

Singapore Management University

## Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University

---

Research Collection School of Social Sciences

School of Social Sciences

---

4-2019

### Disjunctures of belonging and belief: Christian migrants and the bordering of identity in Singapore

Lily KONG

Singapore Management University, lilykong@smu.edu.sg

Orlando WOODS

Singapore Management University, orlandowoods@smu.edu.sg

Follow this and additional works at: [https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sooss\\_research](https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sooss_research)



Part of the [Asian Studies Commons](#), and the [Religion Commons](#)

---

#### Citation

KONG, Lily, & WOODS, Orlando.(2019). Disjunctures of belonging and belief: Christian migrants and the bordering of identity in Singapore. *Population, Space and Place*, 25(6), 1-10.

Available at: [https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sooss\\_research/2823](https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sooss_research/2823)

This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Social Sciences at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School of Social Sciences by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email [cherylids@smu.edu.sg](mailto:cherylids@smu.edu.sg).



**Disjunctures of belonging and belief: Christian migrants and the bordering of identity in Singapore**

Journal:	<i>Population, Space and Place</i>
Manuscript ID	PSP-18-0162.R2
Wiley - Manuscript type:	Research Article
Keywords:	Christianity, Singapore, migration, difference, bordering of identity

SCHOLARONE™  
Manuscripts

Published in Population, Space and Place, 2019,  
Volume 25, Issue 6, e2235, pp. 1-10. DOI: 10.1002/psp.2235

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

**DISJUNCTURES OF BELONGING AND BELIEF:  
CHRISTIAN MIGRANTS AND THE BORDERING OF IDENTITY IN SINGAPORE**

**Abstract**

Migration results in people that are different from one another living in closer physical proximity. Proximity increases the chances of encountering difference, and can lead to both the formation of new communities, and the strengthening of old. As a religion that claims to integrate people into a trans-ethnic, trans-territorial faith community, Christianity encourages such encounters, whilst Christian groups play an important role in mediating them.

Disjunctures of belonging and belief are the outcomes that arise from encounters with difference within spaces of Christianity. Drawing on 100 interviews conducted between August 2017 and February 2018, this paper unravels these disjunctures through a focus on the interplay between migrant and non-migrant Christian communities in Singapore. Whilst Christian groups have the potential to be agents of integration, we consider the ways in which they encourage the 'bordering of identity' by serving to divide communities rather than unite them.

**Keywords:** Christianity, Singapore, migration, difference, bordering of identity

## Introduction

Migration results in people that are – in various ways, and to varying degrees – different from one another living in close(r) physical proximity. This brings about an intermixing of peoples, the overlapping of practices, and the (re)negotiation of identities. To the extent that identity is an “ensemble of subject positions” (Levitt, 2008: 787; after Mouffe, 1992; Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2003), migration can lead to dialectics of integration and disintegration, of inclusion and exclusion. These dialectics are sharpened when religion is a defining aspect of identity, as religion provides “grist for imagining memberships beyond the nation” but can be undermined by the reality that “everyone belongs to social groups, networks and culture” (Levitt, 2008: 766, 785; see also Yang and Ebaugh, 2001; Haugen, 2013; Kong and Woods, 2018). Thus, not only can the realities of ‘belonging’ undermine or even contradict the ideals of ‘belief’, but so too can the practice of belief bring people into contact with groups to which they may not feel that they belong. Given that “separation and hostility between existing and newly arrived groups are key current social and political issues of concern” (Askins and Pain, 2011: 803), the outcomes that arise from encounters with difference “need to be understood if more differentiated and nuanced ways of management are to be developed” (Kong, 2010: 769). This paper theorises these outcomes through an examination of Christian migrants in Singapore.

Our argument is that as much as religion can be a force for the crossing of national borders and dissolution – or at least diminution – of ethno-cultural boundaries, so too can it serve to reproduce them in various and often paradoxical ways. Religion helps to overcome the problematic alignment of “a spatial segregation of communities with lack of social integration” (Askins and Pain, 2011: 805) by bringing diverse communities together through

1  
2  
3 worship. Yet, whilst religion has the potential to connect communities through a unifying,  
4  
5 ‘imagined’ community of believers (Anderson, 1983), ethno-cultural differences can divide  
6  
7 them, creating an enduring tension between what people believe in, and where they feel they  
8  
9 belong. A critical reading of the purported inclusiveness of religion is needed, as “overstating  
10  
11 religion’s positive impact steers us away from confronting how religious practices contribute  
12  
13 to patriarchy, racism, nationalism, militarism, and a host of other social and political ills”  
14  
15 (Cadge et al., 2011: 442). Specifically, the congregation-based nature of Christian worship,  
16  
17 coupled with the trans-ethnic character of many churches – *especially* those in Singapore –  
18  
19 means that churches and other spaces of Christian praxis provide opportunities for ethno-  
20  
21 national divisions and exclusions to manifest (Gomes and Tan, 2015). Indeed, as much as  
22  
23 Christianity strives to bring people together in ways that unify and align, so too can physical  
24  
25 proximity cause differences to be highlighted, boundaries to be more clearly defined, and  
26  
27 ‘parallel societies’ (Gomes, 2017) to be formed.  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35

36 With this in mind, we seek to understand the ways in which practices within Christian groups  
37  
38 can divide communities. Through practices of socio-spatial separation, Christian groups  
39  
40 encourage what we call the ‘bordering of identity’. The bordering of identity builds on recent  
41  
42 efforts to reinterpret borders as “symbols of the processes of social binding and exclusion that  
43  
44 are both constructed or produced in society” (Laine, 2016: 469-470; see also Collyer and  
45  
46 King, 2015; Darling, 2017). Engaging with this line of thought, our conceptualisation of the  
47  
48 bordering of identity considers *how* such processes play out through interactions between  
49  
50 migrant and nonmigrant communities. Bordering begins as an attitude, then manifests as a  
51  
52 behaviour, and is then formalised through socio-spatial organisation. By “attitude” we mean  
53  
54 the mental maps that people use to structure and understand the social worlds in which they  
55  
56 live. As symbols of difference, the presence of migrant communities within Christian spaces  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 can cause ethno-national divisions between communities to be more acutely felt (Lamont and  
4  
5 Molnár, 2002). This, in turn, can cause Christian spaces to become spaces of division where  
6  
7 “limits are marked and lines are drawn” (Wilson, 2017: 456), and where identities become  
8  
9 more essentialised and differences more entrenched. Thus, as much as Christianity functions  
10  
11 as a ‘culture of mobility’ for migrants in Singapore (Gomes and Tan, 2015), the spaces of  
12  
13 Singapore’s Christian communities have evolved to reproduce ethno-national divisions in  
14  
15 tangible and often exclusionary ways. Moreover, many churches in Singapore are ill-  
16  
17 equipped to cope with the challenges of integration; in many instances, they unintentionally  
18  
19 aggravate them instead.  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

26 From here, this paper is divided into three sections. The first reviews two bodies of literature  
27  
28 – one related to the role of religion in (dis)enabling migrant belonging, the other related to  
29  
30 how border theory can provide insight into the workings of everyday society – that frame our  
31  
32 theoretical argument. The second section is empirical, and considers how Christian groups  
33  
34 can perpetuate the socio-spatial cleaving of ethno-national communities in Singapore, and  
35  
36 how these cleavages can undermine the integrative potential of Christianity. The third section  
37  
38 concludes and identifies avenues for further research.  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43

#### 44 **Migrant (dis)integration in the contemporary world**

45  
46  
47  
48

49 A globalised world is not a borderless world. Whilst processes of globalisation may have  
50  
51 brought about the intermixing of people and communities, they have also caused societies to  
52  
53 become increasingly bordered. Borders have been reimagined and rebuilt in response to  
54  
55 greater levels of socio-cultural pluralism; they have shifted scales, and become more specific,  
56  
57 everyday, and socially reproduced than ever before. Balibar (2002) believes that borders are  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 now 'everywhere'. This observation foregrounds recent calls to develop 'multiperspectival'  
4 understandings of borders (see Rumford, 2012; Collyer and King, 2015; Laine, 2016;  
5  
6 Darling, 2017), and the acts of encounter that occur within and across them (Valentine and  
7  
8 Waite, 2012; Wilson, 2017). Migrants can help develop such a perspective, as their cross-  
9  
10 border movement invariably results in the encountering of difference. The negotiation of  
11  
12 difference can, in turn, influence the extent to which migrants are integrated into host country  
13  
14 society and/or integrated into migrant (or other) communities, and the extent to which these  
15  
16 two forms of integration may or may not be aligned. Religion can aid the processes of  
17  
18 migrant integration, providing a bridge that connects migrant and non-migrant groups. But  
19  
20 religion can also create new points of difference and distinction, and can therefore create  
21  
22 disconnections as well (see, for example, Warner, 1997; Yang, 1999; Yang and Ebaugh,  
23  
24 2001; Kong and Woods, 2018). Accordingly, understanding the ways in which borders are  
25  
26 reproduced within spaces of religion can contribute new understandings of migrant  
27  
28 (dis)integration in the contemporary world.  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37

38 The following two subsections explore these issues in more detail. First, we consider the  
39  
40 evolving role of religion in scholarship on migration and transnationalism, and the need for  
41  
42 more critically-attuned scholarship on the disintegrative nature of migrant and nonmigrant  
43  
44 communities that exist within the same framework of religious belief. Second, we discuss  
45  
46 recent developments in the study of borders, and how processes of decoupling and rescaling  
47  
48 can contribute to new understandings of migrant (dis)integration.  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53

### 54 *New modalities of migrant belonging*

55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 Over the past three decades, the study of transnational migration has undergone a shift away  
4 from treating the nation-state as the ‘container’ of society; instead, research has explored  
5 more globally integrated understandings of how power can circulate and settle with the  
6 movement of people (Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2003). For example, the concept of ‘social  
7 fields’ has been developed to show how “social relationships are structured by power”, and  
8 that relationships can cause those implicated within social fields to be “joined in a struggle  
9 for social position” (Glick Schiller, 2005: 442; see also Glick Schiller, 2008; Levitt, 2012;  
10 Kong and Woods, 2018). Social fields demonstrate the ways in which migrants do not  
11 necessarily develop strong or lasting ties with their host societies, but construct and maintain  
12 ties with home-country (or other cross-border) communities instead. Gomes (2017: 185), for  
13 example, notes how “being transient” provides a “common experience” that can strengthen  
14 migrant communities whilst distancing them from the host society. Migrants have been  
15 shown to be implicated within various social fields, which coalesce in time and space to form  
16 and reinforce patterns of inclusion and exclusion; of identity and belonging. As part of these  
17 developments, there have been concerted efforts to look beyond ethnicity to explore the  
18 intersectionality of migrant identities and, more broadly, categorisation instead. Religion  
19 arguably provides a more nuanced facet of migrant identity and belonging, and has provided  
20 a focus of research in recent years.

21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47 To this end, research has explored how religion has enabled migrant communities to pursue  
48 various strategies of (dis)integration, with noticeably different outcomes. These outcomes  
49 are, by and large, a function of the types of social fields that they are able to construct with  
50 each other, with their home countries, and with other, nonmigrant groups. For example, Ng  
51 (2002) has explored how Chinese migrants to the US adopt Christian practices in order to  
52 facilitate their assimilation into mainstream American society, whereas Ley (2006: 2066)  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60



1  
2  
3 shows how the churches of Chinese migrant communities in Vancouver, Canada, serve to  
4  
5 “reproduc[e] a mono-cultural institution” that connects new migrants to the Chinese diaspora.  
6  
7 In other instances, migrant disintegration has been shown to be based on the principal of  
8  
9 pluralism, rather than assimilation. For example, Ugba (2008: 97) shows how African  
10  
11 Pentecostal churches in Ireland enable a sense of belonging amongst African migrants, yet  
12  
13 also serve to construct a “sociocultural and moral universe that conflicts with the dominant  
14  
15 culture and society”, whilst Haugen (2013: 99) offers a more extreme example of how an  
16  
17 African Pentecostal church in Guangzhou, China “promotes the withdrawal, rather than the  
18  
19 integration, of African migrants into Chinese society”. Migrants’ social fields are a reflection  
20  
21 of the ethno-religious groups to which they belong, and can serve to disable or enable a sense  
22  
23 of belonging within the host country.  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30

31 Despite these notable developments, research has failed to explicitly explore the migrant-  
32  
33 non-migrant nexus. Whilst the abovementioned studies have explored the various degrees of  
34  
35 migrant (dis)integration within the context of the host society, they exclusively offer a  
36  
37 migrant-centric perspective. They reflect the strategies of community-building – what Glick  
38  
39 Schiller (2008: 10) terms the “multiple modes of incorporation” – that are deployed by  
40  
41 migrants to cope with situations of unbelonging, but they do not consider the ways in such  
42  
43 strategies are recursively defined by migrant *and* non-migrant communities alike. Nor do  
44  
45 they offer comparisons of different ethnically-defined migrant groups within one,  
46  
47 overarching framework of religion (see, however, Levitt, 2003). Given that “feelings of  
48  
49 communality are defined in opposition to the perceived identity of other... groups” (Lamont  
50  
51 and Molnár, 2002: 174), this imbalance has prevented the development of more relational  
52  
53 theorisations of (non)migrant religious communities as “contingent clusters that come  
54  
55 together within to-be-determined spaces that are riddled by power and interests” (Levitt,  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 2012: 495). Such theorisation will help to reveal new modalities of migrant belonging, and  
4 will contribute to more holistic understandings of the ways in which migrant and non-migrant  
5 communities reproduce various forms of inclusion and exclusion. Borders play a prominent  
6 role in such theorising, as they delineate fundamental forms of difference that are being  
7 reproduced in new, and increasingly self-serving ways.  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16

### 17 *The decoupling and rescaling of borders*

18  
19  
20

21 In recent years, borders have been shown to reproduce new forms of exclusion. Cross-border  
22 migration and socio-cultural intermixing has led to the creation of spaces wherein “all kinds  
23 of unlike things can knock up against each other in all kinds of ways” (Amin et al., 2003: 6;  
24 see also Gupta and Ferguson, 1992; Lamont and Molnár, 2002; Rovisco, 2010). Whereas  
25 such interactions were once viewed in a mostly positive light – with globalisation giving rise  
26 to “mobile patterns that facilitate overlapping loyalties” (Beck, 2000: 51-52) – they have  
27 since been interpreted more critically. Valentine (2008), for example, criticises the  
28 assumption of cosmopolitanism that is embedded in the idea that tolerant and inclusive cities  
29 and societies can arise from mundane, everyday encounters with diversity. Building on this,  
30 Darling (2017: 183) shows how the border ‘within’ has caused cities to reflect the  
31 “diversification of borders into everyday life”. Increasingly, therefore, the “overlapping  
32 loyalties” which Beck speaks of are less likely to be integrated into one cohesive framework  
33 of identity and belonging, but to be juxtaposed and fragmented in exclusionary ways. This  
34 has contributed to a “cultural politics of global cities and their migrants” (Glick Schiller,  
35 2008: 8), as borders are constantly crossed and boundaries redrawn.  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 Interactions like these have caused borders to be decoupled from the territorial demarcations  
4 of the nation-state, and rescaled in ways that have caused “very different types of border[s] to  
5 emerg[e]” (Rumford, 2012: 888; after Balibar, 2002). Combined, these developments  
6  
7 underpin Rumford’s (2012) call for a more ‘multiperspectival’ border studies that is sensitive  
8 to the workings of cultural encounters in space. These encounters can help to reveal both the  
9  
10 ubiquity of borders in daily life, and also their important role in reproducing various forms of  
11  
12 socio-cultural division. In terms of division, Popescu (2012: 2) notes how the *effects* of  
13  
14 borders are often long-lasting, as “patterns of social interaction in space leave lasting  
15  
16 memories, and borders are only slowly erased by people’s mental maps”. This dynamic  
17  
18 becomes more loaded with the potential to reproduce old – but also forge new – forms of  
19  
20 socio-cultural awareness and understanding, as their ubiquity means that borders are  
21  
22 constantly being made, crossed, negotiated and remade by everybody and anybody. They are  
23  
24 the “efforts of ordinary people” (Rumford, 2012: 897; after Sibley, 1995) that lead to the  
25  
26 formation and strengthening of social communities through relational interactions with those  
27  
28 deemed ‘other’. Contact with the ‘other’ can, in turn, reveal how “difference is negotiated,  
29  
30 constructed and legitimated within the contingent moment of encounter” (Wilson, 2017:  
31  
32 454). Thus, as much as borders serve to demarcate otherness, so too can they be deployed in  
33  
34 ways that can help it to be overcome.  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46

47 With this in mind, we propose that the bordering of identity provides a new way to  
48  
49 understand the divisions that emerge between and within migrant and non-migrant  
50  
51 communities. In recognising the fact that “we live divided along cultural, economic, political,  
52  
53 and social lines, in a world of territorial borders whose main purpose is to mark differences in  
54  
55 space” (Popescu, 2012: 1), the bordering of identity refers to the ways in which various  
56  
57 practices of spatial exclusion influence the reproduction of identity, and the sense of  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 belonging therein. Such exclusions are often deployed as strategies to reify differences in  
4 society, and can in turn lead to the othering of communities. In this sense, the bordering of  
5 identity is both a cause and outcome of difference, and provides a conceptual vehicle to help  
6 us better understand how differences can become more entrenched on the one hand, and  
7 minimised or overcome on the other. The concept builds on the observation that “spatial  
8 proximity on its own is not enough to bring about social transformation... [in fact, it] might  
9 actually breed defensiveness and the bounding of identities and communities” (Valentine and  
10 Waite, 2012: 476; after Young, 1990; Amin, 2002). To the extent that “border making is a  
11 power strategy that uses difference to assert control over space by inscribing difference in  
12 space” (Popescu, 2012: 8), the bordering of identity can often be deployed as a strategy of  
13 socio-spatial reclamation and purification. In turn, it can aid or abet the sense of belonging to  
14 an identity-based community. With this in mind, churches are empirically fertile sites in  
15 which the concept of bordering of identity can be applied, observed and advanced, as they  
16 must often negotiate the socio-spatial juxtaposition of difference within an overarching  
17 structure of belief-based sameness.  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39

40 Whereas religion has long been recognised as an integrative force that “skillfully ignor[es]  
41 and circumvent[s] national boundaries” (Cadge et al., 2011: 440), its role in community  
42 formation must be seen as increasingly paradoxical in a world in which national differences  
43 are becoming more obviously – and sometimes more aggressively – asserted. Migration may  
44 involve the crossing of boundaries and the intermixing of peoples, but national borders  
45 continue to be “a marker of difference, on the opposite side of which different modes of  
46 belongingness are acted out in the frame of the respective nation-state” (Laine, 2016: 469). In  
47 such cases, belonging can be juxtaposed with belief, creating situations whereby hitherto  
48 separate communities are brought into close contact with each other through belief, yet such  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 contact may serve to further reify the exclusions that may already arise from different notions  
4  
5 of belonging. In this sense, churches can be construed as “social spaces where different  
6  
7 cultural groups meet and interact, often in conflict” (Askins and Pain, 2011: 805), or as sites  
8  
9 where the disjunctures of belonging and belief can be observed. This is certainly true of  
10  
11 churches in Singapore, where social diversity has resulted in a situation where difference is  
12  
13 often encountered, but not necessarily overcome.  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18

### 19 **Disjunctures of belonging and belief amongst Christian migrants in Singapore**

20  
21  
22  
23 Singapore is characterised by its multi-ethnic and multi-religious population, its small size,  
24  
25 and reliance on foreigners to fill the skills gaps created by the ageing of the domestic  
26  
27 population. Singapore is officially represented by four main ethnic groups – Chinese, Malays,  
28  
29 Indians and Others – with the Chinese forming a majority of the resident population<sup>1</sup> at  
30  
31 74.3% (SingStat, 2017). Christianity (including Catholicism) is the second largest religious  
32  
33 group, at 18.8% of the population (SingStat, 2015), and spans ethnic groups. In 2017, nearly  
34  
35 40% of the total population of 5.6 million consisted of non-Singaporeans (SingStat, 2017),  
36  
37 which has ‘contribut[ed] to a diversity of ethnicities and cultures never before seen’ (Gomes  
38  
39 and Tan, 2015: 217). To manage the ethno-religious diversity that is endemic to Singapore,  
40  
41 the government actively promotes racial (and religious) harmony through, for example, the  
42  
43 celebration of racial harmony in schools, the imposition of ethnic quotas on public housing,  
44  
45 and the establishment of a National Integration Council in 2009 (see Liu, 2014: 1231-1233  
46  
47 for a review of government attempts to integrate migrants). Moreover, Singapore’s small  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57

---

58  
59 <sup>1</sup> The “resident” population comprises Singapore Citizens and Permanent Residents.  
60

1  
2  
3 size<sup>2</sup> means that encounters with difference are commonplace (see Woods 2018a, 2018b).  
4  
5 Accordingly, many churches have large, multi-ethnic and, for some, even multi-national,  
6  
7 congregations that attend English-language services, and smaller, more ethnically/nationally  
8  
9 homogeneous congregations that attend services in their native languages. The fragmentation  
10  
11 of congregations within a single church is a defining characteristic of Singapore churches,  
12  
13 which are spaces wherein difference is reproduced within an overarching structure of  
14  
15 togetherness. In this sense, the Singapore case provides a counterpoint to more positivist, US-  
16  
17 based narratives, that show churches to be spaces wherein inter-ethnic relations can be  
18  
19 strengthened (e.g. Yang and Ebaugh, 2001; Ecklund, 2005; Ehrkamp and Nagel, 2014).  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

26 The following subsections draw on qualitative research conducted between August 2017 and  
27  
28 February 2018. The research was part of a wide-ranging project exploring the role of  
29  
30 Christianity in helping migrants integrate (or not) into Singapore society. 100 interviews were  
31  
32 conducted with various Christian populations in Singapore, including mainline (i.e.  
33  
34 Anglicans, Methodists, Baptists and Presbyterians) and non-mainline (i.e. Assemblies of  
35  
36 God, Pentecostal and independent churches) Protestants, and Catholics. 49 interviews were  
37  
38 conducted with Christian migrants from Asia: Burma, China, India, Indonesia, South Korea  
39  
40 and the Philippines; 28 with Singaporean Christians; and 23 with Singapore-based clergy and  
41  
42 church-leaders. Before fieldwork commenced, a database of all churches in Singapore was  
43  
44 compiled and populated with basic information outlining key contacts, contact details and  
45  
46 congregation structure. The database served as a starting point for sampling amongst clergy  
47  
48 and church-leaders, and enabled us to ensure a degree of representation amongst the  
49  
50 leadership of all denominations. Sampling amongst the two lay groups – Christian  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57

---

58  
59 <sup>2</sup> Approximately 720 km<sup>2</sup>.  
60

1  
2  
3 Singaporeans and Christian migrants – started with personal contacts, from which we  
4  
5 snowballed. When snowballing, we took measures to ensure representation of target  
6  
7 nationality groups (for the migrant group), and to ensure a spread of ages and genders (for  
8  
9 both groups). Whilst there was diversity in age, nationality and socio-economic status within  
10  
11 each group, both were skewed towards younger (i.e. age 20-40) Christians, and skilled  
12  
13 professionals. In itself, these skews are reflective of both the Christian and migrant  
14  
15 populations in Singapore. Amongst the migrant group, a unifying factor was that few had  
16  
17 large networks of extended family in Singapore; most were single, or living with spouses,  
18  
19 siblings or parents/children. Without such networks, the desire for community-building and  
20  
21 integration was arguably more pronounced.  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

29 All interviews were conducted face-to-face by the second author – a migrant and long-term  
30  
31 resident of Singapore – and/or a Chinese Singaporean research assistant, neither of whom  
32  
33 identify as Christian. That said, the second author grew up in an ostensibly Christian  
34  
35 environment, and could therefore appreciate the cross-border differences in religious praxis  
36  
37 that many of our migrant interviewees faced. The vast majority of interviews were conducted  
38  
39 at a location chosen by the interviewee – typically their home, or a venue close to their  
40  
41 workplace. All interviews were conducted in English or Mandarin (especially for Chinese  
42  
43 migrants, and older Singaporean Christians), and all were audio recorded and transcribed in  
44  
45 English. Themes were identified and developed throughout the fieldwork period; the  
46  
47 quotations presented below were chosen based on how representative they are of the group or  
48  
49 subgroup that they represent. The interviews were approached in slightly different ways for  
50  
51 each sampling group, but they converged around the topic of how being Christian in general  
52  
53 (and being part of a church-based community more specifically) may disable or enable the  
54  
55 integration of migrant and non-migrant communities within Singapore. In a general sense,  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 there were minimal differences between Christian denominations, meaning the insights  
4 presented below were observed – to varying degrees, and in various ways – by all  
5 participants we interviewed. This is largely due to the homogenising primacy of other points  
6 of difference (such as nationality, upbringing and class). Where there were differences  
7 between churches and/or denominations, disjunctures of belonging and belief tended to be  
8 more acutely felt by those attending non-mainline (i.e. independent) churches. These  
9 churches are often more growth-oriented, and more commonly associated with Singaporean  
10 and non-Singaporean converts to Christianity. Accordingly, their congregations can be seen  
11 to be more volatile, and more liable to division.  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

26 In the three subsections that follow, we first identify the division between the Singaporean  
27 and non-Singaporean communities. We then consider how these divisions are reproduced  
28 through Christian spaces. Finally, we focus specifically on how the bordering of identity can  
29 lead to a rethinking of the integrative potential of Christianity in Singapore.  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37

### 38 *The cleaving of communities in Singapore*

39  
40  
41

42 In Singapore, the relationship between Christian migrants and Christian Singaporeans is often  
43 a paradoxical one. Christianity provides a bridge that brings people together in space, time,  
44 and belief. Yet, differences in belonging can cause disjunctures within the Christian  
45 community. Accordingly, there is a need to understand “the value of encounters, what  
46 potential they might hold for catalysing change and what might be said about their politics  
47 and spatio-temporality” (Wilson, 2017: 451). In Singapore, Christian spaces have evolved to  
48 divide communities along ethno-linguistic lines. These divisions both reflect, and are  
49 aggravated by, the deep-rooted sense of difference felt between Singaporeans and non-  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60



1  
2  
3 Singaporeans in their daily lives. Ironically, migrants from China and India – that may, at  
4 first glance, be more easily integrated into their respective Singaporean ethnic groups – were  
5 often more likely to experience disjuncture than their less proximate counterparts; a dynamic  
6 that reflects how “xenophobia takes place even though... [Asian migrants] are ethnic and  
7 cultural cousins of Singaporeans themselves” (Gomes and Tan, 2015: 220-221; see also Liu,  
8 2014). In general terms, therefore, we found that ethnic proximity often leads to the  
9 construction of clearer boundaries and more apparent forms of separation, whereas ethnic  
10 distance often leads to more opaque boundaries and acceptance. This reveals the complexity  
11 of the Singapore case, as many Christian migrants from China and India find themselves in  
12 the position of being similar to Singaporean Christians in ethno-religious terms, yet excluded  
13 on the basis of differences in nationality, upbringing and (perceived) class. In itself, this  
14 suggests that these latter factors are more likely to be points of exclusion, irrespective of  
15 ethno-religious similarities. It also highlights the complex intersectionality of subject  
16 positions that is reflective of the historical and geographical specificities of Singapore.  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37

38 Around the world, the presence of migrant communities can trigger a sense of insecurity  
39 amongst local ones (Sanchez, 1997; Rustenbach, 2010). Most commonly, insecurity stems  
40 from the fact that migrants represent a source of competition within domestic labour and  
41 education markets. Compounding this is the fact that they are often motivated to work  
42 hard(er) in order to justify the upheaval of migration, and to make the most of opportunities  
43 that are availed to them. For example, a Filipino accountant commented that, since moving to  
44 Singapore, she has been “more driven to do what I have to do, which in this case is work”,  
45 whilst an Indonesian male recalled his time at a Junior College in Singapore, when the  
46 Singaporean students “kind of see us [migrant scholars] as their competitors”. An underlying  
47 sense of competition between Singaporeans and migrants causes disassociative *attitudes* to  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 manifest, with Singaporeans constructing migrants in a negative light. A Singaporean woman  
4  
5 in her 60s reflected that “the sad part about Singaporeans is... [they] think that they are above  
6  
7 anybody else”, whilst a Filipino female claimed that “they [Singaporeans] really think that  
8  
9 nationalities from my country are low, and they look down on you”. Attitudes like these  
10  
11 would often drive disassociative *behaviours*, with the Indonesian male quoted above recalling  
12  
13 how, at Junior College, “when there is a discussion or a group work, we will end up with the  
14  
15 [international] scholars being in one group, and Singaporeans in another group”. These  
16  
17 examples show how attitudes can manifest as behaviours, which, through the bordering of  
18  
19 identity, can result in the cleaving of communities and the creation of ‘parallel societies’  
20  
21 (Gomes, 2017).  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27

28  
29 The sense of insecurity created by migrants was most acutely observed amongst younger  
30  
31 Singaporeans. One Singaporean in her early 20s admitted that “they are just here to snatch  
32  
33 rice bowls from Singaporeans... I don’t really have a positive feeling towards foreigners”,  
34  
35 whilst another, also in her early 20s, admitted that “we’re xenophobic, I think PRC-wise, we  
36  
37 generally view them, the general view of Singaporeans, well, I think the resentment is we  
38  
39 resent them as a community”. This divide was also observed by a Canadian pastor, who  
40  
41 explained how younger Singaporeans “tend to judge them [migrants] based upon never  
42  
43 having experienced what they have experienced”. The younger generation of Singaporeans  
44  
45 were especially strong in expressing such attitudes and behaviours. Born into a situation of  
46  
47 socio-political stability and economic opportunity, there appears to be a pervasive feeling of  
48  
49 entitlement and defensiveness towards what are perceived to be destabilising foreign  
50  
51 elements. In less tangible terms, however, the presence of foreigners also contributed to a  
52  
53 sense of insecurity surrounding the dilution and feared loss of a distinctive Singaporean  
54  
55 identity. As a middle-aged Singaporean admitted: “I can’t tell anymore, I think right now, in  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 Singapore, I can't tell who is Singaporean and who is not... We lost our identity, I feel, in  
4 terms of looks and appearances". In the face of this sense of "loss", Singaporean identities are  
5  
6 often reasserted through various socio-spatial practices within the church. We elaborate  
7  
8 below.  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13

14 Aggravating this sense of division is the transience of migrant communities in Singapore.  
15  
16 This reduces the incentives for interaction and cross-community engagement (Wood and  
17  
18 Waite, 2011), and in turn can cause both migrant and non-migrant communities to exist in  
19  
20 isolation of each other. A Singaporean university student explained how:  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

26 I think in terms of day-to-day interaction, it's much easier to relate to a Singaporean  
27  
28 than a non-Singaporean. We can relate to a non-Singaporean, but maybe, I don't  
29  
30 know... The thing is, they are here for a short while, after that they will go back to  
31  
32 their own country. I mean, we still talk, but it's different.  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37

38 The net effect of such "difference" is that Singapore is a country that, to a large extent,  
39  
40 cleaves into mutually-exclusive, identity-based communities, at best, superficially  
41  
42 interacting. An Indian migrant recalled how "I've never seen the neighbour concept in  
43  
44 Singapore... [of] everyone coming together as a community, as human actually", whilst  
45  
46 another Indian migrant reiterated this sentiment in his observation that "everyone is behind  
47  
48 all their own friends and relatives, so it's very hard to go beyond that; similar things happen  
49  
50 in the religious setup as well". This idea that the "religious setup" recreates the divisions of  
51  
52 Singapore society was further reiterated by a Singaporean female, who observed that, even  
53  
54 within the church, "we're very socialised to think of them [foreigners] in a certain way, so  
55  
56 even the slightest thing, you will confirm think 'that's my stereotype of them', you know?".  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 As institutions that transgress the divisions of everyday life, churches provide spaces wherein  
4 such communities can potentially be reformed in a more integrated mould. Often, however,  
5 they serve to reproduce them instead.  
6  
7  
8  
9

### 10 11 12 ***Segregated spaces, bordered identities*** 13

14  
15  
16  
17 The divisions in Singapore society are often replicated within churches, and Christian spaces  
18 more generally. Thus, whilst churches in Singapore do act as spaces of migrant integration,  
19 they often fostered integration into nationally- and/or linguistically-oriented worship  
20 communities that resulted in what one church elder describes as “*ecclesia within ecclesia*; a  
21 church within a church”. Migrants become integrated into a specific ethno-linguistic  
22 community within their church, which would often be socio-spatially distinct from the  
23 Singaporean and/or English-language worship community. These distinctions served to  
24 minimise interactions between groups, which, over time enforced the mental distinctions  
25 between self and other (Askins, 2015; Kong and Woods, 2016). For example, a second-  
26 generation Indonesian migrant recounted how her mother, upon first moving to Singapore,  
27 joined an Indonesian congregation, as “being able to find Indonesian friends through church  
28 was, I think, something that helped her grow in confidence” and thus cope with the upheaval  
29 of migration. Yet, the strength of the Indonesian community to which she belongs meant that  
30 “she hasn’t really searched for Singaporean friends outside her circle of [Indonesian]  
31 friends”, despite having now lived in Singapore for nearly two decades. With such isolated  
32 communities worshipping within the same organisational structure, churches in Singapore  
33 can be viewed as spaces of ‘throwntogetherness’ (after Massey, 2005) that represent the  
34 juxtaposition of difference within an apparent structure of religious sameness.  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 This juxtaposition of difference does not just result in a mosaic of different communities  
4  
5 operating within the same church structure, but can serve to actively distantiate communities  
6  
7 from one another as well. An Indian migrant spoke of how “here, sometimes, they do speak  
8  
9 in Chinese knowing that there is an Indian next to you, that’s the sad part of it”, suggesting  
10  
11 that differences are enforced, irrespective of spatial proximity. This gives an idea of the  
12  
13 extent to which “encounters *make* difference” (Wilson, 2017: 455, original emphasis; see also  
14  
15 Dunn, 2010), as opportunities to bring people together in space and time can be undermined  
16  
17 by the practice of exclusionary behaviours. People can at once be physically proximate, but  
18  
19 socially distant. Indeed, whilst “there are no natural borders to separate human beings in  
20  
21 space” (Popescu, 2012: 8), markers of human difference – physiological characteristics,  
22  
23 languages spoken, everyday practices – provide the raw building blocks from which borders  
24  
25 are constructed and communities divided. The bordering of identity starts with the individual,  
26  
27 and is replicated, strengthened and formalised through various group and organisational  
28  
29 dynamics. In this sense, bordering is deployed as a strategic tool to demarcate the “political,  
30  
31 discursive, symbolic, and material orders that reflect the transformation of space into territory  
32  
33 by various social groups and actors” (Laine, 2016: 466). These borders separate communities  
34  
35 over space and time, and result in three modalities of segregation that can be summarised as  
36  
37 splitting, substitution and specialisation.  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45

46  
47 Splitting involves one’s ethno-national group separating itself from the main congregation,  
48  
49 but remaining within the overarching church structure. For example, a Singaporean pastor  
50  
51 explained how the Filipino congregation split from the main Singaporean congregation  
52  
53 because they “caused a lot of displeasure among Singaporeans”, whilst a Filipino explained  
54  
55 that “the way they [Singaporeans] act, they don’t want to be near to other races or cultures”.  
56  
57 Splitting can therefore be viewed as an outcome of the “tensions that emerge as different  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 constituents – guest and host – lay claim to the same space(s)” (Ehrkamp and Nagel, 2014:  
4 320). Substitution involves one ethno-linguistic community being replaced by another over  
5  
6 time. For example, in one church a Tamil service for Singaporean Indians slowly evolved  
7  
8 into a Tamil service for Indian migrants; a process of substitution that was described by an  
9  
10 Indian migrant as a result of “discreet or obvious... discrimination” on the part of  
11  
12 Singaporean Indians. In a similar vein, a Catholic priest spoke of how a large inflow of  
13  
14 Filipinos into the English-language congregation of his church brought about an outflow of  
15  
16 Singaporeans, as “some Singaporeans don’t want to go to the church because it’s full of  
17  
18 Filipinos”. Specialisation involves the formation of isolated migrant churches that cater  
19  
20 specifically to just one ethno-linguistic/national group. For example, the founder of a Chinese  
21  
22 migrant church recalled how its establishment was a result of his frustration attending  
23  
24 Singaporean Mandarin services, as they are “actually for the not very well educated person”.  
25  
26 By meeting the specific linguistic needs of a community, a church that excluded other  
27  
28 communities was thus formed.  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37

38 These forms of socio-spatial segregation within churches highlight the specificities of the  
39  
40 Singapore case. Whilst immigrant churches in the US, for example, have been shown to  
41  
42 “incorporat[e] people from diverse national origins” (Yang and Ebaugh, 2001: 282; see also  
43  
44 Ecklund, 2005) and have become places of ‘welcome’ for migrants within a more broad-  
45  
46 based context of socio-legal hostility (Ehrkamp and Nagel, 2014), the socio-spatial  
47  
48 segregation found within churches in Singapore can minimise the potential for inter-group  
49  
50 integration, and maximise the potential for inter-group categorisation and othering. For  
51  
52 example, a Singaporean female described how “I can draw boundaries very clearly, even if  
53  
54 it’s unconsciously”, whilst a bible study facilitator explained how:  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 It also has to do with the deeper, more embedded kind of racism... There is this, kind  
4 of, systemic categorisation of people whether intentionally or unconsciously,  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

It also has to do with the deeper, more embedded kind of racism... There is this, kind of, systemic categorisation of people whether intentionally or unconsciously, categorising people whether they are superior or inferior to you. So, unfortunately, the Chinese and Indians [migrants] fall under the less superior [category].

Such categorisations can lead to the formalisation of difference, as “judg[ing] people based on the colour of their skin... is still here in Singapore... we still have these, kind of, ethnic silos here” (Canadian pastor). Socio-spatial segregation within the church further enforces these categorisations, causing identities to become bordered, stereotypes to be reproduced, and an associated “transformation of fluid categories of difference into fixed species of otherness” (Silverstein, 2005: 364; see also Ehrkamp, 2006). These practices of segregation have “profound structuring effects on societies” as they reproduce understandings of “who belongs where, who is an insider and who is an outsider, who is part of us and who is part of them” (Popescu, 2012: 8). In this sense, the exclusion of certain communities can serve to ‘ground’ the more conceptual categorisation of otherness (see Collyer and King, 2015), causing the bordering of identity to be both cause and effect of the segregation of Christian space.

### ***Rethinking the integrative potential of Christianity***

Whilst both belonging and belief can be a source of identification (the latter often linked to religion, the former a more complex matrix of socio-cultural factors that include, but are not limited to, religion), the bordering of identity often fuels disjunctures between them. As an outcome of the bordering of identity, many migrants are forced to negotiate situations of exclusion (or a lack of belonging) within an overarching framework of inclusion (their

1  
2  
3 beliefs). Such negotiations reveal how borders are not fixed, but ever-shifting, and constantly  
4  
5 in the process of being (re)made. Indeed, whilst efforts were sometimes made by churches to  
6  
7 overcome such exclusions and integrate different ethno-national communities into one, united  
8  
9 worship community, they were often aborted due to the fact that doing so is an unrealistic  
10  
11 goal. Even when different groups were brought together in space and time, they would  
12  
13 remain polarised: “they hardly interact... the adults group don’t really interact with people  
14  
15 from different nationalities” (Singaporean pastor). In this case, religious belonging does not  
16  
17 supplant national belonging; rather, the reverse is observed (see Anderson, 1983). The  
18  
19 integrative potential of Christianity is often juxtaposed against the non-integrative nature of  
20  
21 society, revealing how the latter often overrides the former.  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27

28 Whilst churches have the potential to overcome divisions within society, our research shows  
29  
30 that they often fail to do so. A Singaporean youth worker revealed the structural barrier to  
31  
32 integration within churches: “there hasn’t been a concerted effort to try and integrate them  
33  
34 [migrants] because the church has never seen integration as their role”. Clergy and the  
35  
36 leadership of a church would often play an active (or a conspicuously absent) role in allowing  
37  
38 these forms of division to perpetuate. In some instances, migrants thought that clergy could  
39  
40 do more to cultivate the integrationist potential of the church – “I feel like they could have  
41  
42 done more in terms of reaching out to [us]” (Filipino female) – whereas others believed that  
43  
44 they reproduced the biases and prejudices of Singapore society. A Singaporean female  
45  
46 admitted that “sometimes they [pastors] will make very, very generic and sweeping  
47  
48 comments about PRCs, about China, or whatever”, thus causing racial stereotypes to  
49  
50 perpetuate. These stereotypes could directly shape the day-to-day interactions between  
51  
52 migrants and church leadership. An Indian migrant spoke of how her husband’s involvement  
53  
54 in a church committee was limited by the fact that “when we comment on certain things, they  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60



1  
2  
3 [the Singaporeans] will say ‘no, this is not India, it cannot happen here’ ... ‘you don’t tell us,  
4 this is Singapore’”. She went on to admit that such experiences “sadden[ed] us”, and brought  
5 about a questioning of why “this happens, even in a church?”. Through such questioning, the  
6 ideal of integration is cast against the reality of everyday, exclusionary experiences within the  
7 church. Experiences like these caused some to distance themselves from either their beliefs  
8 and/or the church. We return to these ideas below.  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18

19 Sentiment like this was reified by the experiences of a Korean pastor, who was sent to  
20 Singapore to service the Korean ministry of a well-established church. He candidly spoke of  
21 the troubles he faced in trying to work with his Singaporean counterparts to promote the idea  
22 of one, integrated church:  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30

31 Before I came here, the [Singapore church] leadership doesn’t know much the  
32 intention, the meaning of being part of this [integrated] church. They are still trying to  
33 do their own [thing], they want to keep their independence. And even [if] they do  
34 something together with this [Korean] church, it doesn’t come from the identity that  
35 we are one, but they are just doing together and preserving their own identity and  
36 their own culture.  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46

47 This idea of “preserving their own identity and... culture” is observed at the levels of both  
48 the community, and church leadership, and can create a self-reinforcing barrier to realising a  
49 more integrated church. This rejection of the integrative potential of Christianity was widely  
50 felt, and caused many migrants to retreat into their own ethno-cultural communities. Taken to  
51 the extreme, this critical, and more contextually-nuanced interpretation of the Christian faith  
52 resulted in a rejection of the church. An Indian migrant admitted how a lack of belonging in  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 the church in Singapore made her distance herself from the church, and from her beliefs more  
4  
5 generally:  
6  
7  
8  
9

10 I never felt a sense of belonging in the church or the church community [in  
11  
12 Singapore], I never had a sense of belonging... It's not just about the priest, it's about  
13  
14 the community, I think. I don't know if they are all Singaporeans, maybe they have  
15  
16 Filipinos or Indonesians, I am not very sure. I think they have a group within  
17  
18 themselves, so I think they are pretty much comfortable in them[selves]... Everyone  
19  
20 gets into themselves... Whereas in India, everybody has a chance to be involved.  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

26 In this case, the lack of involvement with the church meant that "I could never really connect  
27  
28 to the church here or the Christian community here... I grew out of it". Beyond growing out  
29  
30 of her beliefs, this experience had a more wide-ranging impact on her worldview, as "now I  
31  
32 am questioning everything". This sentiment was reiterated by an Indian male, who claimed  
33  
34 that his experiences with churches in Singapore actually served to exacerbate – rather than  
35  
36 overcome – the sense of dislocation that he felt as a foreigner. He explained how "here, it's  
37  
38 like you're in a foreign land and... sometimes you are, like, just alone in the church, you  
39  
40 don't see anyone... you feel stranded, alone". For both migrants, comparing their experiences  
41  
42 of church attendance in Singapore to those in India brought them into a framework of  
43  
44 comparison that left them feeling dissatisfied and isolated from their religion. For many, a  
45  
46 sense of belonging provides validation of belief, whilst a lack of this sense can cause beliefs  
47  
48 to be reappraised, and sometimes rejected.  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55

56 Belonging can be seen as a form of rootedness that is attached to a place of community,  
57  
58 whereas Christian belief is a form of transcendence that traverses places, communities and  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 the differences found therein. An Indian migrant living in Singapore for 22 years explained  
4  
5 how:

6  
7  
8  
9  
10 Being a Christian is different from being a practicing Christian. So, even here [in  
11  
12 Singapore], people can attend church because they are part of a Christian family, [but]  
13  
14 that's different from being faithful to God. So that particular thing is, it may or may  
15  
16 not be influenced by the church service in different lands, it depends.  
17  
18  
19

20  
21 Here, “faithful[ness] to God” – belief – is interpreted in a way that may or may not intersect  
22  
23 with the sense of belonging that comes from being a “practicing Christian” attending a  
24  
25 “church service in different lands”. In his view, belief is constant, whereas belonging is a  
26  
27 more nuanced, more relational, and more place-based expression of religious community.  
28  
29 These ideas were echoed by a Filipino female, who described how “providence has brought  
30  
31 me to this situation where I don't need to be church-bound for me to be doing what God  
32  
33 wants me to do”. Distancing herself from “church-bound” forms of religious practice reveals  
34  
35 how her beliefs – or “providence” – are decoupled from the need to belong to a church-based  
36  
37 community. Given that she came to such a realisation over the course of the past decade spent  
38  
39 in Singapore, it appears that a lack of belonging within the church brought about the  
40  
41 rationalisation for distancing from it.  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48

## 49 **Conclusion**

50  
51  
52  
53 Migration adds complexity to socio-cultural landscapes, whilst socio-cultural landscapes both  
54  
55 reflect and mediate the presence of different migrant groups. Recent debates surrounding the  
56  
57 integration of migrants and the relative successes of efforts to achieve more cosmopolitan  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 societies have “raised questions about the spaces of interaction that may enable meaningful  
4 and lasting encounters between different social groups” (Askins, 2015: 471). Religious  
5 groups – *especially* ethno-nationally diverse Christian groups – have the ideological and  
6 spatial tools to promote such encounters. Yet, in this paper we have demonstrated how  
7 Christian groups reproduce the divisions that are found within Singapore society. They  
8 encourage a restricted form of integration; one that encourages integration into – and  
9 identification with – an ethno-national community, but not with other communities, or even  
10 with Singapore society-at-large. In doing so, they facilitate the bordering of identities that  
11 emerge from encounters with, and the non-management of, difference. Thus, rather than  
12 helping governments and civil society to manage the realities of hyper-diversity, Christian  
13 groups can actually aggravate pre-existing social divisions.  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30

31 The rhetoric of inclusion that is reproduced by governments throughout the world is often  
32 mediated by individual attitudes and behaviours. These attitudes and behaviours are often  
33 reflective of, and reinforced by, the communities to which an individual belongs. Given that  
34 positive change begins with individuals “deconstruct[ing] dominant discourses that  
35 essentialise minorities as only different” (Askins, 2015: 473), it is clear that religious groups  
36 can play a more proactive role in fostering a sense of belonging that privileges shared belief  
37 over encultured forms of division. The fact that messages of inclusion are undermined by acts  
38 of exclusion within Christian spaces suggests that Christian groups can intervene more  
39 directly in the spatial management, and ideological overcoming, of difference. Without such  
40 interventions, individuals will not have the impetus to embrace the discomforting reality of  
41 experiencing otherness on a more regular basis. In this sense, the challenge lies in finding a  
42 balance between doing what may be beneficial for the group, and what is beneficial for  
43 society more broadly. Working towards greater alignment between different scales of  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 ideology and action – from the state, to the group, to the individual – is a necessary first step  
4  
5 towards managing the challenges of hyper-diversity now, and in years to come.  
6  
7  
8  
9

10 With these ideas in mind, we recommend two overlapping areas for further research. The first  
11  
12 relates to the need to reconcile differences *within* religious groups with differences *between*  
13  
14 religions. Whilst the project from which this paper is derived focuses on the former dynamic,  
15  
16 we acknowledge that Christians, and Christian groups, operate within a much more complex  
17  
18 matrix of identification and belonging. Evaluating the impact of religion relative to other  
19  
20 facets of migrant and non-migrant identity could help to explain the disjunctures outlined  
21  
22 above. Likewise, exploring how other religious groups compare or contrast with the Christian  
23  
24 case outlined here will help to expand existing understandings of how different religious  
25  
26 groups cope with the challenges of social diversity. The second relates to the need to  
27  
28 understand how governments and governing bodies shape (or not) the practices and operation  
29  
30 of religious groups in their management of diversity. Doing so will yield insight into the  
31  
32 ways in which the ideologies that underpin the management of civil society intersect with  
33  
34 religious belief and organisation. Research is needed to identify and understand where  
35  
36 religious governance and praxis diverge, and how they can be aligned so as to contribute to  
37  
38 more ideologically integrated communities in the future.  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

## Acknowledgements

An earlier draft of this paper was presented in May 2018 at the “Transnational Lives of Religion in Asia” workshop, hosted by The Chinese University of Hong Kong. Thanks to Angie Heo and Weishan Huang for organising the workshop, and to all attendees for their constructive engagement with this paper. Thanks also to Shee Siew Ying for fieldwork assistance, and to the anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.

## Funding

This work was supported by the Singapore Ministry of Education (MOE) Academic Research Fund (AcRF) Tier 1 grant [grant number 17-C242-SMU-005].

## References

Amin, A. (2002). Ethnicity and the multicultural city: Living with diversity. *Environment and Planning A*, 34, 959-980.

Amin, A., Massey, D. & Thrift, N. (2003). *Decentering the National: A Radical Approach to Regional Equality*. London: Catalyst.

Anderson, B. (1983). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.

Askins, K. (2015). Being Together: Everyday Geographies and the Quiet Politics of Belonging. *ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies*, 14(2), 470-478.

Askins, K. & Pain, R. (2011). Contact zones: participation, materiality, and the messiness of interaction. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 29, 803-821.

Balibar, E. (2002). *Politics and the Other Scene*. London: Verso.

Beck, U. (2000). *What is Globalization?* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Cadge, W., Levitt, P. & Smilde, D. (2011). De-Centering and Re-Centering: Rethinking Concepts and Methods in the Sociological Study of Religion. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 50(3), 437-449.

1  
2  
3 Collyer, M. & King, R. (2014). Producing transnational space: International migration and  
4 the extra-territorial reach of state power. *Progress in Human Geography*, 39(2), 185-204.  
5  
6  
7

8  
9  
10 Darling, J. (2017). Forced migration and the city: Irregularity, informality, and the politics of  
11 presence. *Progress in Human Geography*, 41(2), 178-198.  
12  
13  
14

15  
16  
17 Dunn, K. (2010). Guest editorial, embodied transnationalism: bodies in transnational spaces.  
18 *Population, Space and Place*, 16(1), 1-9.  
19  
20

21  
22  
23 Ecklund, E. (2005). 'Us' and 'Them': The role of religion in mediating and challenging the  
24 'model minority' and other civic boundaries. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 28(1), 132-150.  
25  
26  
27

28  
29  
30 Ehrkamp, P. (2006). "We Turks are no Germans": assimilation discourses and the dialectical  
31 construction of identities in Germany. *Environment and Planning A*, 38, 1673-1692.  
32  
33  
34

35  
36  
37 Ehrkamp, P. & Nagel, C. (2014). 'Under the radar': Undocumented immigrants, Christian  
38 faith communities, and the precarious spaces of welcome in the U.S. South. *Annals of the*  
39 *Association of American Geographers*, 104, 319-328.  
40  
41  
42  
43

44  
45  
46 Glick Schiller, N. (2005). Transnational social fields and imperialism: Bringing a theory of  
47 power to Transnational Studies. *Anthropological Theory*, 5(4), 439-461.  
48  
49  
50

51  
52  
53 Glick Schiller, N. (2008). Beyond methodological ethnicity: local and transnational pathways  
54 of immigrant incorporation. *Willy Brandt Series of Working Papers in International*  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60



1  
2  
3 Migration and Ethnic Relations 2/08. Sweden: Malmö Institute for Studies of Migration,  
4  
5 Diversity and Welfare.  
6  
7  
8  
9

10 Gomes, C. (2017). *Transient Mobility and Middle Class Identity*. Basingstoke: Palgrave-  
11  
12 Macmillan.  
13  
14  
15  
16

17 Gomes, C. & Tan, C. (2015). Christianity as a Culture of Mobility: A Case Study of Asian  
18  
19 Transient Migrants in Singapore. *Kritika Kultura*, 25, 215-244.  
20  
21  
22

23 Gupta, A. & Ferguson, J. (1992). Space, identity, and the politics of difference. *Cultural*  
24  
25 *Anthropology*, 7(1), 6-24.  
26  
27  
28  
29

30 Haugen, H. (2013). African Pentecostal Migrants in China: Marginalization and the  
31  
32 Alternative Geography of a Mission Theology. *African Studies Review*, 56(1), 81-102.  
33  
34  
35  
36

37 Kong, L. (2010). Global shifts, theoretical shifts: Changing geographies of religion. *Progress*  
38  
39 *in Human Geography*, 34(6), 755-776.  
40  
41  
42  
43

44 Kong, L. & Woods, O. (2016). *Religion and Space: Competition, Conflict and Violence in*  
45  
46 *the Contemporary World*. London: Bloomsbury.  
47  
48  
49  
50

51 Kong, L. & Woods, O. (2018). Mobile bodies, (im)mobile beliefs? Religious accord and  
52  
53 discord as migratory outcomes. *Social Compass*, 65(2), 1-19.  
54  
55  
56  
57

58 Laine, J. (2016). The Multiscalar Production of Borders. *Geopolitics*, 21(3), 465-482.  
59  
60

1  
2  
3  
4  
5 Lamont, M. & Molnár, V. (2002). The study of boundaries in the social sciences. *Annual*  
6 *Review of Sociology*, 28, 167-195.  
7  
8  
9

10  
11  
12 Levitt, P. (2003). "You Know, Abraham Was Really the First Immigrant": Religion and  
13 *Transnational Migration*. *The International Migration Review*, 37(3), 847-873.  
14  
15  
16  
17

18  
19 Levitt, P. (2008). Religion as a path to civic engagement. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 31(4),  
20 766-791.  
21  
22  
23  
24

25  
26 Levitt, P. (2012). What's wrong with migration scholarship? A critique and a way forward.  
27 *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power*, 19(4), 493-500.  
28  
29  
30  
31

32  
33 Ley, D. (2008). The Immigrant Church as an Urban Service Hub. *Urban Studies*, 45(10),  
34 2057-2074.  
35  
36  
37  
38

39  
40 Liu, H. (2014). Beyond co-ethnicity: the politics of differentiating and integrating new  
41 immigrants in Singapore. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 37(7), 1225-1238.  
42  
43  
44  
45

46  
47 Massey, D. (2005). *For Space*. London: SAGE.  
48  
49  
50

51  
52 Mouffe, C. (1992). Democratic citizenship and the political community. In *Dimensions of*  
53 *Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community*. Edited by Mouffe, C. London:  
54 Verso.  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 Popescu, G. (2012). *Bordering and Ordering the Twenty-first Century: Understanding*  
4 *Borders*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10 Rovisco, M. (2010). Reframing Europe and the Global: Conceptualizing the Border in  
11 *Cultural Encounters*. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 28(6), 1015-1030.

12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17 Rumford, C. (2012). Towards a Multiperspectival Study of Borders. *Geopolitics*, 17(4), 887-  
18 902.

19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24 Rustenbach, E. (2010). Sources of Negative Attitudes toward Immigrants in Europe: A Multi-  
25 Level Analysis. *International Migration Review*, 44(1), 53-77.

26  
27  
28  
29  
30 Sanchez, G. (1997). *Face the Nation: Race, Immigration, and the Rise of Nativism in Late*  
31 *Twentieth Century America*. *International Migration Review*, 31(4), 1009-1030.

32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37 Sibley, D. (1995). *Geographies of Exclusion*. London: Routledge.

38  
39  
40  
41  
42 Silverstein, P. (2005). Immigrant Racialization and the New Savage Slot: Race, Migration,  
43 and Immigration in the New Europe. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 34, 363-384.

44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49 SingStat. (2015). *General Household Survey 2015*. Department of Statistics Singapore.

50  
51 Retrieved from: [http://www.singstat.gov.sg/docs/default-source/default-document-](http://www.singstat.gov.sg/docs/default-source/default-document-library/publications/publications_and_papers/GHS/ghs2015/findings.pdf)  
52 [library/publications/publications\\_and\\_papers/GHS/ghs2015/findings.pdf](http://www.singstat.gov.sg/docs/default-source/default-document-library/publications/publications_and_papers/GHS/ghs2015/findings.pdf).

1  
2  
3 SingStat. (2017). *Population Trends 2017*. Department of Statistics Singapore. Retrieved  
4  
5 from: [http://www.singstat.gov.sg/docs/default-source/default-document-](http://www.singstat.gov.sg/docs/default-source/default-document-library/publications/publications_and_papers/population_and_population_structure/population2017.pdf)  
6  
7 [library/publications/publications\\_and\\_papers/population\\_and\\_population\\_structure/populatio](http://www.singstat.gov.sg/docs/default-source/default-document-library/publications/publications_and_papers/population_and_population_structure/population2017.pdf)  
8  
9 [n2017.pdf](http://www.singstat.gov.sg/docs/default-source/default-document-library/publications/publications_and_papers/population_and_population_structure/population2017.pdf).  
10  
11

12  
13  
14 Valentine, G. (2008). Living with difference: reflections on geographies of encounter.  
15  
16 Progress in Human Geography, 32, 323-337.  
17  
18

19  
20  
21 Valentine, G. & Waite, L. (2012). Negotiating Difference through Everyday Encounters: The  
22  
23 Case of Sexual Orientation and Religion and Belief. *Antipode*, 44(2), 474-492.  
24  
25

26  
27  
28 Warner, R.S. (1997). Religion, boundaries, and bridges. *Sociology of Religion*, 58, 217-238.  
29  
30

31  
32  
33 Wilson, H. (2017). On geography and encounter: Bodies, borders, and difference. Progress in  
34  
35 Human Geography, 41(4), 451-471.  
36  
37

38  
39  
40 Wimmer, A. & Glick Schiller, N. (2003). Methodological Nationalism, the Social Sciences,  
41  
42 and the Study of Migration: An Essay on Historical Epistemology. *International Migration*  
43  
44 *Review*, 37(3), 576-610.  
45  
46

47  
48  
49 Wood, N. & Waite, L. (2011). Editorial: Scales of belonging. *Emotion, Space and Society*, 4,  
50  
51 201-202.  
52  
53

54  
55  
56 Woods, O. (2018a). Spaces of the Religious Economy: Negotiating the Regulation of  
57  
58 Religious Space in Singapore. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 57(3), 531-546.  
59  
60

1  
2  
3  
4  
5 Woods, O. (2018b). Religious urbanism in Singapore: Competition, commercialism and  
6 compromise in the search for space. *Social Compass*, DOI: 10.1177/0037768618805871.  
7  
8  
9

10  
11  
12 Yang, F. (1999). *Chinese Christians in America*. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University  
13 Press.  
14  
15

16  
17  
18  
19 Yang, F. & Ebaugh, H. (2001). Transformations in New Immigrant Religions and Their  
20 Global Implications. *American Sociological Review*, 66(2), 269-288.  
21  
22  
23

24  
25  
26 Young, I. (1990). *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton: Princeton University  
27 Press.  
28  
29  
30