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Citation

TSE, Justin Kh.(2016). A tale of three bishops: Ideologies of Chineseness and global cities in Vancouver's Anglican realignment. *Ching Feng: A Journal on Christianity and Chinese Religion and Culture*, 15(1-2), 103-130.

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A Tale of Three Bishops: Mapping the ideologies of “Chineseness” and “Asian Values” in the Global Anglican Realignment in Vancouver

JUSTIN K. H. TSE

Abstract

Most accounts of the 2002 departure of some conservative Anglican parishes from Vancouver’s Diocese of New Westminster (DoNW) over same-sex blessings seemed to fit the narrative of a battle over sexuality in the global realignment of the Anglican Communion. However, attention to the consecration of two new Chinese Anglican bishops—Silas Ng Tak-yin and Stephen Leung Wing-hong, both from Hong Kong—reveals that their split from the DoNW’s Bishop Michael Ingham had more to do with an ideology of cultural pluralization deploying “Asian values.” I, therefore, argue that the schism in Vancouver was a division over the three bishops’ imaginations of global futures with “Chineseness” and “Asian values” as proxy words for this ideology. This paper contributes to the study of Chinese Christianities—as well as other religions—by examining “Chineseness” as an empty category that can be deployed for a variety of ideologies.

INTRODUCTION:
 REVISITING CHINESENESS AND ASIAN VALUES
 IN THE GLOBAL ANGLICAN REALIGNMENT
 IN VANCOUVER

Although the roots of Anglicanism lie in the Church of England, its contemporary situation feels more like the opening line in the Chinese literary classic, *Three Kingdoms* (San guo yan yi 三國演義)—The saying of the trend under heaven, what is divided will be united, and what is united will divide (話說天下大勢·分久必合·合久必分¹)—an appropriate comparison, I suggest, because of the unexpected ways that ideologies of “Chineseness” and “Asian values” influence the worldwide Anglican family. Divided over questions of theological authority and state power since the sixteenth-century Protestant Reformation, the English church and its colonial outposts in Asia, Africa, and the Americas became united in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries as a global “Anglican Communion,” a commonwealth of thirty-eight autonomous provinces affectionately held together by a common set of traditions, politics, and succession of bishops (regional pastors exercising “episcopal” oversight). The four “instruments of unity” that have held the Communion together have conventionally focused on the Archbishop of Canterbury as (1) a symbolic figure of global unity, *primus inter pares* (“first among equals”) who (2) chairs the meeting of primates (the representative provincial archbishops), (3) hosts a decadal conference of Anglican delegates from all over the world at Lambeth Palace (his residence in London), and (4) presides over the Anglican Consultative Council’s (ACC) efforts to build unity through the Communion.

Once united, the Anglican Communion divided into what is being called the “global Anglican realignment.” The story is usually told without reference to Chineseness and Asian values. Instead, it often focuses on the 2003 consecration of Bishop Gene Robinson, an openly

¹ The literal translation, from *Three Kingdoms* 三國演義, is “The saying of the trend under heaven, what is divided unites, what is united divides,” although the official English translation is, “Here begins our tale. The empire, long divided, must unite; long united must divide.” Luo Guanzhong, *Three Kingdoms*, trans. Moss Roberts (Beijing: Foreign Languages, 1991), 5.

gay divorcé, in the Episcopal Diocese of New Hampshire, sending shockwaves through conservative parishes in the United States and Canada, as well as across the “Global South,” a region comprising “Africa, Asia, and Latin America” where historian Philip Jenkins claims that “the center of gravity in the Christian world has shifted.”² After pushing for a resolution “rejecting homosexual practice as incompatible with Scripture” at the Lambeth Conference in 1998,³ the Global South primates realigned some parishes in the Episcopal Church of the United States (TEC) and the Anglican Church of Canada (ACoC) through initiatives like the “Anglican Mission in the Americas” (AMiA), a mission founded by the Rwandan House of Bishops in 2001 and supported by their Southeast Asian counterparts.⁴ By 2008, the Anglican realignment had produced a competitor to the Lambeth Conference called the “Global Anglican Future Conference” (GAFCON); by 2009, it had also established the “Anglican Church in North America” (ACNA) as an alternative to TEC and ACoC, although AMiA has not joined this new province to date.⁵ With TEC’s consecration of an openly lesbian bishop Mary Glasspool in Los Angeles in that same year, communion between the realignment and the Global North became definitively impaired.

Seldom discussed in this narrative are the ideologies of “Chineseness” and “Asian values” that have come to play an important role in the Communion, not least due to the prominence of Chinese Anglicans on the Communion’s world stage (such as Hong Kong’s Archbishop Paul Kwong [Kuang Baoluo 鄭保羅] who began chairing the ACC in April 2016). This absence is especially felt in discussions of the rea-

² Philip Jenkins, *The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 2; Jenkins develops the “Global South” thesis in *The New Faces of Christianity: Believing in the Global South* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

³ XII Lambeth Conference, “Human Sexuality,” Resolution 10, in Section I Resolutions: “Called to Full Humanity,” d, e. See Ian T. Douglas, “The Exigency of Times and Occasions: Power and Identity in the Anglican Communion Today,” in *Beyond Colonialism Anglicanism: The Anglican Communion in the Twenty-First Century*, eds. Ian T. Douglas and Kwok Pui-lan (New York: Church, 2001), especially 25–26.

⁴ See Miranda K. Hassett, *Anglican Communion in Crisis: How Episcopal Dissidents and Their African Allies Are Reshaping Anglicanism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Thaddeus Barnum, *Never Silent: How Third World Missionaries Are Now Bringing the Gospel to the US* (Colorado Springs: Eleison, 2008).

⁵ See Joanna Sadgrove, Robert M. Vanderbeck, Kevin Ward, Gill Valentine, and Johan Andersson, “Constructing the Boundaries of Anglican Orthodoxy: An Analysis of the Global Anglican Future Conference (GAFCON),” *Religion* 40, no. 3 (2010): 193–206.

alignment of three Chinese parishes in Vancouver, two of which have become episcopal seats for the realignment bishops Silas Tak-yin Ng (Wu Dexian 伍德賢; AMiA) and Stephen Wing-hong Leung (Liang Yongkang 梁永康; ACNA)—both of Hong Kong origin—in the ACoC’s Diocese of New Westminster (DoNW). Ostensibly, the split with the DoNW’s Bishop Michael Ingham occurred over the DoNW synod’s approval of a public rite for blessing same-sex unions in 2002, an act that is often considered the Canadian counterpart to TEC’s controversy over gay and lesbian bishops.

I contend that the Vancouver case needs to be examined in its own right. Indeed, I read it as a dispute over Chineseness and Asian values, of which sexuality was only symptomatic, even though the road leading to the 2016 gender-neutral amendment of the ACoC’s marriage canon has itself been contentious. The schism, as I shall demonstrate, exceeded the sexuality issues because they originated from division over various global futures being imagined for the Anglican Communion in a globalizing world. These different imaginaries often used different versions of Chineseness and Asian values as ideological proxies to talk about global economic realities that Anglicans should address. Perhaps as equally important as the oft-discussed sexuality issues (or even more so), these ideological imaginations of Chineseness and Asian values, I argue, lie at the heart of the Anglican Communion’s fractures in Vancouver, for it is through them that the three bishops imagine vastly different global futures with which they propose that the Anglicans should align. Indeed, what is divided will be united, and what is united will be divided—based on the prognostications of globalization.

I will seek to demonstrate this argument in several parts. First, I will elaborate on my theory of ideology in order to clarify how I see Chineseness and Asian values at work in constituting Global Anglicanism. This will be followed by a brief methodological statement. I will then tell the tale of the three bishops in Vancouver in relation to each other as they have struggled since the 1990s over how to use Chineseness and Asian values to imagine Vancouver’s future as a global city. Instead of treating each bishop as an ideal type, I will move through the history of the realignment in Vancouver in three subsections, with each bishop as a heuristic guide. I will first discuss Ingham’s collision with conservative Asian Anglicans over religious pluralism in the 1990s. Then the story will move to Ng’s central role as a charismatic exorcist in the conservative Anglicans’ walk-out from the 2002 DoNW synod to form the Anglican Communion in New

Westminster (ACiNW); I will expound next on the role of Ng's supernatural sensibilities in the ACiNW split between the AMiA charismatics (represented by the Anglican Coalition in Canada [ACiC] as an AMiA network) and ACNA evangelicals (as a Canadian ACNA diocese called the Anglican Network in Canada [ANiC]) in the late 2000s. Finally, I will explore Leung's philosophical musings on being formed as a "shame-based" "Asian" Anglican in the legal milieu of ANiC's wrangling in court with the DoNW in the late 2000s over their final withdrawal from the ACoC in 2008; this ultimately led to his elevation as bishop over ANiC's Asian and Multicultural Ministries in Canada (AMMiC). My hope is that this reading of Chinese ideologies in the Anglican Communion will advance the study of Chinese religions by emphasizing that "Chineseness" is an empty ideological category that remains geographically productive because it is often used as a cipher to discuss fantasies of global futures.

PREDICTING THE FUTURE:
CHINESENESS AND ASIAN VALUES
AS IDEOLOGIES OF GLOBALIZATION

What is at stake in the Anglican forms of Chineseness that I explore are their projections of futures for a society said to be "global," utilizing the vague terminologies of "Chineseness" and "Asian values" as attempts to rewire the Anglican Church to fit with these socioeconomic fantasies. Indeed, as the anthropologist Aihwa Ong points out, "Chineseness" here can be conflated with "Asian values" because the "new cultural representations of 'Chineseness'" must be seen "in relation to transnational Asian capitalism," which is what is usually denoted by the word "global" in contemporary conversations about "globalization." However, my usage of "Asian values" is broader than critical theorist Slavoj Žižek's understanding of "capitalism with Asian values" as an emerging form of "authoritarian" capitalism that "no longer needs Western cultural values in order to function smoothly," wealth accumulation unwedded to "egalitarianism, fundamental human rights, the welfare state, to name a few."⁶ In my tale, "Asianness" is simply an

⁶ Slavoj Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (London: Verso, 1989), 16.

empty signifier, an ideological cipher for a number of global futures that are certainly capitalistic but differ in modes of governance. In this sense, I find myself agreeing with Žižek's broader description of the ideological as "*not the 'false consciousness' of a (social) being but this being itself in so far as it is supported by 'false consciousness.'*"⁷ However, I hope also to show that these ideological projects seldom achieve completion; if anything, ideologies of Asian values have divided the Anglican Communion, especially in the DoNW, because (as we shall see) there are simply too many ways to be "Asian" or "Chinese."

This materialistic emphasis on capital as a generator of cultural ideology is especially pressing in Vancouver. Urban geographers have long noted that policies in Vancouver adopted after the 1986 World Exposition ("Expo 86") led not only to the gentrification of working-class neighborhoods and former manufacturing buildings, but also to the placing of Vancouver on an "international property market."⁸ This shift in policy coincided with a spike in Chinese immigration in light of the 1997 handover of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty, bringing the population of ethnic Chinese in Metro Vancouver to just under 400,000 by the late 2000s.⁹ These new

⁷ Slavoj Žižek, *Refugees, Terror and Other Troubles with the Neighbors: Against the Double Blackmail* (London: Melville House, 2016), 23. Italics are original.

⁸ Literature on the global restructuring of Vancouver as an international property market, especially with respect to Chinese migrations in the Asia-Pacific, includes: Kris Olds and Katharyne Mitchell, "Chinese Business Networks and the Globalization of Property Markets in the Pacific Rim," in *Globalization of Chinese Business Firms*, eds. Henry Yeung and Kris Olds (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 2000), 195–219; Kris Olds, *Globalization and Urban Change: Capital, Culture, and Pacific Rim Mega-Projects* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Katharyne Mitchell, *Crossing the Neoliberal Line: Pacific Rim Migration and the Metropolis* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004); David Edgington, Michael Goldberg, and Tom Hutton, "Hong Kong Business, Money, and Migration in Vancouver, Canada," in *From Urban Enclave to Ethnic Suburb: New Asian Communities in Pacific Rim Countries*, ed. Wei Li (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006), 155–183; David Ley, *Millionaire Migrants: Trans-Pacific Life Lines* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).

⁹ For overview of the Hong Kong diaspora, see Ronald Skelton, ed., *Reluctant Exiles? Migration from Hong Kong and the New Overseas Chinese* (Armond, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994); *Emigration from Hong Kong: Tendencies and Impacts* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1999); Gary Hamilton, ed., *Cosmopolitan Capitalists: Hong Kong and the Chinese Diaspora at the End of the Twentieth Century* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000). Peter Li notes that Chinese migrations to Canada prior to 1997 tended to be from Hong Kong; after 1997, Hong Kong migration fell while mainland Chinese migration increased significantly; see Peter Li, "The Rise and Fall of Chinese Immigration to Canada: Newcomers from Hong Kong SAR

migrants brought new market-oriented practices to Vancouver: They accumulated familial capital through the transnational strategies of “astronaut families” where working adults embark on a “Pacific shuttle” between Vancouver and the Asia-Pacific for employment,¹⁰ they brought young students to obtain an “international education” in Vancouver as “cultural capital” to facilitate future employment in Asia,¹¹ they participated in “circular migration” between Asia and North America throughout their life cycle.¹² As a hub for both offshore property investment and transnational Chinese migrations, Vancouver became a “global city,” a command-and-control center of the global economy (as it is often described in urban sociology),¹³ a city through which global capital flows, facilitated in this case especially by transnational Chinese familial networks.¹⁴ In this sense, Vancouver has been termed a “global city” and Hong Kong an “international financial centre,” not unlike the framing of the Anglican Communion as a “global commonwealth.” The question over which the three bishops disagreed was: *By what are those new geographies constituted, and how should Anglicans fit ideologically into those new global economic realities?*

Indeed, this tale of three bishops, as I am telling it, is the story of how Anglicans seek to be active agents in what they take to be emerging global societies through the language of “Chineseness” and “Asian

of China and Mainland China, 1980–2000,” *International Migration* 43, no. 3 (2005): 9–32. Ethnography of the new mainland Chinese migrations to Vancouver can be found in Teo Sin-yih, “Vancouver’s *Newest* Chinese Diaspora: Settlers or ‘Immigrant Prisoners?’” *GeoJournal* 68 (2007): 211–222.

¹⁰ Johanna L. Waters, “Flexible Families? ‘Astronaut’ Households and the Experiences of Lone Mothers in Vancouver, British Columbia,” *Social and Cultural Geography* 3, no. 2 (2002): 117–134; “Flexible Citizens? Transnationalism and Citizenship amongst Economic Immigrants in Vancouver,” *The Canadian Geographer* 47, no. 3 (2003): 219–234.

¹¹ Johanna L. Waters, *Education, Migration, and Cultural Capital in the Chinese Diaspora* (Amherst, NY: Cambria, 2008).

¹² David Ley and Audrey Kobayashi, “Back to Hong Kong: Return Migration or Transnational Sojourn?” *Global Networks* 5 (2005): 111–128. A critique of this narrative as overly determinative of Hong Kong migrants’ movements can be found in Justin K. H. Tse and Johanna L. Waters, “Transnational Youth Transitions: Becoming Adults between Vancouver and Hong Kong,” *Global Networks* 13, no. 4 (2013): 535–550.

¹³ John Friedmann, “The World City Hypothesis,” *Development and Change* 17, no. 1 (1986): 69–83; Saskia Sassen, *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo*, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

¹⁴ Karen Y. P. Lai, “New Spatial Logics in Global Cities Research: Networks, Flows, and New Political Spaces,” *Geography Compass* 3, no. 3 (2009): 997–1012.

values.” The Chinese Anglicans who populate my story are mostly from Hong Kong. Like their Roman Catholic counterparts, Hong Kong is usually seen as Chinese Anglicanism’s symbolic center, as it was the place where the exiled Chung Hua Sheng Kung Hui (Zhong hua sheng gong hui 中華聖公會), the Anglican territory encompassing all of China, came to settle in exile after the Chinese Communist Revolution in 1949. While the Anglican province of Hong Kong is officially called the Hong Kong Sheng Kung Hui (HKSKH, Xiang gang sheng gong hui 香港聖公會), all Chinese Anglican and Episcopal parishes throughout the world are also called “Sheng Kung Hui” (SKH, Sheng gong hui 聖公會), the “holy public community.”

Pairing the global geographies of the SKH with the realignment, two configurations come to light. On the one hand, HKSKH is usually aligned with the Global North Anglican provinces of the Church of England (CoE), TEC, and the ACoC. While the HKSKH does not endorse same-sex unions,¹⁵ HKSKH’s provincial secretary Rev. Peter Douglas Ho-ming Koon (Guan Haoming 管浩鳴) is often sent as an observer to TEC’s General Conventions, Kwong currently chairs the London-based ACC, and HKSKH’s claim to fame is that it is the first province to have ordained a woman, Rev. Florence Tim-oi Li (Li Tianai 李添嫺), to the priesthood in the 1940s, starting a contentious series of conversations across the Communion about women priests and bishops.¹⁶ Moreover, it was in Hong Kong where the ACC held an emergency meeting during the DoNW crisis in 2002.

On the other hand, that the realignment in Vancouver encompassed all three of the DoNW’s Chinese parishes—the historic Chinatown mission Church of the Good Shepherd (GSC, Mu ai tang 牧愛堂), St Matthias’ and St Luke’s Church (Sheng lu jia sheng ma ti ya tang 聖路

¹⁵ “HKSKH Sentiments with Respect to Certain Anglican Issues,” *The English Echo* 266 (June 2010): 3–4.

¹⁶ Indeed, the ordination case of Rev. Florence Tim-oi Li is cited in the DoNW’s response to the 2004 Windsor Report on Communion: The criteria is that unilateral decisions of local dioceses could not be made without the rest of the Communion; Diocese of New Westminster, Anglican Church of Canada, *Diocesan Response to the Windsor Report, Adopted by the 103rd Session of the Synod of the Diocese Meeting on May 13 and 14, 2005* (Vancouver, BC: Anglican Church of Canada, 2005), para. 9–13. The Windsor Report had chided the DoNW for authorizing a rite of same-sex blessings that “at this time goes against the formally expressed opinions of the Instruments of Unity and therefore constitutes action in breach of the legitimate application of the Christian faith as the churches of the Anglican Communion have received it, and of bonds of affection in the life of the Communion, especially the principle of interdependence.” *The Lambeth Commission on Communion: The Windsor Report 2004* (London: The Anglican Communion Office, 2004), para. 141.

加聖馬提亞堂), and Emmanuel Church in Richmond (REC, Yi ma nei tang 以馬內利堂)—suggests that the Chineseness at work in the Vancouver case needs to be more closely examined. For one, these parishes were realigned with Global South Anglicanism. But this is an anomaly when compared with the dominant global geographies of the SKH aligning with the Global North. As we shall see, the coincidence that the realignment parishes were led by Asian Anglicans can be associated with the role played in Vancouver by the Anglican Province of Southeast Asia (PSEA), a province comprising Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei that was granted autocephaly by the Archbishop of Canterbury in 1996. As I shall show, PSEA brokered some of the relationships between Chinese Anglicans in Vancouver and other parts of the Communion. In this way, SKH Anglicans are not the only ideological generators of Chineseness and Asian values in this story. Instead, both Anglicans aligned with the Global North (e.g. ACoC, DoNW, HKSKH) and with the Global South (PSEA, ACNA [ANiC], AMiA [ACiC]) are invested in making Asian values because they are all interested in predicting the future.

METHODOLOGY

This study is part of a larger project on Cantonese-speaking Protestants and their engagements with three Pacific Rim civil societies, Vancouver, San Francisco, and Hong Kong. For this project, I conducted key informant interviews—recorded conversations with individuals specifically targeted for their ability to comment on my project's aims—among Cantonese Protestants, of which Bishops Ng and Leung were part. There were 50 interviews in Vancouver, 47 in San Francisco (including one Episcopalian priest), and 45 in Hong Kong (including one Anglican priest and one theologian, but I did not interview Archbishop Kwong). As Ingham was not part of this original project, I did not interview him. However, Ingham and Kwong are public figures with published materials that are arguably adequate as a comparative archive with the interview transcripts of the other two Chinese bishops. In turn, perhaps part of my ability to access the Cantonese Protestants I interviewed was due to the fact that at the time of research from 2011 to 2012, I identified myself as a Cantonese-speaking Protestant in the Anglican tradition; as a matter of full disclosure, I was employed prior to doing this research as a

ministry intern discerning a call to ordination in Leung's parish from 2006 to 2007 and Ng's from 2007 to 2009, but there is no financial conflict of interest as my employment ended well before my research began in 2011. Moreover, I have since become a layperson in the Ukrainian Greco-Catholic Church. I have also since developed friendships with members of the ACoC, including some who pushed at the highest levels for sexual liberalization. However, I like to think that, even when I was a Protestant and a known entity in some of these parishes, the prominence of Cantonese Protestants in Vancouver's civil society in the 2000s would have made them willing to give interviews to any interested parties seeking to represent them fairly. All interviewees whose names are used in this paper have given written permission for their usage in my research.

PLURALIZING ANGLICAN VANCOUVER: BISHOP MICHAEL
INGHAM'S IDEOLOGY OF CULTURAL PLURALISM

The bishop with whom this tale begins is Michael Ingham, the bishop against whom the other bishops in the ACiC and ANiC were later consecrated. To understand Ingham's usage of "Asian values," it is first necessary to describe his overall ideology. Since the 1980s, Ingham has attempted to align the ACoC with what he imagined to be a "post-Christendom era." Even before Ingham became the DoNW's bishop in 1994, his first book *Rites for a New Age* described the dissolution of "Christendom": the alliance of the Christian church with state establishments, the presumed superiority of the Christian message over other religious teachings, and the oligarchic rule of a few over the many. By contrast, Ingham imagined post-Christendom's new era to feature a disestablished church as a "pilgrim" practicing pluralistic interreligious tolerance in a global village marked by radical democratic egalitarianism.¹⁷ In other words, what was ushering in this new age was globalization, a process that Ingham understood as a cultural pluralism inevitably wrought by free circulation of capital throughout the world. For Ingham, this new pluralism was worth celebrating:

¹⁷ Michael Ingham, *Rites for a New Age: Understanding the Book of Alternative Services* (Toronto: Anglican Book Centre, 1986), 22–24.

We are once again facing an indifferent and sometimes hostile world. We are once again at the edges of power, discovering a new mission among the powerless. There is no reason now for triumphancy other than the fact that we are still a vessel of the gospel message. But that is what energized the apostolic church.¹⁸

In other words, the energy of a post-Christendom theology is based on what Ingham assumes to be a new global culture of pluralism, and he presumes this cultural shift to be the inevitable product of opening up capital to the world, coinciding with shifts within Vancouver toward “global city” status in the late 1980s. The church, Ingham held, needed to align with these new global realities.

The problem was an asymmetrical relationship between Ingham’s ideology of pluralism and the actual cultural practices of Christians—especially Anglicans—from Asia. In the early 1990s, the ethnic Chinese leader of Anglicans in Singapore, Bishop Moses Tay (Zheng Lingguang 鄭靈光), caused an uproar in the DoNW when he declared that Vancouver needed an exorcism due to the totem poles in the downtown Stanley Park.¹⁹ Pluralistic as Ingham’s global post-Christendom was, this event signaled that Ingham’s pluralism had competition from the very Asian Anglicans he thought would be sympathetic to his predictions of the future. In other words, Ingham’s passivity before the power of the global economy blindsided him to what Jenkins might have called a global “next Christendom” outside of his ideology.

At the heart of this disagreement about “global Christianity” was therefore not theological doctrine, *per se*; it was rather about how to conceptualize “Asian religions” based on an ideology of “Asian” values undergirded by shifts in the global economy. In 1997, Ingham published a second book titled *Mansions of the Spirit*, doubling down on his post-Christendom ideology by arguing against what he termed “Christian exclusivism,” “the position which holds that such truth as can be known about God has been fully revealed in Jesus Christ.”²⁰ For Ingham, such posturing failed to engage the global non-European

¹⁸ Ibid, 40.

¹⁹ Jenkins, *The Next Christendom*, 139–140. Jenkins cites this story from Ferdy Baglo, “Canadian Bishop Blocks Asian Church Leader from Visiting His Diocese,” *Christianity Today*, November 29, 1999.

²⁰ Michael Ingham, *Mansions of the Spirit: The Gospel in a Multi-Faith World* (Toronto: Anglican Book Centre, 1997), 51.



(read: “Asian,” and “for economic reasons”) migrations, which would inevitably (in his mind) bring the world’s religions (like Hinduism and Buddhism) to North American global cities like Vancouver. As Ingham put it:

For the first time we are coming into contact with the religions of the world embodied in human faces and next-door-neighbour families. The relationship, therefore, between Christianity and the world’s religions is no longer an academic question.²¹

In other words, Ingham read the shifts in the global economy as having activated Asia as a key source of migration to Vancouver, and for him, that meant the inevitable migration of distinctly “Asian” (read: non-Christian) religions that required a much more inclusive theology in order for the church to accommodate such changing realities in their global city.

Ingham’s imagination of Asia created an ideological rift between him and Anglicans aligned with Tay, who soon became the newly-formed PSEA’s primate. When Tay sought to visit Vancouver again in the late 1990s, Ingham refused to allow it. By contrast, Ingham invited the Dalai Lama to Vancouver in the early 2000s—not so much to highlight Tibetan independence as a cause, but to reinforce the prescriptive ideology of religious pluralism in a global economy by organizing interfaith panels on pluralism, eventually culminating in the founding of the Interspiritual Centre of Vancouver (ISCV) in 2004. The effect, then, of Ingham’s ideological prescriptiveness was *not* so much a flourishing of interreligious pluralism in the DoNW, but the introduction of a division in the diocese over the question of what constitutes “Asian values” to which Anglicans should accommodate.

The stage for the dramatic rupture of the DoNW in the 2002 was thus set by the ideological fissures over “Asian values” in the 1990s. As this story shows, two Anglican blocs had already developed in the DoNW by the late 1990s—Ingham’s cultural pluralists and those aligned with the PSEA exorcists—their fundamental difference over their ideologies of “Asia.” By 1998, a small group of delegates in the

²¹ Ibid., 14. Ingham’s logic resembled the assumptions of other religious scholars, such as Harvard University’s Diana Eck, who remarked in 2001 that the religious sites she had studied in India  now coming to the United States, and the interdisciplinary team of British Columbia  Asian studies claiming that the globalization of Vancouver meant that Asian religions had reshaped the urban landscape.

DoNW that had since the late 1980s repeatedly introduced resolutions to allow parishes to use a rite to publicly bless same-sex couples surprisingly found their initiative, known at the 1998 synod as Motion 9, undercut by a very narrow margin. While Ingham was compelled to reject this motion because it did not have enough votes, the voting gap narrowed in the 2001 synod. In the lead-up to the 2002 synod, Ingham issued a statement known as Motion 7 to help Motion 9 pass. Addressed to all parishes in the DoNW—but especially to the dissenting ones—Ingham sought to “resolve the impasse” blocking Motion 9 by appointing a “Canadian bishop from outside this diocese to offer pastoral care to those parishes and clergy who desire it” while not requiring any member of the diocese to “act against their conscience in the blessing of same-sex unions” (though he acknowledged that he could not “bind” his “successors in this matter”). With this in mind, Ingham indicated that he intended to approve Motion 9 if the synod’s votes carried it. In this way, Ingham sought to “maintain the highest level of communion in our diocese where there is honest disagreement on Motion 9” by recognizing “the legitimate pastoral needs of different members of the church” so that everyone could “remain the diocesan family” with “a measure of tolerance, hospitality, and mutual respect from all of us, and a period of continuing work at reconciliation.”

Yet the dissenting parishes that had already been disgruntled by Ingham’s cultural pluralism imagined that this yet more radical move toward pluralization—one attempting even to include dissent on the rite of same-sex blessings—would marginalize them. As the votes fell 215 to 129 in favor of Motion 9 in June 2002, a group of eight parishes walked out of the synod, rejecting Ingham’s proposal, and announced the formation of the ACiNW; this in turn triggered the need for a meeting of the ACC in Hong Kong calling for Ingham to explain why the DoNW had proceeded unilaterally on the liberalization of sexuality policy without the rest of the Communion. Cultural pluralization, it seemed, had led to sexual liberalization. But was the ACiNW’s disagreement with the DoNW only over sex? To answer that question, our tale must turn from the DoNW to one of the leaders of the synod walk-out who eventually became the bishop of the ACiC, Silas Ng.

“THE ALTAR HAS BEEN DEFILED!”:
BISHOP SILAS NG’S IDEOLOGY OF PURIFYING EXORCISM

A number of persons claimed to speak for the ACiNW in its early days, but few were Chinese.²² Responding to Ingham’s comments to the ACC in Hong Kong that Motion 9 was to care for lesbian and gay persons as “victims of persecution” by the church, the Reverend Ed Hird clarified that the ACiNW had simply been adhering to the 1998 Lambeth Conference Resolution 1.10 that blessing same-sex unions was incompatible with scriptural authority.²³ Writing to Ingham after the Diocese of Yukon’s Bishop Terry Buckle backed away from providing episcopal oversight to the ACiNW, the Reverend Trevor Walters wrote on behalf of the ACiNW clergy that Ingham’s demands that the lay people in individual parishes must decide whether or not to stay within the DoNW was “an attempt to bully them out of the church which they love and to abandon the doctrines of the church to which they adhere.”²⁴ Although these communiqués often included the names of clergy like Silas Ng, Stephen Leung, and Simon Chin (Chen Zhongwen 陳仲文; then-rector of St Matthias and St Luke’s), the Chinese rectors who became bishops—Ng and Leung—are seldom represented in the documents as agents of dissent and realignment except in their own parishes. Situating them on the realignment’s main stage, it becomes much more apparent that the ACiNW’s dissent from the DoNW was about much more than sexuality, for Ng and Leung can be seen as Asian Anglicans continuing the disagreement of the 1990s between the ideologies of actually-Asian Anglicans and Ingham’s use of Asian religions to propagate his ideology of cultural pluralization.

²² The qualifier here is that the ACiNW did have Chinese Anglican lay members who could speak as representatives to the local Chinese press, but the point stands that the way this DoNW schism is often recounted usually does not include Chinese Anglicans as active agents.

²³ David Virtue, “ACiNW Responds to Bishop Ingham’s Haven for Persecuted Homosexuals,” *Virtue Online*, September 24, 2002, accessed October 25, 2016, http://listserv.virtueonline.org/pipermail/virtueonline_listserv.virtueonline.org/2002-September/004148.html.

²⁴ David Virtue, “ACiNW Clergy Sad at Ingham’s Decision to Proceed against Them,” *Virtue Online*, April 1, 2003, accessed October 25, 2016, http://listserv.virtueonline.org/pipermail/virtueonline_listserv.virtueonline.org/2003-April/004923.html.

It can in fact be argued that Silas Ng, originally a member of Ingham's inner circle of advisors and a creative priest that Ingham had tasked with planting the Church of Emmanuel as a Chinese parish in the largely-Chinese suburb of Richmond, can be regarded as one of the pioneers of the synod walkout, thanks in no small part to his charismatic gifts and exorcist sensibilities. In the key informant interview that I conducted with him, he told me that one of his earliest charismatic experiences occurred in the early spring of 2002 when he "received a word" from God—"Exodus"—and proceeded to communicate this word in a meeting to the clergy who were reportedly "shocked": "Do we need to go as extreme as 'exodus'?" he remembers them musing; in fact, he recounted how one priest who later became prominent in the ACiNW attempted to "talk him out of this word" while he was having his car fixed at an auto dealer in Richmond.²⁵ As Ng tells the story, one of Ng's parish members—another ethnic Chinese person—then received a second prophetic word, "walk out," in the late spring.


Ng noted that if they stayed in the DoNW, they would "not be part of Jesus' church" because they would be "out of the Bible." Convinced of this, the clergy who subsequently composed the ACiNW prepared to walk out, at which point (as Ng recounts) Bishop Ingham saw each of the "rebellious pastors" in private to chide them on their insubordination. In response, Ng reportedly told Ingham about the word that he had received "from the Lord," to which Ingham was allegedly surprised that "in this century, you can really hear Jesus," so Ng pulled out his spiritual journal to show him the exact date on which he had received the word. It can therefore be inferred from Ng's account that these charismatic experiences led in a major way to the formation of the ACiNW, although when I asked him about the prominence of Chinese Anglicans in the breakaway, he responded, "No, I am the only one who brought the message. It was my personal reception, and at our every-week meeting, many people had messages." What this denial affirms, of course, is that the charismatic experiences—and Ng's, in particular—lay in the background of the 2002 walk-out.

What was also true, however, was that Ng's insistence on trusting the validity of these supernatural experiences led to a split within the ACiNW itself. In 2002 and 2003, the ACiNW had attempted to pursue

²⁵ Bishop Silas Tak-yin Ng, personal communication, October 16, 2013. All subsequent quotes from Ng are from this key informant interview unless otherwise indicated.

an “inside strategy” of staying within the ACoC in order to keep their property. Ng told me that it was in fact he who then “thought of an outside strategy because the ACoC had already blessed same-sex, so we should not hold the licence.” He explained,

A spiritual tie is like a virus, so I described it like D-Day. They are only tricking the outsiders before the main force. They have some men on the beach, and then the main force. So I said that we should treat them like D-Day, and we got into an argument.

In other words, Ng insisted on a view of spiritual warfare in a way that was not unlike the sensibilities of Archbishop Tay calling for the exorcism of Vancouver due to the Stanley Park totem poles. Indeed, as the disagreement about the “inside” and “outside” strategy escalated, Ng and his colleagues attended the AMiA Winter Conference in the United States, where they brokered their reception into the Anglican Province of Rwanda through none other than Moses Tay and his successor, Archbishop Yong Ping-chung (Yang Pingzhong 楊平忠). Not one to shy from a good dramatic moment, Ng returned to the ACoC parish where REC had been housed and declared as part of a liturgical ceremony that “the altar had been defiled.” In a well-timed moment caught in a newspaper photo that still hangs framed in REC’s new location, Ng tore his DoNW clergy license into pieces  and led his congregation to march across the town with a cross held high to a vacant warehouse that they rented as a church home. The significance of this act, which was one of the founding moments of the Anglican Coalition in Canada (ACiC) as a new entity, should not be understated: as other ACiNW clergy such as the Reverend Ed Hird in North Vancouver and the Reverend Barclay Mayo in Pender Harbour followed suit with equal flair, this full embrace of the “outside strategy” also dramatically divided them from the ACiNW’s strategy of internal dissent in the ACoC by drawing the ACiC literally into a new Anglican province (Rwanda, brokered by the PSEA).²⁶ Indeed, the shattering of the ACiNW movement meant that those pursuing the “inside strategy” also had to find a new name: the Anglican Network in Canada (ANiC).

The “Chineseness” here is subtle; it has more to do with the fact that Ng and his parish had to work out the question of their “spiritual ties”

²⁶ Martha N. Sison, “Evicted Congregations to Leave Buildings,” *Anglican Journal*, May 1, 2005, accessed October 26, 2016, <http://www.anglicanjournal.com/articles/evicted-congregations-to-leave-buildings-2877>.

in the context of both Metro Vancouver's Chinese Canadian community and their newfound affiliations with the PSEA's primates, who both shared Ng's charismatic approach. Indeed, prior to becoming bishop, Ng had been the face of Asian Anglicanism for the AMiA, serving as the "Network Leader" of the "Asian Initiative" (AI) to plant Asian churches across North America. AI's greatest success was a Chinese church in Toronto aptly named after the new cathedral, Toronto Emmanuel Church, though this achievement, according to Ng's account, also triggered an international dispute with Hong Kong Anglicans over the new parish's plot of land in Toronto. In Ng's view, this was a case of "spiritual warfare" marked by "friendly fire." This Toronto church plant had come out of a larger Chinese Anglican parish in Toronto, St John's McNicoll, because the donor of its building fund had wanted to pull out of the ACoC and join AI, triggering others at St John's to appeal to Anglican bishops in Hong Kong to send letters accusing Ng of "stealing sheep and the church." The sphere of such action—a dispute within the SKH world—suggests yet again that Ng's charismatic practices need to be understood from the perspective of what it means to be "Chinese" and "Asian" as an Anglican. Although Ng has been just made the Apostolic Vicar of the newly formed Anglican Mission in Canada (an update of the ACiC) in 2016, his sensibilities are perhaps best understood as emerging from the production of an Asian Anglicanism contrasting Ingham's post-Christendom ideology. Where Ingham sought to accommodate new Asian religious pluralism, Ng wanted to reclaim Christendom through spiritual warfare, exorcism, and charismatic purification.

In engaging such spiritual warfare, Ng found new allies among Chinese evangelicals, as they combatted political and cultural liberalism in Canada with the weapons of spiritual warfare. Ng told me of "prayer walks" that he had led to claim the land of Richmond for Christ's sovereignty:

I can only say that ever since the Lord above told Joshua that every part of the land that he walks will be his—that is one of the prayer walk texts—and I also see that around the world there are prayer walks—at that time was Marching for Jesus—Marching for Jesus was in those years that was the lead-up to same-sex marriage passing. . . so I consider that prayer walk is a spiritual action.

Here, the link between the exorcists' twin objections to Ingham's proposals for cultural and sexual pluralization become apparent: instead of accepting the social changes to Christendom that come with

processes like globalization, Christ's land must be reclaimed. Such reclamation requires the physical act of walking (the "walk-out," the "prayer-walk"), accompanied with an active cutting of ties with spiritual forces that are interpreted as against Christ's sovereignty, such as the totem poles and the DoNW. Ng also spoke in this way of the "spiritual warfare beyond what we can understand in the principalities" when it came to praying for Canada's national leadership. Over the course of thirty weeks before one Canadian federal election, Ng led his parish to pray for each of the Members of Parliament (MPs) by name. "So suddenly, the Conservatives win!" He exclaimed, revealing that the purpose of his prayers was to usher in a new spiritual leadership that could abate the liberalizing path of the Canadian nation-state, although he was very clear that he had never told his parish members how to vote, nor had he attempted to manipulate the political process. "I am not the only church praying for the MPs, only the first!" He clarified, telling me that he had also suggested the idea to the Vancouver Chinese Evangelical Ministerial Fellowship (VCEMF)—a local interdenominational gathering of all Chinese evangelical pastors and voluntary staff workers—with an emphasis on saying the "name" of each MP for the prayers to take hold.

It is therefore that Ng, as a *Chinese* Anglican and an *Asian* Anglican, practices and mobilizes for spiritual warfare through prayer techniques. This Chineseness—these "Asian values"—are the diametrical opposite to Ingham's acceptance of the global economy's disruption of Christendom. In this view, if Christendom is being disrupted, the forces disrupting it cannot only be material; they must be spiritual. These transcendent shifts are not to be passively accepted; instead, Anglicans should be actors in supernatural sphere, claiming back the land, cutting it off from spiritually malicious forces, and achieving spiritual purification of the world. In this way, the flow of Chinese migrants and Asian Anglicans into Vancouver is *not* to be interpreted as cause for pluralizing the DoNW's way of thinking. Instead, they are agents of purification who can be mobilized to exorcise Vancouver—an ideological formulation that, as we shall see in Stephen Leung's case, also made some Chinese Anglicans uncomfortable.

SHAME IN A WORLD OF LAW:
STEPHEN LEUNG'S IDEOLOGY OF
MULTICULTURAL SPIRITUALITY

One of the legal sagas that was widely-discussed in Vancouver's civil society in the late 2000s was a case that was decided in the Supreme Court of British Columbia known as *Bentley et al v. Anglican Synod of the Diocese of New Westminster*, 2010 BCCA 506. The case revolved around ANiC, whose parishes had by 2008 given up on the inside strategy when the national ACoC's General Synod voted in 2007 to declare that positions on same-sex relationships were not matters of "core doctrine (in the sense of being creedal)," effectively opening the door to amending the marriage canon to affirm same-sex marriage, which was done in 2016.²⁷ Because the parishes in ANiC *did* consider the matter of same-sex unions as core to the doctrine of sin, they voted to withdraw from the ACoC to join the Anglican Province of the Southern Cone in 2008 before merging with the newly-formed ACNA as its Canadian diocese in 2009. Understanding that Ingham intended then to lay claim to their buildings, ANiC fired first, suing the DoNW on the basis of a precedent case from the 1980s that if a religious society had departed from its original founding purposes, it could no longer have claim to its building. *Bentley* thus turned theological doctrine into a legal matter, claiming that the DoNW had departed from "historic Anglican orthodoxy," which meant that the ANiC parishes holding to a traditional Christian understanding of sexuality could keep their buildings. Although the case was decided against ANiC, the consolation prize was that one of ANiC's Chinese parishes, the Church of the Good Shepherd, could keep a \$2.2 million bequest from one of its late parishioners, Dr. Daphne Wai-chan Chun, to fund its possible needs for a new building. Transforming Anglicanism in Vancouver into an arena of ecclesiastical legal wrangling, *Bentley* was also the context in which Stephen Leung became bishop in September 2009 over ANiC's Asian

²⁷ "GS/2007 June/A186 Blessing of Same Sex Unions—Core Doctrine of ACC," in "General Synod Resolutions Related to Issues of Sexuality 1989–2004," accessed October 26, 2016, <http://www.anglican.ca/faith/focus/hs/ssbh/resolutions/>; General Synod 2016 Resolution Number A051-R2, "Subject: Amendment to Canon XXI (On Marriage in the Church)," accessed October 26, 2016, <http://www.anglican.ca/wp-content/uploads/a051-R2.pdf>.

and Multicultural Ministries in Canada (AMMiC), a non-territorial arrangement in which Leung lay claim to episcopal oversight to all persons with “visible minority” status in ANiC, especially Asians. As with Ng, re-situating Leung in this discussion highlights how sexuality is only symptomatic of an Anglican dispute about global shifts and pluralization using “Chineseness” and “Asian values” as ideological proxies.

While Ng had a flair for the supernaturally dramatic, Leung’s reasoning often waxed rationalistic, almost with a certain legal brilliance. For Leung, Ingham’s embrace of pluralism represented a failure of reason and coherence, conceptually “separating salvation from social ethics,” as he put it, which made his theological formulations problematic.²⁸ However, it did not follow that (as Ng demanded) defectiveness demands the total separation of spiritual ties, for the universe in which Leung operated was as legal as it was supernatural. Leung insisted that joining the synod walk-out did not mean that he had ever left the ACoC. Articulating his rationale for remaining within ANiC’s “inside strategy,” he said:

I told the ACoC, “I can’t take this.” I asked Canada to help me, but they pushed me, marginalized me. I appealed to the Communion, to the Global South; I never left the Communion, but they gave me a way out . . . If the ACoC goes back to the orthodox faith in its canons and constitutions, I would go back, but I can’t go with a defective declaration.

In other words, he had watched as the ACoC’s internal legal structure had itself become defective through what he considered its theological gymnastics in not disciplining the DoNW for Motion 9 in 2002, making way for the “core doctrine” vote at the national synod in 2007. Creatively maneuvering with Anglican polity, Leung justified his participation in the walk-out as leaving this defective legal structure while staying within the “Communion,” remaining in a larger ecclesiastical apparatus while waiting to see whether the ACoC would reverse course on its canonical defectiveness.

In the same way, Leung had also been prepared for the civil implications of these problems in ecclesiastical law, although this preparation was ultimately attributed to supernatural intervention. As one of

²⁸ Stephen Wing-hong Leung, personal communication, May 5, 2011. All quotes from Leung are from this interview, unless other indicated.

his trustees, lawyer Peter Si-kun Li, told me, Leung's realization that he was being marginalized by the ACoC had resulted in a stroke of both brilliance and divine providence in relation to the ownership of his parish's building. As Li recounted:

Then you see that the miracle is that if we had smoothly found something at the time and bought a building, with a ruling like this, that building would belong to the diocese, meaning that we would have lost it. But because we were not able to, could not find a suitable place, and we just held it, held it, then when the case comes, we are still holding onto that fund and then we had a separate filing about that. So although the other buildings were lost to the diocese, that bequest was still given back to us. If it had not been separated, it would have been gone too.

Indeed, in the early 2000s, the Church of the Good Shepherd had been searching for a building; unable to find one, they resorted to swapping properties with the Metropolitan Temple, a Pentecostal church: "There was a church that took pity on us, and we were able to use their building for a time."²⁹ Providential as this story is, what it ultimately illustrates is that Leung and his parishioners understood themselves to live in a world primarily governed by civil and canon law. God may be able to provide a way out of legal traps, but being agents in the world, whether ecclesiastical or legal, requires some understanding of the law.

Termining this legal apparatus to be "Western" and symptom of a "guilt" culture in which right and wrong are determined by one's standing before the law, Leung explained his actions as part of a coherent Chinese culture that engaged this world of law with a "shame" culture. Indeed, he writes in his Master of Theology thesis—one supervised at Regent College by its founder, Professor James Houston—that this was a duality which he found useful for ministering in Chinese evangelical contexts. Repeating his findings to me in our interview, he told me that "Western" cultures tended to be "guilt-based" in the sense that they adhered to legal norms, whereas "Chinese" culture was "shame-based" because wrongdoing struck at the core of one's interior identity, leading to a loss of "face."³⁰ "For Asians in general," he ex-

²⁹ Peter Si-kun Li, personal communication, September 21, 2011.

³⁰ Stephen Wing-hong Leung, *Face-Shame in the Chinese Culture: A Divine Reverse for Spiritual Growth in Christian Community* (Unpublished ThM thesis, Regent College, Vancouver, BC, 2001). Leung's readings of shame in Chinese culture in con-

plained, “shame is predominant. The key of the house is shame. So the purpose of Asian theology is to see shame.” Promoting an ideology of “Asianness” and “Chineseness” that is yet again different from Ingham and Ng, Leung pinpointed “shame” as the ideological content of “Asian” cultures, especially “Chinese” culture, in a way that could be positioned over against a dominating legal culture:

The problem is that we use the law to discipline people because we fear punishment. For example, we say that the law prohibits speeding. Now we can teach people not to speed in a different way—“so be a good citizen”—use this approach to develop the inside, so for example, the difference from legalism in the Bible, not by human effort.³¹

The subtext here is that shame and guilt are not mutually exclusive; shame is in fact deeper than guilt, for while the law demands external conformity, the shame-based culture that Leung attributes to Asia (and therefore, China) leads to deep, internal transformation. “Asian values,” in other words, are about interior spirituality, as opposed to the legal obsessions of the West.

What this means in turn is that persons formed by shame can possibly outplay their guilt-formed Western brethren on the legal arena. Indeed, Leung suggested that both factors—“guilt” and “shame”—led to his tactical abilities in maneuvering ANiC’s “inside strategy” until the withdrawal in 2008. For Leung, Anglicanism was a matter of “shame” because it was more than just being part of a legal system, although he said that the accusations launched against him in his role in the realignment often made reference to this institutional apparatus:

In my struggling, I was labeled as splitting the church. This is “guilt”. . . . Splitting the church is a guilt accusation against an institutional church, and I am excommunicated.

However, Anglicanism for Leung was in fact more about an identity that was as core to his being as his “Chineseness”:

trast to a culture of guilt emerge most prominently from his expositions of Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s *Ethics*.

³¹ Leung, personal communication.

For example, shame is when I go back to Hong Kong, I am not seen as Anglican. It would for example be like them saying that I am not Chinese; it's not my language.

Leung thus repudiated Ingham's attempts to discipline him as stemming from a legal, "guilt-based" understanding of Anglicanism, although he also suggested that if Ingham wanted to play legal games with him, he could hit back in a "Western" law-centered way. Appealing to "freedom of speech," he said that one particularly poignant threat that Ingham had issued was that he would "take our licenses." This threat had been based on evidence from "our sermons against the diocese and the bishop—I said something that I disagreed with him." Instead of trying to shame the bishop, Leung turns to legal language: "This was never discussed, that this can be evidence. This is a matter of free speech. It's not just me; all the dissenting clergy know about this." Ingham, Leung suggested, had misunderstood his Chinese clergy, ironic because Ingham was the one who had first argued for accepting globalization and the arrival of Asian religions in Vancouver. Leung implied that if Ingham really professed to understand Asian religions, he should have known better than to threaten his Chinese priests with the law, as they were able to beat him at his own game given the shame-formation that (for Leung) actually constitutes the core ideology of Asian religion and Chinese values.

As bishop over ANiC's AMMiC segment, Leung works out this ideology of shame-based Asian values in church ministry. As one of Leung's priests Rev. Anson Ann puts it, there is on the one hand a global Asian network to which AMMiC is connected, including being "in close contact with" the PSEA's new primates—Archbishop John Chew when I interviewed Ann and Leung—while starting new relationships with churches and organizations "in Malaysia and China," such as a partnership with International China Concern (ICC; a non-profit organization for orphans in the People's Republic of China [PRC]) as well as short-term mission teams to Thailand and Myanmar. This energy in AMMiC, as Ann put it, had the *raison d'être* "so we know that we're tied to Asia, there is a purpose for us to be here, God didn't bring us here just to enjoy our retirement lives." Yet all of these bridging relationships were also productive for clarifying what Asia and "Asian values" are ideologically:

Ever since Bishop Stephen became a bishop, I see he has been . . . well, he knows very clearly that he's not just being a bishop of Asian ministry in Vancouver and North America—he is called to be a

bridge for Asian Christianity and North American Christianity
 We're meant to be a bridge to lands both ways, since we're privileged this way, we speak both languages.³²

By “both languages,” Ann conflates a particular “Chinese” language with “Asian,” as the two common languages between him and Leung are Cantonese and English. Reading Asian values from *de facto* “Chinese” assumptions, “Asian Christianity” and “North American Christianity” are posited as fundamentally separate ontological entities that must be bridged. As Leung told me in our 2011 interview, there would be a series of conferences for Vancouver’s local Asian evangelicals (and indeed, I attended the 2011 and 2012 iterations as part of my field work) that would not be exclusive to Anglicans: “It is not Anglican; they will not go that far. It’s too fast for the first conference to do an Anglican Eucharist. We have to strike the balance with evangelicals, or they will complain, or they will not come if we do not get the trust first. *You want us all to become Anglican?*” He quipped, mimicking the possible lingering evangelical suspiciousness at his liturgical sensibilities. This non-exclusivity in terms of denomination would facilitate the discussion of “Asian” (or rather, “Chinese”) culture and its implications for ministry as an attempt to educate all attendees, regardless of ethnicity, about the need to minister at a shame-based ontological level instead of remaining at the legal surface. Drawing over 150 attendees at each year’s conference who were mostly Chinese evangelicals without backgrounds in Anglicanism, AMMiC’s ministry suggests that Leung’s participation in Vancouver’s Anglican realignment also aligned him with local non-Anglican Chinese evangelicals.

This educational mandate suggests that Leung’s understanding of shame comes from his spiritual sensibility and awareness about an alternate ideological approach to a world that he understands as governed by legal apparatuses. While Ingham argues that Anglicans must accept a post-Christendom that has shifted through economic globalization and Ng argues for the retaking of Christendom through charismatic practice, Leung understands the world as a heavily regulated set of legal networks and mechanisms that has even crept its way into Anglicanism’s *modus operandi*. To be “Asian” is not to resist this world; it is to learn to play the game better than the players themselves by investing in a spirituality that is deeper than what this law-obsessed universe offers. Such a view can be contrasted with Ng’s “outside strategy” of

³² Anson Ann, personal communication, April 25, 2011.

completely cutting ties with a spiritually corrupt world; for Leung, the ACoC—and Vancouver’s legal apparatus, for that matter—are only *defective*, which means that their apparatuses offer tools that those with enough interior, shame-based, self-cultivation can use to great advantage. This process of integrating shame in a guilt-based world forms the crux of Leung’s episcopal ministry, rounding out the map of three very different versions of “Asian values” at work in constituting the Anglican realignment in Vancouver.

CONCLUSION:
“CHINESENESS” AND “ASIAN VALUES”
IN THIS TALE OF THREE BISHOPS

The frequent complaint from those following Edward Said in unmasking the field of orientalism as an intellectual fraud is that this discussion of “Chineseness” and “Asian values” seldom takes into account the agency of Asians themselves. In this tale of three bishops, Chinese Anglican bishops are part and parcel of the creation of “Chineseness” and “Asian values” that are distinctively made in Vancouver. The centering of Asian subjects in the narrative about the Anglican realignment in Vancouver that supposedly began in 2002 reveals that the divisions in the DoNW were formed as early as the 1990s. The dispute was not so much about sex as it was over the meanings of Asianness and Chineseness amidst the global migrations reshaping Vancouver as a city. What I have attempted to produce is what might be called an “ideological map” exploring how the three bishops theorized their participation in a liberal global economy and civil society. For the DoNW’s Bishop Ingham, these economic shifts signaled a change in the demographic makeup of global cities like Vancouver, demanding that Anglicans passively acquiesce to post-Christendom where religions from Asia would be dominant. Countering Ingham was a reassertion of Christendom by Asian Anglicans themselves, beginning with the PSEA’s Archbishop Tay and following on through the charismatic practices of the ACiC’s Silas Ng as assertion of genuine Asian agency. Yet not all Asian Anglicans agreed with such a dynamically exorcist approach, allowing for the possibility of a third Chineseness advocated by ANiC’s Stephen Leung in a mode of shame-based spirituality that could form Asian Anglican subjects to outwit the guilt-based legal apparatuses that are dominant

modes of governance in both ecclesial and civil circles. In the emerging field of Chinese Christianities, perhaps the question that could be posed is: *What forms of Chineseness are Christians inventing, and for what purposes?*

This inquiry into Chineseness is also a pertinent question for the field of Anglican studies, where energy is often expended on the development of theological tradition and the emergence of post-colonial forms of Anglicanism. Taking seriously the Chinese bishops in my tale as actors in the realignment in their own right, a further avenue of research might inquire into what extent ideologies of globalization using “Asian values” and “Chineseness” as proxies might be coming to constitute the Communion’s thinking at a global scale. For example, Archbishop Paul Kwong now not only acts in his capacity as HKSKH’s primate, but also both as the chair of the Canterbury-appointed ACC as one of its instruments of unity as well as in a more civic position as a member of the PRC’s Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Kwong’s standing in the Anglican Communion as a Chinese primate—arguably *the* Chinese primate—gives him not only the space to develop ideologies of Chineseness that will yet again be different from this tale of three bishops, but also the platform to propagate these ideologies across the Communion. As Kwong explains in a book that proposes a Hong Kong identity reconcilable with a national Chinese one, generating this ideology is intimately linked to his role in the Anglican Communion; both, after all, have to do with developing *identities*—ideological forms—for the sake of reconciliation:

In writing this book, and in thinking about the issue of identity in community, my focus has been on Hong Kong. But through my participation in bishops’ meetings, and in conversations with Christians from around the globe, I have come to believe that our experience in Hong Kong may also have implications for churches in other parts of the Anglican Communion.³³

Like the other bishops in this paper, Kwong is thus invested in developing an ideology of Chineseness—in his case because the global future he imagines is one in which Hong Kong must work with an emerging PRC on a world stage.

³³ Paul Kwong, *Identity in Community: Toward a Theological Agenda for the Hong Kong SAR* (Zürich: Lit Verlag, 2008), 235.

The political manifestations of Kwong's identity construction are significant for both Hong Kong as well as for the Anglican Communion. Biblical exegete Sam Tsang accuses Kwong of putting "the burden on the 'Hong Kong people' not to be xenophobic and discriminatory" while failing "to consider altogether the seriousness of the mainland invasion and the Hong Kong government's own violation of the Basic Law" when voicing his opposition to the pro-democracy Umbrella Movement in 2014.³⁴ Indeed, I would be remiss in a paper on the SKH in *Ching Feng* to mention HKSKH's withdrawal from the Chinese University of Hong Kong's Divinity School of Chung Chi College on similar grounds. While HKSKH insists that this move was purely administrative, critics of its timing point out that it occurred alongside both Kwong's critical comments on the Umbrella Movement and the broad support of Divinity School faculty and students for Hong Kong democracy, suggesting that there might be an aspect of the split along the lines of differing global visions cloaked in an ideology of Chineseness.³⁵ If the construction of identity leads to such political divisiveness, questions can be asked about how Kwong's well-meaning proposals to construct identities for reconciliation on the Anglican Communion's global stage will turn out. This line of inquiry is important, after all, given both the tale of three bishops *and* Kwong's status as a Chinese Anglican chairing one of the Communion's instruments of unity (the ACC). The ideological construction of Chineseness and Asian values is no longer internal to SKH circles but is now presented as a Communion-wide question.

Such an inquiry into Anglicanism would necessitate an intervention in the field of Global Christianity as well. In a stunning review of how the term "Global South Christianity" became an equivalent to "Global Christianity," Michael Nai-chiu Poon reveals that the entire field based on the term "Global Christianity" is indebted to the Anglican Communion's usage of the term "Global South Anglican" to denote the bloc of dissenting archbishops who also happened to be from regions of the

³⁴ Sam Tsang, "Exegeting the Occupation of Hong Kong: The Umbrella Movement as a Battleground for Liberation Hermeneutics," in *Theological Reflections on the Hong Kong Umbrella Movement*, eds. Justin K. H. Tse and Jonathan Y. Tan (New York: Palgrave, 2016), 152.

³⁵ UCA News, "Anglican Withdrawal from Hong Kong College Questioned; Pro-Beijing Sentiment Suspected behind Move, Critics Say," *UCA News*, May 20, 2016, accessed October 27, 2016, <http://www.ucanews.com/news/anglican-withdrawal-from-hong-kong-college-questioned/76096>.

world troubled by the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the early 2000s.³⁶ With Anglicanism at the core of Global Christian studies, the line of inquiry I have advanced asks for more serious reflection on why ideologies may not be so clear in surface realities. Although the phenomena that seem to have realigned the Anglican Communion and are predicted to reshape geographies of Global Christianity ostensibly revolve around sexual morality and charismatic revival movements, how are all of these phenomena related to processes in the global economy? And to what extent are they shaped by what Žižek so provocatively calls “capitalism with Asian values,” which he frequently qualifies as having “nothing to do with Asian people and everything to do with the clear and present tendency of contemporary capitalism as such to suspend democracy”?³⁷ What are the material processes necessitating the production of ideologies prescribing interpretations of Global Christianity as a revival of Christendom in the Global South, and how might examining ideologies of Chineseness and Asian values in the arena of Global Christian studies yield insights into how the “Global South” is constituted and what the real place of sexuality is in these debates?

In each of these extended lines of inquiry from this tale of three bishops, I am proposing to take the study of Chinese religions on the road, to inquire about what “Chineseness” and “Asian values” are at an ontological level in fields that do not typically make such inquiries. Revealing that this question is important in unexpected areas of study such as Anglican studies, Global Christian studies, and urban geography in the context of global economy, the ideological map that I have made ultimately shows that ideologies of Chineseness and Asian values are often placed together, but usually result in dividing. But if the *Three Kingdoms* is right, what is divided must unite. Perhaps it is through the interrogation of these all-too-reified categories of “Chineseness” and “Asian values” that such new networks of solidarity, bonds of affection, and even communion can be developed.

³⁶ Michael Nai-chiu Poon, “The Global South Anglican—Its Origins and Development,” *Global South Anglican Online*, March 11, 2008, accessed October 27, 2016, http://www.globalsouthanglican.org/index.php/blog/comments/the_global_south_anglican_its_origins_and_development_michael_nai_chiu_poon.

³⁷ Slavoj Žižek, *Trouble in Paradise: From the End of History to the End of Capitalism* (London: Allen Lane, 2015), 19.