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A social choice rule is said to be implementable if one can design a mechanism(or institution) in which the set of outcomes prescribed by a given solutionconcept coincides with that specified by the social choice rule. I adoptinterim equilibrium (i.e., Bayesian Nash equilibrium where each agent’s interimbeliefs do not necessarily admit a prior) as the solution concept andinvestigate the corresponding implementation problem in general incompleteinformation environments. I identify arguably the weakest set of conditionsunder which implementation in interim equilibrium is possible. By doingso, I also unify the literature of the so-called Bayesian implementation andNash implementation.


closure, convex range property, implementation, interim equilibrium, interim incentive compatibility, interim equilibrium monotonicity, intersection property, Nash implementation, no-worst-rule condition, social choice set


Economic Theory

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Economic Theory

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Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

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