I gave a new objection to the defeasibility theory of knowledge, namely that prohibits you from knowing that you know that p if your knowledge that p is a posteriori. Rodrigo Borges claims that Peter Klein has already satisfactorily replied to a version of my objection. He attempts to defend this reply and argues that my objection fails because a principle on which it is based is false. I show that my objection is not a version of the old one that Klein attempts (unsatisfactorily) to address, that Borges’s defence of Klein’s reply fails and that his argument against my new objection leaves it untouched.
defeasibility, second-order knowledge, a posteriori knowledge, perceptual experience
Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology
WILLIAMS, John Nicholas.(2016). Still a New Problem for Defeasibility: A Rejoinder to Borges. Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology, 7(1), 83-94.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/1991