While parental matchmaking has been widespread throughout history and across countries, we know little about the relationship between parental matchmaking and marriage outcomes. Does parental involvement in matchmaking help ensure their needs are better taken care of by married children? This paper finds supportive evidence using a survey of Chinese couples. In particular, parental involvement in matchmaking is associated with having a more submissive wife, a greater number of children, a higher likelihood of having any male children, and a stronger belief of the husband in providing old age support to his parents. These benefits, however, are achieved at the cost of less marital harmony within the couple and lower market income of the wife. The results render support to and extend the findings of (Becker et al., 2015) where parents meddle with children's preferences to ensure their commitment to providing parental goods such as old age support.
Agency cost, China, Endogenous institutions, Marriage, Matchmaking, Old age support, Parental goods, Parental matchmaking, Preference manipulation
Behavioral Economics | Economics | Family, Life Course, and Society
Journal of Comparative Economics
HUANG, Fali and XU, Lixin Colin.
Love, money, and parental goods: Does parental matchmaking matter?. (2016). Journal of Comparative Economics. Research Collection School Of Economics.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1918
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.