Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

1-2016

Abstract

I objected that the defeasibility theory of knowledge prohibits you from knowing that you know that p if your knowledge that p is a posteriori. Rodrigo Borges claims that Peter Klein has already satisfactorily answered a version of my objection. He attempts to defend Klein’s reply and argues that my objection fails because a principle on which it is based is false.I will show that my objection is not a version of the old one that Klein attempts (unsuccessfully) to address, that Borges’ defence of Klein’s reply fails and that his argument against my new objection leaves it untouched.

Keywords

Defeasibility theory of knowledge

Discipline

Epistemology | Philosophy

Research Areas

Humanities

Publication

Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology

Volume

7

Issue

1

First Page

83

Last Page

94

ISSN

2069-0533

Identifier

10.5840/logos-episteme2016717

Publisher

Institutul European

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme2016717

Included in

Epistemology Commons

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