Title

The Myerson value for complete coalition structures

Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

12-2011

Abstract

In order to describe partial cooperation structures, this paper introduces complete coalition structures as sets of feasible coalitions. A complete coalition structure has a property that, for any coalition, if each pair of players in the coalition belongs to some feasible coalition contained in the coalition then the coalition itself is also feasible. The union stable structures, which constitute the domain of the Myerson value, are a special class of the complete coalition structures. As an allocation rule on complete coalition structures, this paper proposes an extension of the Myerson value for complete coalition structures and provides an axiomatization.

Keywords

Union stable structure, Complete coalition structure, The Myerson value, Potential

Discipline

Economic Theory

Research Areas

Economic Theory

Publication

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research

Volume

74

Issue

3

First Page

427

Last Page

443

ISSN

1432-2994

Identifier

10.1007/s00186-011-0371-4

Publisher

Springer Verlag (Germany)

Additional URL

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00186-011-0371-4

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