We study a mechanism design problem where arbitrary restrictions are placed on the sets of first-order beliefs of agents. Calling these restrictions Δ, we use Δ-rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2003, ) as our solution concept, and require that a mechanism virtually implement a socially desirable outcome. We obtain two necessary conditions, Δ-incentive compatibility and Δ-measurability and show that the latter is satisfied as long as a particular zero-measure set of first-order beliefs is ruled out. In environments allowing small transfers of utility among agents, these two conditions are also sufficient.
Wilson doctrine, Mechanism, design, Robust virtual implementation, Δ-rationalizability, Incentive compatibility, Measurability, Type diversity
Journal of Economic Theory
ARTEMOV, Georgy; KUNIMOTO, Takashi; and SERRANO, Roberto.
Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine. (2013). Journal of Economic Theory. 148, (2), 424-447. Research Collection School Of Economics.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2002
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