Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

1-2016

Abstract

This article is the first empirical study investigating the corporate reorganisation of Chinese domestically-listed companies. Through examining these cases, it challenges the assertion made by most of these corporate reorganisation plans and by Chinese state-run media reports that creditors and general public shareholders were the major beneficiaries. Through an analysis of the data generated from all forth-three such cases, this articles reveals that: First, unsecured creditors could have, on average, received 61.37% more of their claims if the fundamental value distribution principle, the absolute priority norm, could have been complied with in these reorganisations; Second, if the general-public-shareholder-protection scheme issued by the China Supreme People's Court could be rigorously implemented, 85.37% of the shares relinquished by general public shareholders could have been avoided. These two groups were not the winners. Instead, this article argues that it was local governments and controlling shareholders who were the real winners.

Keywords

Bankruptcy reorganization, law, governance, performance, enforcement, China

Discipline

Asian Studies | Commercial Law

Research Areas

Corporate, Finance and Securities Law

Publication

Journal of Corporate Law Studies

Volume

16

Issue

1

First Page

101

Last Page

143

ISSN

1473-5970

Identifier

10.1080/14735970.2015.1090141

Publisher

Taylor & Francis (Routledge): SSH Titles - no Open Select

Copyright Owner and License

Author

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1080/14735970.2015.1090141

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