Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

6-2017

Abstract

Moral dialogue for moral subjectivists is gravely limited. As soon as moral subjectivists hold another person to any moral standard independent of the person’s belief, they must give up their moral subjectivism. Some moral subjectivists might turn out to be moral realists who accord primacy to autonomy. This, however, is a senseless position that renders all persons equally worthless, unless such moral realists concede that norms that limit autonomy exist. But if so, they are not different from any other moral realists after all.

Keywords

Moral subjectivism, moral realists

Discipline

Law | Law and Philosophy

Research Areas

Law, Society and Governance

Publication

Think

Volume

16

Issue

46

First Page

25

Last Page

36

ISSN

1477-1756

Embargo Period

7-31-2017

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

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