Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
6-2017
Abstract
Moral dialogue for moral subjectivists is gravely limited. As soon as moral subjectivists hold another person to any moral standard independent of the person’s belief, they must give up their moral subjectivism. Some moral subjectivists might turn out to be moral realists who accord primacy to autonomy. This, however, is a senseless position that renders all persons equally worthless, unless such moral realists concede that norms that limit autonomy exist. But if so, they are not different from any other moral realists after all.
Keywords
Moral subjectivism, moral realists
Discipline
Law | Law and Philosophy
Publication
Think
Volume
16
Issue
46
First Page
25
Last Page
36
ISSN
1477-1756
Embargo Period
7-31-2017
Citation
TAN, Seow Hon.
The problems with moral subjectivism. (2017). Think. 16, (46), 25-36.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/2140
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