Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

3-1996

Abstract

I argue that Moore's propositions, for example, 'I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don't believe that I did' cannot be rationally believed. Their assertors either cannot be rationally believed or cannot be believed to be rational. This analysis is extended to Moorean propositions such as God knows that I am an atheist and I believe that this proposition is false. I then defend the following definition of assertion: anyone asserts that p iff that person expresses a belief that p with the intention of causing relevant epistemic change in the cognition of an actual or potential audience.

Discipline

Philosophy

Research Areas

Humanities

Publication

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Volume

74

Issue

1

First Page

135

Last Page

149

ISSN

0004-8402

Identifier

10.1080/00048409612347111

Publisher

Taylor and Francis

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.1080/00048409612347111

Included in

Philosophy Commons

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