Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

5-2008

Abstract

Maskin and Tirole [Maskin, E., Tirole, J., 1999. Unforeseen contingencies and incomplete contracts. Review of Economic Studies, 66, 83–114] show that indescribability does not matter for contractual incompleteness when there is symmetric information both at the contracting stage and at the trading stage. Following their setup, I show that with asymmetric information at both stages, indescribability can matter.

Keywords

Asymmetric information, Incentive compatibility, Incomplete contracts, Indescribability, Individual rationality

Discipline

Behavioral Economics | Economic Theory

Research Areas

Economic Theory

Publication

Economics Letters

Volume

99

Issue

2

First Page

367

Last Page

370

ISSN

0165-1765

Identifier

10.1016/j.econlet.2007.08.007

Publisher

Elsevier

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.08.007

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