Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

Preprint

Publication Date

1-2018

Abstract

While legislatures typically use majority rule to allocate a budget in distributive legislation, near-unanimous consent over the broad allocation of benefits is pervasive. I develop a game-theoretic model where players strategically interact in a universal coalition to determine allocations, with non-cooperative bargaining as a threat point for the breakdown of cooperation. To quantify the effects of political power and actual needs on the agreed-upon allocation, I structurally estimate the model using the "Bridge Bill Capital Budget" in 1992. I find that 9.58% of the budget would be allocated differently if allocations were determined only based on actual needs.

Keywords

Universalism, Distributive legislation, Legislative bargaining

Discipline

Political Economy

Research Areas

Applied Microeconomics

Publication

International Economic Review

First Page

1

Last Page

46

ISSN

0020-6598

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

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