I objected that the defeasibility theory of knowledge prohibits you from knowing that you know that p if your knowledge that p is a posteriori. Rodrigo Borges claims that Peter Klein has already satisfactorily answered a version of my objection. He attempts to defend Klein’s reply and argues that my objection fails because a principle on which it is based is false.I will show that my objection is not a version of the old one that Klein attempts (unsuccessfully) to address, that Borges’ defence of Klein’s reply fails and that his argument against my new objection leaves it untouched.
Defeasibility theory of knowledge
Epistemology | Philosophy
Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology
WILLIAMS, John Nicholas.(2016). Still a new problem for defeasibility: A rejoinder to Borges. Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology, 7(1), 83-94.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/2100
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