Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

7-2015

Abstract

European Union (EU) sanctions are agreed in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), a framework where the unanimity rule prevails and where individual Member States have a formal veto. Thus, Member State compliance with sanctions can be expected to be optimal: If Member States have serious objections to the imposition of sanctions, they can veto their adoption in the Council.Yet, while implementation is comparatively satisfactory, Member States have availed of opportunities to undermine the application of EU sanctions regimes at various levels. On the basis of the theoretical framework provided by Saurugger and Terpan, the present article explores various ways in which Member States attempt to resist EU measures, categorizes them and explains Member States’ choice of resistance techniques.

Keywords

Sanctions

Discipline

Eastern European Studies | Political Science

Research Areas

Political Science

Publication

Europan Foreign Affairs Review

Volume

20

Issue

2/1

First Page

39

Last Page

61

ISSN

1384-6299

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/abstract.php?area=Journals&id=EERR2015024

Share

COinS