Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
7-2006
Abstract
Mixed-member electoral systems require voters simultaneously to cast ballots in single-member districts (SMD) and multimember, proportional representation (PR) constituencies. It may be that not all parties offer candidates in both electoral contexts, however. In this event would-be voters for some parties may find themselves ‘frustrated’ by the restricted choice menu on offer in the SMD, being effectively forced to split their vote between different parties. Here we explore the different behaviours of frustrated voters in the 1996 mixed-member election to Italy’s Chamber of Deputies, characterizing these as being either in some sense non-strategic (concerned above all with the relative policy platforms of candidates) or strategic (concerned above all to influence the eventual composition of government). Using an extended method for ecological inference, we parameterize and estimate rates of different types of ticket-splitting at the district level, and link the degree of what we characterize as strategic voting to the relative policy distance between the respective local representatives of the Italian pre-electoral coalitions.
Discipline
Political Science
Research Areas
Political Science
Publication
British Journal of Political Science
Volume
36
Issue
3
First Page
459
Last Page
485
ISSN
0007-1234
Identifier
10.1017/S000712340600024X
Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Citation
BENOIT, Kenneth, GIANNETTI, Daniela, & LAVER, Michael.(2006). Voter strategies with restricted choice menus. British Journal of Political Science, 36(3), 459-485.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/4044
Copyright Owner and License
Publisher
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1017/S000712340600024X