Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

3-2016

Abstract

I gave a new objection to the defeasibility theory of knowledge, namely that prohibits you from knowing that you know that p if your knowledge that p is a posteriori. Rodrigo Borges claims that Peter Klein has already satisfactorily replied to a version of my objection. He attempts to defend this reply and argues that my objection fails because a principle on which it is based is false. I show that my objection is not a version of the old one that Klein attempts (unsatisfactorily) to address, that Borges’s defence of Klein’s reply fails and that his argument against my new objection leaves it untouched.

Keywords

defeasibility, second-order knowledge, a posteriori knowledge, perceptual experience

Discipline

Philosophy

Research Areas

Humanities

Publication

Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology

Volume

7

Issue

1

First Page

83

Last Page

94

ISSN

2069-0533

Publisher

Institutul European

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Included in

Philosophy Commons

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