Protection for Sale under Monopolistic Competition: An Empirical Investigation
This paper proposes a general empirical framework to estimate the protection-for-sale model, where the protection regime shifts according to a sector's market structure (perfectly or monop-olistically competitive). We base the protection structure on Grossman and Helpman (1994) for the subset of perfectly competitive sectors and on Chang (2005) for the subset of monop- olistically competitive sectors. The two protection regimes are simultaneously estimated with joint constraints. The results of the J-test consistently reject the homogeneous (perfect compe- tition) protection-for-sale model often adopted in previous literature and suggest a direction of improvement toward the proposed heterogeneous protection structure model.
Trade policy; Political economy; Protection for sale; Monopolistic competition; Intraindustry trade
European Economic Association Meeting 2005 Annual Congress
Chang, Pao Li.
Protection for Sale under Monopolistic Competition: An Empirical Investigation. (2005). European Economic Association Meeting 2005 Annual Congress. Research Collection School Of Economics.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/853
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