Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

12-2011

Abstract

In his seminal work Moral Notions, Julius Kovesi presents a novel account of concept formation. At the heart of this account is a distinction between what he terms the material element and the formal element of concepts. This paper elucidates his distinction in detail and contrasts it with other distinctions such as form-matter, universal-particular, genus-difference, necessary-sufficient, and open texture-closed texture. We situate Kovesi’s distinction within his general philosophical method, outlining his views on concept formation in general and explain how his theory of concept formation is applied in moral philosophy.

Keywords

Kovesi, Fact, Value, Morality, Concepts, Family resemblance

Discipline

Philosophy

Research Areas

Humanities

Publication

Philosophia

Volume

39

Issue

4

First Page

699

Last Page

720

ISSN

0048-3893

Identifier

10.1007/s11406-011-9305-x

Publisher

Springer Verlag

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-011-9305-x

Included in

Philosophy Commons

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