This paper is roughly in two parts. The first deals with whether know-how is constituted by propositional knowledge, as discussed primarily by Gilbert Ryle (1949) The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001). Knowing how. Journal of Philosophy, 98, pp. 411-444 as well as Stephen Hetherington (2006). How to know that knowledge-that is knowledge-how. In S. Hetherington (Ed.) Epistemology futures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The conclusion of this first part is that know-how sometimes does and sometimes does not consist in propositional knowledge. The second part defends an analysis of know-how inspired by Katherine Hawley' (2003). Success and knowledge-how. American Philosophical Quarterly, 40, pp. 19-31, insightful proposal that know-how requires counterfactual success. I conclude by showing how this analysis helps to explain why know-how sometimes does and sometimes does not consist of propositional knowledge.
Knowing how, Propositional knowledge, Counterfactual success, Ability, Reliable methods, Ryle, Hawley, Hetherington, Williamson, Stanley, Lewis
WILLIAMS, John N..(2008). Propositional Knowledge and Know-How. Synthese, 165(1), 107-125.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/250
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