Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

5-2014

Abstract

The article explores the features and charts the principle theorizing of regulatorysociability from collaboration rather than intervention, whateverthe interest-based motivation behind transforming crisis, toward orderliness.A key theme is the role played by corporations in facilitating and benefitingfrom sociability. A particular explanatory focus on the way in whichcorporate culture can change from predatory jurisdiction shopping to embracingmutuality of interests in the context of environmental sustainabilityis employed. The article concludes with a discussion of how, as compulsorydiscipline increases, it may produce compliance but at costs for regulatorysociability. The alternative regulatory paradigm is one that movesto resolve the antimony between desire (profit) and reason (sustainability)in a manner that relies on and endorses the constituents of collaboration.Collaborative regulation, the article suggests, can arise out of crisis and bejustified through desires for orderliness without compulsion. But for collaborativeregulation to be sustainable, it must complement certain positive“orderly” aspects within political economy. The analysis determines someobservations concerning the shape and shaping of collaborative regulationin an atmosphere of more pluralist knowledge-based (disciplinary) engagementinvolving trust, comity, and sustainability.

Keywords

sociability, collaborative regulation, sustainability, corporate governance

Discipline

Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics | Law and Society

Research Areas

Law, Society and Governance

Publication

Administration and Society

Volume

46

Issue

4

First Page

339

Last Page

370

ISSN

0095-3997

Identifier

10.1177/0095399712454115

Publisher

SAGE Publications (UK and US)

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.1177/0095399712454115

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