Publication Type

Working Paper

Publication Date

2-2004

Abstract

In "Reference and Contingency", Gareth Evans maintains that it is possible for an expression both to be a proper name and to have a descriptive sense. Evans calls such names descriptive names. He further claims that if ‘a’ is a name whose reference is fixed by a definite description ‘the φ‘, then ‘a’ will have the same sense as ‘the φ‘. Against Kripke’s objection that names and descriptions are not interchangeable salva veritate within modal contexts, Evans argues that the objection is based upon a false assumption about the connection between contents (thoughts in Frege’s sense) and propositions (sets of possible worlds). On his view, a name whose reference is fixed by a definite description will take on the sense of the description but not its modal properties. One cannot therefore argue from a difference in proposition to a difference in content.

Discipline

Philosophy

Research Areas

Humanities

First Page

1

Last Page

9

Publisher

SMU Social Sciences and Humanities Working Paper Series, 2-2004

City or Country

Singapore

Copyright Owner and License

Author

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Previous Versions

Aug 31 2010

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