Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

6-2006

Abstract

We show that a perfect correlated equilibrium distribution of an N-person game, as defined by Dhillon and Mertens (1996) can be achieved using a finite number of copies of the strategy space as the message space.

Keywords

correlated equilibrium, perfection, hierarchy of beliefs

Discipline

Economic Theory

Research Areas

Economic Theory

Publication

Economic Theory

Volume

28

Issue

2

First Page

475

Last Page

479

ISSN

0938-2259

Identifier

10.1007/s00199-005-0630-9

Publisher

Springer Verlag (Germany)

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0630-9

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