Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

6-2006

Abstract

Recent developments in European competition and electronic communications law have led to an increased focus on, and importance of, independent administrative authorities. The competences available to these authorities are often wide-ranging, at times encompassing elements of all three of Montesquieu’s powers. These competences typically embody a considerable degree of discretion to allow the balancing of the – opposing – interests of various groups of stakeholders, such as consumers, competitors and manufacturers. This raises the question how the independence of administrative authorities can be counterbalanced by a certain degree of accountability for their actions. The aim of the present article is to review how three Member States – the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France – have shaped the judicial accountability of the independent administrative authorities. On the basis of an analysis of some important cases the article attempts to assess whether there are commonalities between the ways the national courts in these Member States review the exercise of discretionary powers by independent administrative authorities. The article will also ascertain the influence of EC law and the European Convention on Human Rights, notably Articles 6 and 13 thereof, on the standard of review applied in the Member States.

Keywords

National independent authorities, competition law and economic regulation, standard of review, Tetra Laval

Discipline

Administrative Law | Law and Economics

Research Areas

Public Interest Law, Community and Social Justice

Publication

Utrecht Law Review

Volume

2

Issue

1

First Page

111

Last Page

135

ISSN

1871-515X

Identifier

10.18352/ulr.19

Publisher

Utrecht University School of Law

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.18352/ulr.19

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