Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

5-2016

Abstract

This paper proves the following result: every path-connected domain of preferences that admits a strategy-proof, unanimous, tops-only random social choice function satisfying a compromise property is single-peaked. Conversely, every single-peaked domain admits a random social choice function satisfying these properties. Single-peakedness is defined with respect to arbitrary trees. The paper provides a justification of the salience of single-peaked preferences and evidence in favor of the Gul conjecture (Barber\303\240 2010).

Keywords

Random social choice functions, strategy-proofness, compromise, single-peaked preferences

Discipline

Econometrics | Economics

Research Areas

Econometrics

Publication

Theoretical Economics

Volume

11

Issue

2

First Page

711

Last Page

733

ISSN

1933-6837

Identifier

10.3982/TE1972

Publisher

Wiley

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.3982/TE1972

Included in

Econometrics Commons

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