Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

11-2011

Abstract

We uncover a new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies by mechanisms that satisfy the “best element property” where for each agent, there exists a strategy profile that gives him the highest payoff in the mechanism. This class includes finite and regular mechanisms. We conclude that either the quasilinearity-like assumptions of available sufficiency results cannot be completely dispensed with or some mechanisms that do not satisfy the best element property must be employed. We term the condition “restricted deception-proofness.” It requires that, in environments with identical preferences, the social choice function be immune to all deceptions, making it then stronger than incentive compatibility. In some environments the conditions for (exact or approximate) implementation by mechanisms satisfying the best element property are more restrictive than previously thought.

Keywords

Mechanism design, Exact and approximate implementation, Iteratively undominated strategies, Restricted deception-proofness, Incentive compatibility, Measurability

Discipline

Economic Theory

Research Areas

Economic Theory

Publication

Journal of Economic Theory

Volume

146

Issue

6

First Page

2583

Last Page

2593

ISSN

0022-0531

Identifier

10.1016/j.jet.2011.02.005

Publisher

Elsevier

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.02.005

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