Title

A Method for Evaluating the Behavior of Power Indices in Weighted Plurality Games

Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

2002

Abstract

In this paper, a systematic method to facilitate the comparison of a priori measures of power in an n-player r-candidate (n, r) weighted plurality game is proposed. This method, which exploits the notion of a structure of embedded winning coalitions (SEWC), enables the listing of all power profiles relevant to an (n, r) game under a given index and permits the computation of the probability of occurrence of each of these profiles. The vulnerability of an index to different paradoxes of power can also be systematically studied. For the purpose of illustration, we apply this method to the analysis of four well-known 2-candidate power indices namely the Shapley-Shubik index, the Banzhaf index, the Johnston index and the Deegan-Packel index. In each case, the set of power profiles and the likelihood of occurrence of each of these profiles are enumerated. The superadditivity property of these indices is also studied.

Discipline

Econometrics

Research Areas

Econometrics

Publication

Social Choice and Welfare

Volume

19

Issue

3

First Page

665

ISSN

0176-1714

Publisher

Springer Verlag

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