Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
1-1993
Abstract
John Carter's paper provides a good discussion of many fundamental problems associated with the satisfactory enforcement of contractual obligations. In reviewing the various subtopics of the conference, he posits a scale of 'security' for performance that runs from simple reliance on the promisor's word to that of the chattel or real property mortgage with maximum rights of self-help in the promisee. In this commentary on his paper, I will argue that the greatest security for any promisee remains the word of the promisor and that this is so for reasons beyond those of honour. First, the duty of good faith imposes on contracting parties an obligation, independent of their mutual covenants, to perform their undertakings. Second, this same duty of good faith often imposes limitations on the self-help remedies of a secured party, especially when it is coupled with the general dislike of forfeiture. Third, the duty of good faith is consistent with the usual expectations of contracting parties in a commercial setting who rely more often on the development of long term relationships of trust and predictable performance than on the security of proprietary interests.
Discipline
Commercial Law | Contracts
Publication
Journal of Contract Law
Volume
6
Issue
1
First Page
19
Last Page
26
ISSN
1030-7230
Publisher
Elsevier Science B.V., Amsterdam.
Citation
HUNTER, Howard.
The Duty of Good Faith and the Security of Performance. (1993). Journal of Contract Law. 6, (1), 19-26.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/2223
Copyright Owner and License
Author
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.