Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

3-2004

Abstract

We show the robustness of the Walrasian result obtained in models of bargaining in pairwise meetings. Restricting trade to take place only in pairs, most of the assumptions made in the literature are dispensed with. These include assumptions on preferences (differentiability, monotonicity, strict concavity, bounded curvature), on the set of agents (dispersed characteristics) or on the consumption set (allowing only divisible goods).

Keywords

Bargaining, Competition, Exchange, Decentralization

Discipline

Economic Theory

Research Areas

Applied Microeconomics

Publication

Journal of Economic Theory

Volume

115

Issue

1

First Page

78

Last Page

88

ISSN

0022-0531

Identifier

10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00131-5

Publisher

Elsevier

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00131-5

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