Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

3-2013

Abstract

We study a mechanism design problem where arbitrary restrictions are placed on the sets of first-order beliefs of agents. Calling these restrictions Δ, we use Δ-rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2003, [5]) as our solution concept, and require that a mechanism virtually implement a socially desirable outcome. We obtain two necessary conditions, Δ-incentive compatibility and Δ-measurability and show that the latter is satisfied as long as a particular zero-measure set of first-order beliefs is ruled out. In environments allowing small transfers of utility among agents, these two conditions are also sufficient.

Keywords

Wilson doctrine, Mechanism, design, Robust virtual implementation, Δ-rationalizability, Incentive compatibility, Measurability, Type diversity

Discipline

Economic Theory

Research Areas

Economic Theory

Publication

Journal of Economic Theory

Volume

148

Issue

2

First Page

424

Last Page

447

ISSN

0022-0531

Identifier

10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.015

Publisher

Elsevier

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.015

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