This paper proves the following result: every path-connected domain of preferences that admits a strategy-proof, unanimous, tops-only random social choice function satisfying a compromise property is single-peaked. Conversely, every single-peaked domain admits a random social choice function satisfying these properties. Single-peakedness is defined with respect to arbitrary trees. The paper provides a justification of the salience of single-peaked preferences and evidence in favor of the Gul conjecture (Barber\303\240 2010).
Random social choice functions, strategy-proofness, compromise, single-peaked preferences
Econometrics | Economics
CHATTERJI, Shurojit; SEN, Arunava; and ZENG, Huaxia.
A Characterization of Single-Peaked Preferences via Random Social Choice Functions. (2016). Theoretical Economics. 11, (2), 711-733. Research Collection School Of Economics.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1844
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