In this paper, we introduce the notion of a linked domain and prove that a non-manipulable social choice function defined on such a domain must be dictatorial. This result not only generalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem but also demonstrates that the equivalence between dictatorship and non-manipulability is far more robust than suggested by that theorem. We provide an application of this result in a particular model of voting. We also provide a necessary condition for a domain to be dictatorial and use it to characterize dictatorial domains in the cases where the number of alternatives is three.
social choice functions, strategyproof, dictatorship, Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, restricted domains
Springer Verlag (Germany)
ASWAL, Navin; CHATTERJI, Shurojit; and SEN, Arunava.
Dictatorial domains. (2003). Economic Theory. 22, (1), 45-62. Research Collection School Of Economics.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1883