Title

Tops-Only Domains

Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

12-2009

Abstract

In this paper we consider the standard voting model with a finite set of alternatives A and n voters and address the following question: what are the characteristics of domains $${\mathcal D}$$ that induce the property that every strategy-proof social choice function $${f: {\mathcal D}^n \rightarrow A}$$ satisfying unanimity, has the tops-only property? We first impose a minimal richness condition which ensures that for every alternative a, there exists an admissible ordering where a is maximal. We identify conditions on $${\mathcal D}$$ that are sufficient for strategy-proofness and unanimity to imply tops onlyness in the general case of n voters and in the special case, n = 2. We provide an algorithm for constructing tops-only domains from connected graphs with elements of A as nodes. We provide several applications of our results. Finally, we relax the minimal richness assumption and partially extend our results.

Keywords

Voting-rules - Strategy-proofness - Restricted domains - Tops-only domains

Discipline

Econometrics

Research Areas

Economic Theory

Publication

Economic Theory

Volume

46

First Page

255

Last Page

282

ISSN

0938-2259

Identifier

10.1007/s00199-009-0509-2

Publisher

Springer Verlag

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0509-2

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