Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

5-2013

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate domains that admit “well-behaved” strategy-proof social choice functions. We show that if the number of voters is even, then every domain that satisfies a richness condition and admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function, must be semi-single-peaked. Conversely every semi-single-peaked domain admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function. Semi-single-peaked domains are generalizations of single-peaked domains on a tree introduced by Demange (1982).

Keywords

Strategy-proofness, Restricted domains, Semi-single-peaked domains

Discipline

Economic Theory

Research Areas

Economic Theory

Publication

Journal of Economic Theory

Volume

148

Issue

3

First Page

1050

Last Page

1073

ISSN

0022-0531

Identifier

10.1016/j.jet.2012.10.005

Publisher

Elsevier

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Additional URL

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.10.005

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