Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

8-1987

Abstract

The preface paradox strikes us as puzzling because we feel that if a person holds a set of inconsistent beliefs, i.e. beliefs such that at least one of them must be correct, then he should give at least one of them up. Equally, if a person's belief is rational, then he has a right to hold it. Yet the preface example is prima facie a case in which a person holds an inconsistent set of beliefs each of which is rational, and thus a case in which that person has a duty to relinquish what he has a right to keep.

Discipline

Philosophy

Research Areas

Humanities

Publication

Theoria

Volume

53

Issue

2-3

First Page

121

Last Page

140

ISSN

1755-2567

Identifier

10.1111/j.1755-2567.1987.tb00706.x

Publisher

Wiley

Copyright Owner and License

Author

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1987.tb00706.x

Included in

Philosophy Commons

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