In this paper, we investigate domains that admit “well-behaved” strategy-proof social choice functions. We show that if the number of voters is even, then every domain that satisfies a richness condition and admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function, must be semi-single-peaked. Conversely every semi-single-peaked domain admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function. Semi-single-peaked domains are generalizations of single-peaked domains on a tree introduced by Demange (1982).
Strategy-proofness, Restricted domains, Semi-single-peaked domains
Journal of Economic Theory
CHATTERJI, Shurojit; SANVER, Rezmi; and SEN, Arunava.
On Domains that Admit Well-Behaved Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions. (2013). Journal of Economic Theory. 148, (3), 1050-1073. Research Collection School Of Economics.
Available at: http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1790
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