I argue that Moore's propositions, for example, 'I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don't believe that I did' cannot be rationally believed. Their assertors either cannot be rationally believed or cannot be believed to be rational. This analysis is extended to Moorean propositions such as God knows that I am an atheist and I believe that this proposition is false. I then defend the following definition of assertion: anyone asserts that p iff that person expresses a belief that p with the intention of causing relevant epistemic change in the cognition of an actual or potential audience.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Taylor and Francis
WILLIAMS, John N..(1996). Moorean Absurdities and the Nature of Assertion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74(1), 135-149.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/12
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