Publication Type

Working Paper

Publication Date

10-2013

Abstract

Artemov, Kunimoto, and Serrano (2013a,b, henceforth, AKS) study amechanism design problem where arbitrary restrictions are placed on the setof first-order beliefs of agents. Calling these restrictions Δ, they adopt Δ-rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003)) and show that Δ-incentivecompatibility and Δ-measurability are necessary and sufficient conditions forrobust virtual implementation. By appropriately defining Δ in order to restrictattention to complete information environments, I exploit the implicationsof AKS and show that the permissive implementation result of Abreu andMatsushima (1992a) is robust to how the underlying type space is specified.However, AKS need to fix a complete information environment throughouttheir analysis and therefore does not enable us to ask if robust virtual implementationresults are “robust” to the relaxation of the complete informationenvironment. The main result of this paper shows that permissive robust virtualimplementation results can be extended to nearby incomplete informationenvironments.

Keywords

Complete information, first-order belief, incentive compatibility, measurability, robust virtual implementation, rationalizable strategies

Discipline

Economic Theory

Research Areas

Economic Theory

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Takashi_Kunimoto/publication/260603016_Robust_Virtual_Implementation_with_Almost_Complete_Information/links/0f317531d367b07447000000.pdf

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