Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

7-2006

Abstract

We characterize dominant-strategy incentive compatibility with multidimensional types. A deterministic social choice function is dominant-strategy incentive compatible if and only if it is weakly monotone (W-Mon). The W-Mon requirement is the following: If changing one agent's type (while keeping the types of other agents fixed) changes the outcome under the social choice function, then the resulting difference in utilities of the new and original outcomes evaluated at the new type of this agent must be no less than this difference in utilities evaluated at the original type of this agent.

Keywords

dominant-strategy implementation, multi-object auctions

Discipline

Economic Theory

Research Areas

Economic Theory

Publication

Econometrica

Volume

74

Issue

4

First Page

1109

Last Page

1132

ISSN

0012-9682

Identifier

10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00695.x

Publisher

Econometric Society: Econometrica

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00695.x

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