Publication Type

Working Paper

Publication Date

11-2013

Abstract

This paper shows how property rights security improves over time as a result of increasing legal quality and political democratization in a political economy context, where political and legal institutions adapt to evolving factor composition of land and capital in the dynamic economic development process. There seems to exist a clear sequence of di⁄erent forms of protection in that it is unlikely to have a strong rule of law with an exploitative political regime, or to have a democratic political system when the distribution of potential coercive power is too skewed. The routine form of protection thus shifts from coercion to politics and then to law. The predictions of the model are consistent with general historical patterns in England.

Keywords

Property Rights, Coercion, Politics, Law, Democratization, Factor Composition, Monarchy, Democracy, Suffrage Extension.

Discipline

Political Economy | Property Law and Real Estate

Research Areas

Applied Microeconomics

First Page

1

Last Page

24

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

https://economics.smu.edu.sg/sites/default/files/economics/Events/APCC2013/Papers/7Dec/3_huang_fali.pdf

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