Title

Moore-paradoxical belief, conscious belief and the epistemic Ramsey test

Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

9-2012

Abstract

Chalmers and Hájek (2007) argue that on an epistemic reading—one that seems reasonable—of Ramsey’s test for the acceptability of conditionals, the test is faulty. They argue for the claim that applying the test to each of certain pair of conditionals requires one to think that one is omniscient or infallible, unless one forms irrational Moore-paradoxical beliefs. I show that this claim is false. The epistemic Ramsey test is indeed faulty. Applying it requires that one think of anyone as omniscient and if one is rational, to think of anyone as infallible-if-rational. But this is not because of Moore-paradoxical beliefs. Rather it is because applying the test requires a certain supposition about conscious belief. It is important to understand the nature of this supposition.

Keywords

Ramsey, Ramsey test, Moore, Chalmers, Hájek, Conditionals, Paradox, Belief, Conscious belief, Infallibility, Omniscience, Irrationality

Discipline

Philosophy

Research Areas

Humanities

Publication

Synthese

Volume

188

Issue

2

First Page

231

Last Page

246

ISSN

0039-7857

Identifier

10.1007/s11229-011-9925-5

Publisher

Springer

Copyright Owner and License

Author

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Previous Versions

Oct 31 2010

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9925-5

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