In this article, we argue that weak property rights over transnational pollution and the limited threat of retaliatory punishments blunts the effectiveness of a broad-based multilateral agreement to deliver the emission reductions required to mitigate climate change. Instead, we propose a policy framework that builds on unilateral commitments, endogenous innovation and technology transfer that could lead to cumulative emissions reduction by altering the participation constraints of nations over time.
Climate, Cumulative, Emissions, Global, Negotiations, Reduction, Technology, Unilateralism
Economic Theory | Public Economics
CESifo Economic Studies
CHATTERJI, Shurojit and Ghosal, Sayantan.
Technology, Unilateral Commitments and Cumulative Emissions Reduction. (2009). CESifo Economic Studies. 55, (2), 286-305. Research Collection School Of Economics.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1792