We show the robustness of the Walrasian result obtained in models of bargaining in pairwise meetings. Restricting trade to take place only in pairs, most of the assumptions made in the literature are dispensed with. These include assumptions on preferences (differentiability, monotonicity, strict concavity, bounded curvature), on the set of agents (dispersed characteristics) or on the consumption set (allowing only divisible goods).
Bargaining, Competition, Exchange, Decentralization
Journal of Economic Theory
KUNIMOTO, Takashi and SERRANO, Roberto.
Bargaining and competition revisited. (2004). Journal of Economic Theory. 115, (1), 78-88. Research Collection School Of Economics.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2000
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