Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

11-2008

Abstract

This paper is roughly in two parts. The first deals with whether know-how is constituted by propositional knowledge, as discussed primarily by Gilbert Ryle (1949) The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001). Knowing how. Journal of Philosophy, 98, pp. 411-444 as well as Stephen Hetherington (2006). How to know that knowledge-that is knowledge-how. In S. Hetherington (Ed.) Epistemology futures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The conclusion of this first part is that know-how sometimes does and sometimes does not consist in propositional knowledge. The second part defends an analysis of know-how inspired by Katherine Hawley' (2003). Success and knowledge-how. American Philosophical Quarterly, 40, pp. 19-31, insightful proposal that know-how requires counterfactual success. I conclude by showing how this analysis helps to explain why know-how sometimes does and sometimes does not consist of propositional knowledge.

Keywords

Knowing how, Propositional knowledge, Counterfactual success, Ability, Reliable methods, Ryle, Hawley, Hetherington, Williamson, Stanley, Lewis

Discipline

Philosophy

Research Areas

Humanities

Publication

Synthese

Volume

165

Issue

1

First Page

107

Last Page

125

ISSN

0039-7857

Identifier

10.1007/s11229-007-9242-1

Publisher

Springer Verlag

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9242-1

Included in

Philosophy Commons

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