Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

6-2009

Abstract

In this article, we argue that weak property rights over transnational pollution and the limited threat of retaliatory punishments blunts the effectiveness of a broad-based multilateral agreement to deliver the emission reductions required to mitigate climate change. Instead, we propose a policy framework that builds on unilateral commitments, endogenous innovation and technology transfer that could lead to cumulative emissions reduction by altering the participation constraints of nations over time.

Keywords

Climate, Cumulative, Emissions, Global, Negotiations, Reduction, Technology, Unilateralism

Discipline

Economic Theory | Public Economics

Research Areas

Economic Theory

Publication

CESifo Economic Studies

Volume

55

Issue

2

First Page

286

Last Page

305

ISSN

1610-241X

Identifier

10.1093/cesifo/ifp009

Additional URL

http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cesifo/ifp009

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