Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

Postprint

Publication Date

2-2006

Abstract

For Moore, it is a paradox that although I would be absurd in asserting that (it is raining but I don’t believe it is) or that (it is raining but I believe it isn’t), such assertions might be true. But I would be also absurd in judging that the contents of such assertions are true. I argue for the strategy of explaining the absurdity of Moorean assertion in terms of conscious Moorean belief. Only in this way may the pathology of Moorean absurdity be adequately explained in terms of self-contradiction. David Rosenthal disagrees with this strategy. Ironically, his higher-order thought account has the resources to fulfil it. Indeed once modified and supplemented, it compares favourably with Brentano’s rival account of conscious belief.

Keywords

Moore's paradox, belief, absurdity

Discipline

Philosophy

Research Areas

Humanities

Publication

Philosophical Studies

Volume

127

Issue

3

First Page

383

Last Page

414

ISSN

0031-8116

Identifier

10.1007/s11098-004-7826-x

Publisher

Springer Verlag

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7826-x

Included in

Philosophy Commons

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