Title

An Analysis of Protectionist First-Price Auctions

Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

1993

Abstract

Analyzes the equilibrium bid strategies for the protectionist first-price auction. Bidding by a local and a foreign firm to supply a government project; Higher local surplus in a first-price sealed-bid auction compared with the second-price auction when rule-of-thumb discrimination is practiced; Relevance in government procurements.

Discipline

Economics

Research Areas

Applied Microeconomics

Publication

American Economist

Volume

37

Issue

1

First Page

21

Last Page

30

ISSN

0569-4345

Publisher

Omicron Chi Epsilon

Additional URL

http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=9306107018&site=ehost-live

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