Title

Not Knowing that you Know: A New Objection to the Defeasibility Theory of Knowledge

Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

4-2015

Abstract

Foley (2012: 93–98) and Turri (2012: 215–19) have recently given objections to the defeasibility theory of propositional knowledge. Here, I give an objection of a quite different stripe by looking at what the theory must say about knowing that you know. I end with some remarks on how this objection relates to rival theories and how this might be a worry for some of these.

Discipline

Philosophy

Research Areas

Humanities

Publication

Analysis

Volume

75

Issue

2

First Page

213

Last Page

217

ISSN

0003-2638

Identifier

10.1093/analys/anv017

Publisher

Oxford University Press

Embargo Period

8-12-2015

Additional URL

http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anv017