of Christian settlers. To investigate whether this is indeed the case, we divided our Mindanao sample into Muslim and non-Muslim respondents-relying on religion as a rough proxy to differentiate between respondents who are indigenous and those that are settlers. Given the relatively small numbers involved (120 Muslim Mindanaoans and 440 non-Muslim Mindanaoans), we should interpret these results with some caution. That said, there was a difference between the two groups. While the modal response of both groups was indifference (41.7 per cent for Muslims and 39.8 per cent for non-Muslims), Muslim respondents were substantially more likely to have negative views of Spanish colonialism (37.5 per cent versus 25.9 per cent). These results suggest that Mindanaoans on the whole do not think differently about Spanish colonialism than the people from other regional groups, with the plurality of respondents of all types feeling indifferent-though there may be notable differences between those who are indigenous to Mindanao and those who are not. The results for the NCR also painted a similar picture. There was only a small difference between the respondents who viewed Spanish colonialism either positively (29.1 per cent) or negatively (26.3 per cent) (see Figure 4a), and significantly more who believed colonialism was more beneficial than not (see Figure 4b). However, the number of such responses greatly paled in comparison to the volume of the most common response, namely, indifference.

These results lead us to several conclusions, the most general being that Spanish colonialism elicited neither strong emotions nor strong opinions for nearly a majority of Filipinos. The modal answer was ambivalence. In this regard, Spanish colonial history in the Philippines does not capture the contemporary Filipino imagination in the same way that it does for citizens in other countries who have undergone traumatic experiences under a foreign occupying power. For example, the Japanese colonization of Korea remains a salient issue in current politics,19 as does the Soviet occupation and violence in Ukraine under Stalin.20

Martial Law under Ferdinand Marcos

No event in Philippine history has been scrutinized as extensively as the period of martial law,21 which lasted from 1972 to 1981. Marcos justified martial law as a response to various leftist and rightist plots against his administration. Scholars have worked to situate martial law in a broader political context, for example, arguing that it was "the consequence of political decay after American-style democracy failed to take root in Philippine society", and "a reflection of Filipino society's history of authoritarianism and supposed need for ironfisted leadership".22 Whatever its origins, martial law (and Marcos' regime more generally) fundamentally reshaped Philippine politics. This is most obviously true at the level of institutions. The 1987 Constitution, enacted a year after Marcos was forced into exile in Hawaii, is an explicitly anti-martial law constitution.23 The Marcos era was even a structural break in how the Philippine political system functioned. Before Marcos' declared martial law, there were few political parties and relatively low levels of electoral volatility; the post-Marcos era, however, saw the proliferation of parties and higher levels of electoral volatility.24

There is also considerable interest in holding the Marcos family accountable for the plunder and corruption that they undertook while in power.25 Researchers have attempted to lay out in specific detail the many ways in which martial law and the broader Marcos dictatorship damaged the Philippine economy.26 And of course, there has been much work that seeks to document the many human rights abuses surrounding martial law.27

Finally, the ghost of martial law still haunts contemporary politics. With Marcos' son, Ferdinand Marcos Jr., ascending to the presidency in May 2022 after securing roughly 59 per cent of the vote, opposition candidates and their supporters have generally assumed that Marcos Jr.'s popularity derives from his father's legacy, in which martial law takes pride of place. This is not an unfounded assumption. There has been a proliferation of blogs, Facebook pages and videos on YouTube and TikTok which seek to extol the benefits of the martial law era, dubbing the period as the "Golden Age" of the Philippine economy and Philippine society. In fact, the disinformation from these online sources is posited as a major reason why Marcos Jr. won the May 2022 elections.28

Martial law's ultimate legacy, in the collective memory of Filipinos themselves, remains a paradox. The Constitution was rewritten to prevent it from happening again, scholars have written of the illiberalism and the various affronts to democracy it enabled, and Ferdinand Marcos' legacy in the "eyes of the world" is that of a dictator, an autocrat and a thief.29 And yet his son has now assumed the office his father once held. Why have voters been willing to look past the failings of the elder Marcos years and embrace his son?30

To better understand public opinion about martial law, we asked respondents about their opinions on two issues: how respondents felt about martial law under President Ferdinand Marcos (Question 3), and the extent to which they thought martial law under President Marcos was beneficial or not (Question 4). Similar to the questions on Spanish colonialism, both questions were constructed on a fivepoint scale, with possible answers to the first question ranging from "Strongly negative" to "Strongly positive", and answers to the second question ranging from "Extremely not beneficial" to "Extremely beneficial". Figure 5 presents the results from Question 3.

What is immediately striking is that respondents were much more likely to view martial law as positive versus negative: 23.17 per cent of respondents had a negative feeling about martial law versus 34.46 per cent who had a positive feeling. 35.25 per cent could not say if their feelings were positive or negative. Furthermore, very few respondents seemed to have strong feelings about the martial law era. This went in both directions. Only 3.79 per cent of respondents had strongly negative feelings towards martial law, while only 2.83 per cent had strongly positive feelings. The responses to Question 4 in Figure 6 below paint a similar picture. The most common response was again indifference, with 39.54 per cent of respondents uncertain whether martial law was beneficial or not. The next largest response was that martial law was beneficial (35.96 per cent), while significantly fewer people thought martial law was not beneficial (17.5 per cent). Only a small fraction of respondents had strong feelings towards martial law, viewing it as extremely beneficial (3.91 per cent) or extremely not beneficial (2.71 per cent). Again, there were significantly more Filipinos who viewed martial law in a positive light compared to those who believed it was harmful (not beneficial).

For these questions on martial law, we also disaggregated the results by age group to differentiate between the respondents who lived through the martial law period and those who were exposed to it as a historical event. Such a disaggregation gets at potential differences between learning about history and having the experience of living through that history. When separated by age, the results for Question 3 were telling (see Figure 7). Among respondents aged 65 and older, the sentiment was generally positive towards martial law, with 41.84 per cent of respondents in this age group reporting

either positive or strongly positive feelings. This is significantly higher than the percentage of over-65 respondents who reported a negative feeling (25.85 per cent), or neither positive nor negative feelings (29.93 per cent), towards martial law.

A similar pattern also held among respondents between 55 and 64 years old. While the over-65 group were mostly adults during the martial law era, those in the 55-64 age group were still coming of age during that period as children, teenagers and young adults. Research on political socialization and political generations suggests that this period (from around 18 to 25 years of age) constitutes the "impressionable years" during which an individual's long-term political outlook is shaped.31 However, the 55-64 age group does not appear to be markedly different in their attitudes towards martial law when compared to the older peers. Among the 55-64 cohort, strongly positive or positive feelings towards the martial law era was the most common response at a combined 42.78 per cent. Meanwhile, 24.06 per cent reported negative feelings, while 27.81 per cent registered neither positive nor negative feelings.

These dynamics shifted only slightly in the 45-54 age group. For this group, martial law was mostly a memory, as they came of age after the fall of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986. Here we see that the most common response was indifference (34.55 per cent) towards Marcos' martial law regime, though followed closely by those who reported positive feelings (33.87 per cent). Negative feelings against martial law were reported at a much lower share (25.63 per cent) in this age group. As we move to younger age cohorts, the feelings of ambivalence continued to increase, with 46.13 per cent of respondents aged between 18 and 24 indicating their indifference to martial law. Overall, across all age cohorts, positive feelings towards martial law were substantially more common than negative feelings.

It is worth considering why some respondents who lived through martial law have reported-almost paradoxically-positive perceptions of this period. However, the appearance of a paradox is merely the result of presuming that the martial law era was a universally negative experience. Rather, the lived experiences of the Filipino people during this period were varied, and indeed martial law presented different things to different audiences. There was the "smiling martial law", an image created and intended for a largely international audience; the martial law of law and order, applied especially at the outset to attract businesses and alleviate the worries of ordinary citizens about crime in the streets; and martial law as authoritarian rule, which wielded its harshest weapons against the select few who were tagged by the dictatorship as communists or subversive elements of society, thereby sparing the majority of society from much of the worst authoritarian excesses of illegal arrest, torture and enforced disappearances.32

We now turn to Question 4. The responses to this question mirrored the cohort dynamics of question one (see Figure A2 in the appendix). Among respondents older than 65, the modal response was that martial law had positive benefits (38.44 per cent). Indifference was somewhat less common at 34.35 per cent, while only 23.47 per cent of respondents believed that martial law was harmful (i.e., either not beneficial or extremely not beneficial). These cohort dynamics are replicated in the 55-64 age cohort, with the modal response (39.57 per cent) being that martial law brought positive benefits. Indifference comes in second at 30.48 per cent. It was less common for respondents to report that martial law was not beneficial (20.05 per cent).

For the 45-54, 35-44, 25-34 and 18-24 age cohorts, the pattern shifted somewhat. Across these cohorts, the modal response was indifference. The second largest response came from those who saw martial law as beneficial or extremely beneficial, followed by those who reported martial law as not beneficial or extremely not beneficial. In general, the response that martial law was beneficial was much more common than the response that it was not beneficial.

In other words, those who were adults during the martial law era tended to have the most favourable views of the period. Among cohorts that were too young to have experienced martial law, respondents were primarily indifferent. Yet even these cohorts were still much more likely to believe that martial law was beneficial, rather than harmful, for the Philippines.33

Finally, we disaggregated the results by educational attainment (see Figure 8). If the education system is effective in teaching about the human rights abuses and excesses that occurred during the martial law period, then we should see more negative attitudes towards the era among those with higher levels of education. This thinking is in line with the policy of the Philippine Department of Education about how to teach the history of martial law in the Philippines, which ostensibly emphasized the issue of human rights abuses during that period.34 However, our survey results indicate that this is clearly not the case. To illustrate, we again focused on two groups of respondents: those with an elementary education at most and those with college degrees. The results were striking. College graduates were more likely to state that martial law had a positive impact (39.91 per cent)-which was also the cohort's modal response- than a negative impact (16.67 per cent). By contrast, among those with only an elementary education, 42.66 per cent could not say if martial law had positive or negative impacts, 33.46 per cent believed that martial law bestowed positive benefits on the country, while only 17.03 per cent believed that martial law was not beneficial. Across all the cohorts, with the exception of college graduates, the modal response was one of indifference.

Overall, the survey results show that respondents were more likely to think that martial law benefitted rather than harmed the Philippines. This is true across every age group and at every level of education. The differences between the cohorts were only a matter of degree. This suggests that the attempts to educate the general public about martial law and its negative effects have not been effective, especially considering that positive sentiment towards martial law is positively correlated with education. Moreover, whether one experienced martial law or not has at best only a minor bearing (and which generally trends in a positive direction) on one's attitudes towards that period. These findings call into question arguments that positive sentiment towards martial law is mainly a function of mis-education or generational distance given the extent of positive feelings towards martial law and beliefs about its benefits among people who directly experienced the episode and among highly-educated citizens. Additionally, large numbers of Filipinos have ambiguous feelings about martial law. This is most pronounced in the younger age cohorts, where indifference was the modal response-suggesting that indifference may increase over time.

The People Power Revolution of 1986

The People Power Revolution of 1986 was a non-violent protest that led to the fall of President Ferdinand Marcos and the beginning of Corazon (Cory) Aquino's tenure as the Philippines' first female president. The revolution ended Marcos' 21 years of authoritarian rule and returned the country to the democratic system that had been in place since its independence in 1946. At the time, People Power was more than just a major event in Philippine history. It made international news and cast the country into the centre of global affairs in a way that has not been replicated since. Cory Aquino was the Time magazine's Person of the Year in 1987, serving as an emblem of the enthusiasm over the country's return to democratic rule, and of the optimism that was prevalent both in the Philippines and abroad as the Cold War drew to a close.35

Yet People Power's legacy is complicated for many reasons. First, while Cory Aquino's legacy as an icon of democracy and a symbol of hope is almost universally celebrated, Cory Aquino's actual presidency received mixed reviews. Her presidency was plagued with political instability, manifest most clearly in the many coups that attempted to unseat her.36 Furthermore, economic growth remained sluggish, at an average 3.4 per cent per year from 1987 to 1992, the years of her presidency, considerably trailing the annual growth rate of regional neighbours such as Thailand (9.8 per cent) and Malaysia (7.6 per cent) over the same period. A myriad of other problems during her presidency, such as the constant electricity blackouts and water shortages, affected the quality of life for ordinary Filipinos.37 Finally, her administration was also criticized for numerous human rights violations38 and for not doing enough to prevent the return of powerful oligarchs to the heights of economic and political power in the Philippines.39

On the other hand, People Power as a tool for political mobilization may still have some currency. In 2001, Filipinos again took to the streets and re-enacted People Power to depose President Joseph Estrada and install President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Similarly, another People Power-styled protest was staged by Estrada supporters against Arroyo which failed to remove her. While one may reasonably argue that the People Power movement was not truly a masses-led protest, and instead was the by-product of elite infighting, it is still a fact that People Power has been deployed and invoked as a particularly salient and effective tool to spur mobilization (in the name of democratic accountability) and overcome political gridlock.40

Finally, the political ascent of Bongbong Marcos casts further uncertainty on the long-term perceptions of People Power. The movement's widespread acclaim in the 1980s stands in marked contrast to the situation in May 2022 when the Philippine presidency was won by the son of the very same president ousted by the movement. It is thus timely to examine the standing that People Power has in the imagination of the Filipino public today.

Like the previous two historical events, we asked the following two questions: how respondents felt about People Power, and whether respondents thought People Power was beneficial or not. Both questions were constructed on a five-point scale, with possible answers to Question Five ranging from "Strongly negative" to "Strongly positive", and possible answers to Question Six ranging from "Extremely not beneficial" to "Extremely beneficial".

The overall results for Question Five are displayed in Figure 9. Again, the modal response was that respondents had neither positive nor negative feelings towards People Power, once again pointing to the relatively weak hold of these particular historical events on the Filipino collective memory.41 Yet, in contrast to Spanish colonialism, but similar to martial law, there was clearly a larger share of respondents who felt positively (30.71 per cent) about People Power than those who felt negatively (21.62 per cent) towards it. The results are similar when we consider the question of whether respondents perceived People Power to have been beneficial or not (see Figure A3 in the appendix): 31.92 per cent of respondents answered that People Power was beneficial,42 while 17.71 per cent believed that People Power was not beneficial. Overall, the pendulum seems to swing towards a positive collective memory of People Power, both in terms of how respondents perceived the movement and its benefits.

As with the questions on martial law, we disaggregated the respondents' perceptions of People Power by age to differentiate between those who lived through the episode and those who only understand the event as a historical recollection. In our breakdown of the respondents' feelings towards People Power by age (see Figure 10), a few stylized facts stand out. First, across all the age groups, feelings about People Power were more positive than negative. Second, the gap between positive and negative views did not appear to be a function of age. More respondents from the older cohorts tended to have positive views compared to their younger peers, but they were also more likely to hold negative views than their younger compatriots. Once again, though, the modal response for most cohorts was one of ambivalence. Indeed, the 55-64 cohort was the only age group where the modal answer was positive feelings, rather than indifference. Notably, the people of the 55-64 age cohort were teenagers and young adults who were coming of age during People Power, and it is possible that this direct experience is reflected in greater positive sentiment within this group vis-a-vis other cohorts.43

We also briefly considered attitudes towards People Power by educational attainment (see Figure A4 in the appendix). Once again, respondents from across all educational attainment groups were more likely to view People Power positively rather than negatively, though the modal response across all educational attainment groups was indifference.

Support for both Martial Law and People Power

The analysis thus far raises an interesting question: Could Filipinos simultaneously hold favourable views of both martial law and People Power? Such a combination of beliefs is, at face value, incongruent given the very principles that each event stood for. Martial law amounted to the consolidation of Marcos' authoritarian rule. People Power was, if nothing else, about the removal of Marcos from power and the end of his authoritarian rule. Thus, one might expect that those who hold positive or negative views about martial law to hold the opposite view about People Power. And in fact, 20.9 per cent of respondents displayed this expected consistency in their views: 10.2 per cent viewed martial law positively and People Power negatively, while 10.7 per cent held the reverse view.

What about the remaining respondents? More than three-quarters of respondents held more nuanced views of the two events. It is possible, perhaps even likely, that some respondents felt historically

disconnected from one or both of these events. Martial law and People Power, for some, may be viewed as inter-elite power struggles with only limited salience for the lives of ordinary Filipinos. Consistent with this view, 55 per cent of respondents were ambivalent about one or both events. Specifically, 22.6 per cent of respondents expressed ambivalence about both events. A further 32.7 per cent were ambivalent about one of the events, while holding either positive or negative views about the other.44

Perhaps the most interesting were the 24 per cent of respondents that held seemingly inconsistent views of the two events. Among this group are 9.1 per cent who appeared to have a "pox on both their houses" attitude, holding negative views about both events. More puzzling was the 14.7 per cent of respondents who held positive views of both events-in effect, approving both the authoritarianism of Marcos' martial law regime and his ouster through People Power.

One way to examine this group of voters is to consider conditional effects, which look only at those who reported positive feelings for one event and then examining their feelings about the other event. Among those who expressed positive views about martial law, only 27 per cent expressed negative feelings towards People Power. In contrast, 39 per cent of respondents who reported positive feelings towards martial law also expressed positive feelings towards People Power. In total, a much larger number of respondents (351) reported holding positive feelings towards both events compared to the number of respondents (254) who registered negative feelings for martial law and positive feelings for People Power.

Among the respondents who had positive feelings towards People Power, 45 per cent also registered positive feelings for martial law while 33 per cent viewed martial law negatively. A similar pattern could be discerned when we considered the question of whether respondents thought either martial law or People Power was beneficial. Among the subset of respondents who considered martial law to be beneficial, roughly 41 per cent also considered People Power to be beneficial. Meanwhile, among respondents who considered martial law to have been detrimental (i.e., not beneficial), 42 per cent expressed positive feelings towards People Power. In terms of aggregate number, nearly 400 respondents expressed the opinion that both events were beneficial to the Philippines compared to the 200 respondents who reported that People Power was beneficial and martial law was not beneficial. Collectively, these conditional effects revealed an interesting lack of consistency in how Filipinos view the relationship between these two major historical events.

While we are cautious about overinterpreting our findings, one potential theory that may explain these potentially paradoxical results is an attitude of political pragmatism. Filipinos who considered martial law to be beneficial may have seen it as a necessary measure to restore order and improve peace and security. Once the gains from martial law were realized, these same respondents may have felt that it was time to move to a model of government with greater civil liberties and more checks and balances. Or, perhaps, they may have grown weary of the Marcos regime's abuses and excesses. In other words, these respondents may feel that martial law was beneficial to the country at the time it was imposed, and People Power was also needed and beneficial when it occurred.

Addressing Potential Concerns and Limitations

In this section, we address the potential concerns and limitations of our descriptive exercise. One important concern might be that these descriptive accounts were taken during a "non-representative" moment in Philippine history. Another credible concern is that indifferent responses represent a lack of attention or effort rather than true ambivalence.

The first concern stems from the fact that we administered the surveys close to the 2022 presidential elections. As such, respondents' opinions are particularly in tune with the current political debates around Bongbong Marcos, his father's legacy and consequently the historical legacy of People Power. We have two responses to these concerns. First, it is of course possible that the descriptives we have shown capture only one moment in time. Yet the solution is simple: researchers can simply run this exercise again after the elections to see if the results are consistent with (or different from) ours. Either way, the results presented in this article provide a baseline against which to examine questions about Philippine collective historical memory in the future-questions that previously could not be easily answered because we simply did not have any systematic basis to evaluate what the Philippine historical memory actually is. These results are the first set of measures that allow us to do so.

Moreover, if indeed it is the case that current political events mobilized respondents around strong opinions on these major historical events, then we should expect to see potentially polarized responses around their perceptions and assessments of these events. However, this is not the case. Almost uniformly, the modal response was indifference-not what would be expected if the current electoral environment were significantly priming respondents to think about and evaluate these historical events. Finally, the analysis about attitudes towards Spanish colonialism also provides us with some clarity on this issue. Specifically, the topic of colonialism was not politicized in the lead up to the May 2022 presidential election and should thus be uncoupled from the political effects that may have plagued perceptions over martial law and People Power. Yet, we see a similar pattern in the responses to the questions on Spanish colonialism as we do to the other questions. We therefore conclude that the responses that we see were not merely a product of the politicization of martial law and People Power as a result of the 2022 elections.

The second concern is that the high levels of indifferent responses are the result of respondents' inattention or lack of effort; they responded indifferently to the historical events because they were not thinking deeply about them. The implication here is that the respondents were not taking the survey seriously. If this were the case, we would expect to see a similar pattern when asked about a more contemporary event as part of the same set of questions. This is not what we observe. For example, when we asked respondents for their opinion on Duterte's drug war (immediately after the questions on the three historical events), over 65 per cent responded that they had either positive or very positive feelings towards it and 68.96 per cent answered that it was either beneficial or very beneficial-constituting an overwhelming majority of respondents. This is consistent with respondents seriously assessing the event in question and expressing their feelings and opinions towards it.

It is still unclear why a surprising number of respondents seem to support both martial law and People Power. As noted above, one potential explanation is that these respondents considered martial law to be beneficial, but believed that it was indeed time for change when People Power took place. From this point of view, seeing both martial law and People Power as beneficial is logical. Both were

necessary and beneficial at a given point in time, and so both were supported by voters. Another, perhaps more simple, explanation is a cognitive inconsistency of some sort. Further work can tease out this seeming paradox.

Conclusion

How do Filipinos remember their history? It is surprising that such a foundational question lacks a systematic answer. The answer to this question has both academic and practical political implications. As such, we have endeavoured to provide an answer. Using a national representative sample of 2,400 respondents, surveyed in two waves in January and February 2022, we examined Filipinos' views on three major events in Philippine history: Spanish colonialism, martial law under Ferdinand Marcos, and the People Power Revolution of 1986.

The responses were enlightening and provide a useful baseline for understanding the collective memory of the Filipino people. There are several immediate takeaways. First, the most common perception towards the three events was one of indifference. Whether this is the result of an education system that has not done a good job of teaching history, or because politicians, for some reason, do not or cannot effectively invoke historical arguments and long-run national identity as a form of political mobilization, or because Filipinos simply prefer to live their lives in the present, remains an open question. Second, respondents tended to view martial law more positively than negatively. This result is perhaps surprising, given the many documented difficulties, including the suspension of democratic rule and an economic crisis, that the country faced during that time. Yet this result also perhaps lends credence to theories attributing Bongbong Marcos' victory in the 2022 presidential elections to online campaigns on platforms such as TikTok that sought to rehabilitate the legacy of the elder Marcos and martial law. Third, there is a small but surprising degree of overlap between respondents who viewed both martial law and People Power favourably. This result is paradoxical because People Power is often framed as essentially a protest in response to the excesses of martial law and Marcos' rule in general. The aforementioned three facts-general indifference to historical events, a more positive perception of martial law and a significant overlap between respondents who view both martial law and People Power favourably-open up several avenues for further exploration. The Filipino collective memory seems quite complex, and future work can begin to unpack that complexity.

Breaking down the results by age, educational attainment and region also leads to several informative insights. A few are worth repeating. First, respondents who were adults during the martial law era tended to view it more positively than those who were too young or not born yet during that period. This has several important implications: the idea that support for Bongbong Marcos is due to the public being "misinformed" about martial law seems to be, at least in its more basic forms, without merit. If this hypothesis were true, then we would expect lower levels of support for martial law among respondents who were more conscious of the realities of the martial law period, having lived through it. This is not the case. Second, educational attainment did not seem to make a major difference in how people viewed the martial law era. In fact, college graduates (compared to respondents with at most an elementary education) were more likely to think of martial law as having a positive impact than a negative impact. This result suggests that educational efforts currently in place to teach the public about the negative effects of martial law are not an easy antidote to dispel misinformation and disinformation about that period.

Finally, this article suggests several future avenues of academic work. As a descriptive paper, our results naturally lay out an agenda for trying to understand why Filipinos view history the way they do. Future work might examine how historical memory shapes identity, political partisanship and ultimately, who holds political office. For example, it is very much worth exploring why it is that the most highly-educated citizens, and the citizens who lived through martial law, tended to view the period more positively compared to the other age and education cohorts. More disturbingly, could it be that those who experienced martial law first-hand perceive themselves as having benefitted from it (despite the many extralegal and anti-democratic actions that were carried out)? Another potential question worth asking is whether support for martial law assisted Bongbong Marcos in his May 2022 electoral victory.45 If so, this would be clear evidence for how historical memory can continue to shape contemporary politics, helping determine who holds the most powerful office in the country, the presidency.

APPENDIX

Figure A1 Attitudes on the Impact of Spanish Colonization by Educational Achievement



Figure A2 Attitudes on the Impact of Martial Law by Age Cohort



Figure A3 Attitudes on the Impact of People Power



Figure A4 Feelings Towards the People's Power Revolution of 1986 by Educational Achievement



NOTES

1 Examples include the Catholic Educational Association of the Philippines urging voters to "reject candidates who run under [a] platform of lies and historical distortion ... particularly the brazen presentation of the Marcos dictatorship and martial law as benevolent regimes in our political history". See John Eric Mendoza, "Catholic School Orgs Urge Voters: Reject Bets Supporting Martial Law Revisionism", Inquirer.net, 8 February 2022, https://newsinfo.inquirer. net/1551519/fwd-catholic-school-orgs-urge-voters-reject-bets-who-support-martiallaw-revisionism-duterte-admins-unjust-acts; adverts and explainers by the group, Campaign Against the Return of the Marcoses and Martial Law, available at https://www.facebook.com/CARMMAPH; and this campaign aid for Leni Robredo with a celebrity describing the realities of life under Marcos, available at https://twitter.com/i/status/1518911035042066432.

2 Marital law was formerly lifted in 1981 but Marcos remained in power until 1986.

3 There are, in principle, many different choices for the historical episodes we could examine. We included Spanish colonialism because that period accounts for a large portion of Philippine history, and is also relevant to studies examining colonial legacies and how people view the colonial past. Martial law and People Power were chosen because we presumed that they are well-known events; moreover, both events are of relative importance now as discussions around authoritarian nostalgia, the legacy of Ferdinand Marcos and the failure of post-Marcos liberal democracy have become a larger part of academic and popular discourse. Finally, we wanted to compare historical events that are highly salient and somewhat polarizing in the current era (i.e., martial law and People Power), with historical events that are less salient and polarizing (i.e., Spanish colonialism).

4 In light of Ferdinand Marcos Jr.'s electoral victory and analyses suggesting that both his and Rodrigo Duterte's wins were partly the result of the shortcomings of the post-Marcos "order", [see, for example, Marco Garrido, "Democracy as Disorder: Institutionalized Sources of Democratic Ambivalence among the Upper and Middle Class in Manila", Social Forces 99, no. 3 (2021): 1036-59], our article may also contribute to explaining the popularity of these two presidents. For arguments along this line, see Cleve V. Arguelles, "'We are Rodrigo Duterte': Dimensions of the Philippine Populist Publics' Vote", Asian Politics & Policy 11, no. 3 (2019): 417-37; Nicole Curato, "Politics of Anxiety, Politics of Hope: Penal Populism and Duterte's Rise to Power", Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 35, no. 3 (2016): 91-109; Julio Cabral Teehankee and Yuko Kasuya, "The 2019 Midterm Elections in the Philippines: Party System Pathologies and Duterte's Populist Mobilization", Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 5, no. 1 (2020): 69-81; Mark R. Thompson, "Bloodied Democracy: Duterte and the Death of Liberal Reformism in the Philippines", Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 35, no. 3 (2016): 39-68. In other words, interpretations of historical events may have contributed to who citizens voted for and supported in recent elections.

5 We did not include similar questions about US colonialism because we expected this historical event to have contemporary salience given former President Rodrigo Duterte's anti-US rhetoric and continuing debates about the legacies of that historical period.

6 After promising to be tough on crime during his campaign, Duterte sanctioned a massive nation-wide crackdown on drug dealers and users upon taking office which resulted in thousands of extrajudicial killings by security forces and vigilantes. See Human Rights Watch, "Philippines' 'War on Drugs'", https:// www.hrw.org/tag/philippines-war-drugs.

7 Assessing the merits and drawbacks of the various definitions of collective memory is well beyond the scope of this article, but for a broader discussion of collective memory, see Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1925); Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: Les lieux de mémoire", Representations 26 (1989): 7-24; Noa Gedi and Yigal Elam, "Collective Memory-What is it?", History and Memory 8, no. 1 (1996): 30-50; Jeffrey K.

Olick, "Collective Memory: The Two Cultures", Sociological Theory 17, no. 3 (1999): 333-48; Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

8 Olick, "Collective Memory", p. 338.

9 Ibid., pp. 333-48.

10 The full dataset used for this article is available for download from the Harvard Dataverse: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/FW85I4.

11 Multi-stage probability sampling is a very standard sampling technique used by survey firms worldwide and taught in standard statistics courses. In the run-up to the 2022 elections, there were debates about Pulse Asia's methods and the accuracy of its results (see, for example, Zacarian Sarao, "Pulse Asia Defends Sampling Methods amid Criticisms on Latest Survey", Inquirer.net, 3 May 2022, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1591737/pulse-asia-defends-samplingmethods-amid-criticisms-on-latest-survey; Ronald Holmes, "Pulse Asia: On Disinformation Regarding our Pre-election Surveys", ABS-CBN.com, 3 May 2022, https://news.abs-cbn.com/spotlight/05/03/22/pulse-asia-on-disinformationregarding-our-pre-election-surveys). In the end, the election results tracked closely with the Pulse Asia surveys, both in terms of who won the election and the magnitude of their electoral margin.

12 Michael Lipka, "5 Facts about Catholicism in the Philippines" (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/01/09/5facts-about-catholicism-in-the-philippines/.

13 Patricio N. Abinales and Donna J. Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines (London, UK: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), pp. 41-74.

14 Renato Constantino and Letizia R. Constantino, The Philippines: A Past Revisited, Vol. 1 (Quezon City, The Philippines: Renato Constantino, 1975), p. 78.

15 Dean Dulay, "The Search for Spices and Souls: Catholic Missions as Colonial State in the Philippines", Comparative Political Studies 55, no. 12 (2021): 2050-85.

16 The views about the impacts of martial law (Question Two) are similar, see Figure A1 in the Appendix.

17 Abinales and Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines, pp. 41-74.

18 Jorge V. Tigno, "Migration and Violent Conflict in Mindanao", Population Review 45, no. 1 (2006): 23-47.

19 Hu Y. Jeong and Johanna R. Vollhardt, "Koreans' Collective Victim Beliefs about Japanese Colonization", Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 27, no. 4 (2021): 629-41.

20 Arturas Rozenas, Sebastian Schutte and Yuri Zhukov, "The Political Legacy of Violence: The Long-term Impact of Stalin's Repression in Ukraine", The Journal of Politics 79, no. 4 (2017): 1147-61.

21 See for example, William H. Overholt, "The Rise and Fall of Ferdinand Marcos", Asian Survey 26, no. 11 (1986): 1137-63; Mark R. Thompson and Michael Cullinane, The Anti-Marcos Struggle: Personalistic Rule and Democratic Transition in the Philippines (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1995); Mark R. Thompson, "The Marcos Regime in the Philippines", in Sultanistic Regimes, edited by Houchang E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), pp. 206-29; Rizal G. Buendia, "Now it can be told: Shadow of Memories and Skeletons", Philippine Political Science Journal 34 no. 2 (2013): 199-216; Emmanuel S. de Dios,

Maria Socorro Gochoco-Bautista and Jan Carlo Punongbayan, Martial Law and the Philippine Economy, UP School of Economics Discussion Papers No. 202107 (Manila, The Philippines: University of the Philippines School of Economics, 2021).

22 Rizal Obanil, "Dark Era or Golden Age: Filipinos Young and Old Look at Martial Law", Manila Bulletin, 21 September 2018, https://mb.com.ph/2018/09/21/darkera-or-golden-age-filipinos-young-and-old-look-at-martial-law/.

23 Alan A. Tan, "The 1987 Constitution: Fossilizing Martial Law Jurisprudence", Ateneo Law Journal 32 (1987): 71.

24 Allen Hicken, "Party and Party System Institutionalization in the Philippines", in Party System Institutionalization in Asia: Democracies, Autocracies, and the Shadows of the Past, edited by Allen Hicken and Erik Kuhonta (New York City, New York: Cambridge University Press. 2015), pp. 307-27.

25 Ralph G. Steinhardt, "Fulfilling the Promise of Filartiga: Litigating Human Rights Claims against the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos", Yale Journal of International Law 20 (1995): 65.

26 de Dios, Gochoco-Bautista and Punongbayan, Martial Law and the Philippine Economy.

27 Buendia, "Now it can be told", pp. 199-216.

28 See, for example, Rochel Ellen Bernido, "Marcos Jr. Benefited from Facebook - Study", Rappler, 10 May 2022, https://www.rappler.com/nation/elections/ ferdinand-marcos-jr-benefited-facebook-disinformation-study/.

29 For example, William Lee Adams, "Down with Dictators: Ferdinand Marcos", Time Magazine, 20 October 2011, http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/ article/0,28804,2097426_2097427_2097447,00.html.

30 On the other hand, it is fair to consider an alternative perspective: Filipinos are concerned with bread-and-butter issues as a consequence of their actual lived experiences, and weigh much less allegations of historical abuses or the opinion of the international community.

31 Danny Osborne, David O. Sears and Nicholas A. Valentino, "The End of the Solidly Democratic South: The Impressionable-years Hypothesis", Political Psychology 32, no. 1 (2011): 81-108; Anil Menon and Jiannan Zhao, "Maoist Era Upheaval and Political Interest in China", 2020, https://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3653318.

32 We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for raising this point.

33 See Garrido, "Democracy as Disorder".

34 Maribelle Corpuz-Uminga, "Transitional Justice and Teaching Youth about the Martial Law Era in Philip

35 "1986: Corizon Aquino", Time Magazine, 5 March 2020, https://time.com/5793685/ corazon-aquino-100-women-of-the-year/.

36 "Coup Launched Against Aquino", Los Angeles Times, 1 December 1989, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1989-12-01-mn-144-story.html.

37 Keith Richburg, "Energy Shortages Creating Havoc in Manila", Washington Post, 28 April 1990, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/04/28/ energy-shortages-creating-havoc-in-manila/6ea04451-d3d5-44f3-9cdc56a1a0834078/.

38 Sidney Jones, "Aquino's Tarnished Track Record", Index on Censorship 19, no. 2 (1990): 5-7.

39 Benedict Anderson, "Cacique Democracy and the Philippines: Origins and Dreams", New Left Review 169 (1988): 3.

40 Aries A. Arugay and Dan Slater, "Polarization without Poles: Machiavellian Conflicts and the Philippines' Lost Decade of Democracy, 2000-2010", The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 681, no. 1 (2019): 122-36; Carl H. Landé, "The Return of 'People Power' in the Philippines", Journal of Democracy 12, no. 2 (2001): 88-102.

41 It is also possible that most Filipinos have different ideas of what events are historically important.

42 Future work might explore whether framing these events in different ways, for instance-EDSA or the ouster of Marcos, instead of People Power-might yield different responses.

43 Osborne, Sears and Valentino, "The End of the Solidly Democratic South"; Menon and Zhao, "Maoist Era Upheaval".

44 The breakdown is as follows: indifferent feelings towards People Power + positive feelings towards Martial Law = 12.5 per cent; indifferent feelings towards People Power + negative feelings towards Martial Law = 7.4 per cent; indifferent feelings towards Martial Law + positive feelings towards People Power = 7.3 per cent; indifferent feelings towards Martial Law + negative feelings towards People Power = 5.5 per cent.

45 Dean Dulay, Allen Hicken, Anil Menon and Ronnie Holmes, "Who's Voting for 'Bongbong' Marcos to be the Next Filipino President?", Washington Post, 6 May 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/05/06/bongbongmarcos-duterte-philippines-election-may9/.