Title

Random dictatorship domains

Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

7-2014

Abstract

A domain of preference orderings is a random dictatorship domain if every strategy-proof random social choice function satisfying unanimity defined on the domain is a random dictatorship. Gibbard (1977) showed that the universal domain is a random dictatorship domain. We ask whether an arbitrary dictatorial domain is a random dictatorship domain and show that the answer is negative by constructing dictatorial domains that admit anonymous, unanimous, strategy-proof random social choice functions which are not random dictatorships. Our result applies to the constrained voting model. Lastly, we show that substantial strengthenings of linked domains (a class of dictatorial domains introduced in Aswal et al., 2003) are needed to restore random dictatorship and such strengthenings are "almost necessary".

Keywords

Strategy-proofness, Random social choice functions, Random dictatorship

Discipline

Economic Theory

Research Areas

Economic Theory

Publication

Games and Economic Behavior

Volume

86

First Page

212

Last Page

236

ISSN

0899-8256

Identifier

10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.017

Publisher

Elsevier

Additional URL

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.017

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