Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

Postprint

Publication Date

3-2014

Abstract

Is there a Moore’s paradox in desire? I give a normative explanation of the epistemic irrationality, and hence absurdity, of Moorean belief that builds on Green and Williams’ normative account of absurdity. This explains why Moorean beliefs are normally irrational and thus absurd, while some Moorean beliefs are absurd without being irrational. Then I defend constructing a Moorean desire as the syntactic counterpart of a Moorean belief and distinguish it from a ‘Frankfurt’ conjunction of desires. Next I discuss putative examples of rational and irrational desires, suggesting that there are norms of rational desire. Then I examine David Wall’s groundbreaking argument that Moorean desires are always unreasonable. Next I show against this that there are rational as well as irrational Moorean desires. Those that are irrational are also absurd, although there seem to be absurd desires that are not irrational. I conclude that certain norms of rational desire should be rejected.

Keywords

Moore, paradox, Belief, Desire, Norms, Absurdity, Irrationality

Discipline

Philosophy

Research Areas

Humanities

Publication

Acta Analytica

Volume

29

Issue

1

First Page

1

Last Page

23

ISSN

0353-5150

Identifier

10.1007/s12136-013-0189-1

Publisher

Springer Verlag

Copyright Owner and License

Author

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-013-0189-1

Included in

Philosophy Commons

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